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Communication and the Limits of Papal Authority in the Medieval West, 1050-1250 
 
Jeffrey M. Wayno 
 
This study uses the analysis of communication practices and strategies to argue for a new 
understanding of papal power in the years 1050 to 1250. Historians frequently argue that the high 
medieval papacy increased the scope and effectiveness of its authority through the creation, 
maintenance, and use of centralized governmental institutions. According to this view, legates, 
councils, delegated justice, legal codification, and a remarkable production of letters all allowed 
the bishops of Rome to reach into the far corners of Christendom to shape in profound ways the 
spiritual, political, and economic trajectories of medieval Europeans. But how effective were 
those institutions? To what degree was the papacy able to implement policy at the local, national, 
and international levels? The following study attempts to answer this question by considering the 
specific communicative mechanisms and strategies that the papacy employed in a variety of 
policy realms. Four case studies analyze the papacy’s efforts to: 1) resolve the York-Canterbury 
primacy dispute at the turn of the twelfth century; 2) mobilize political support during the papal 
schism of 1159; 3) reform the Church in the wake of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215; and 4) 
convene the Council of Rome to fight Emperor Frederick II in 1240. Each case reveals 
innovations in papal communication practices while simultaneously highlighting key limitations 
in the papacy’s ability to implement its will. The papacy, once a model of institutional 
centralization for medieval historians, suddenly appears much less centralized—and, in many 
cases, much less effective—of an institution than many scholars had led us to believe. This 
conclusion forces us to rethink what we know about one of the single most important institutions 
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CHALLENGING A WELL-WORN NARRATIVE: 
Papacy, Power, and Communication 
 
“But it is one thing to write as a poet and another to write as a historian: the poet can recount or 
sing about things not as they were, but as they should have been, and the historian must write 
about them not as they should have been, but as they were, without adding or subtracting 
anything from the truth.”1 
 
      -Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote 
 
A Well-Worn Narrative: 
 Every year, in classrooms around the world, teachers of European history conjure for 
their students an image of two titans of the past locked in battle. The date is September 7, 1303; 
the scene, the papal residence in the small Italian town of Anagni. Pope Boniface VIII, the aged 
and intractable leader of the Western Church, rests quietly in his chambers when, quite suddenly, 
a “great force of armed men of the party of the King of France…[break] through the doors and 
windows of the papal palace at a number of points...till at last the angered soldiery [force] their 
way to the pope.”2 What followed has become known to posterity as the “Outrage of Anagni.”3 
The French forces of Philip IV “the Fair,” led by the king’s shifty and politically brilliant agent, 
Guillaume Nogaret, assaulted and ridiculed the pope in a humbling display of secular power. 
Boniface’s supporters fought back and rescued the humiliated pontiff shortly thereafter, whisking 
                                                
1 Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote, trans. Edith Grossman (New York: Ecco, 2005), p. 476. 
 
2 Henry G.J. Beck, “William Hundleby’s Account of the Anagni Outrage,” The Catholic Historical Review 32 
(1946), pp. 192, 195: “venit ad Anagniam subito et inopinate magnus exercitus hominum armatorum ex parte regis 
Francie…et cum papa non posset ultra se defendere, per Thayram et suos ruptis et ostiis et fenestris palacii papae 
per plura loca, ac igne imposito ex alia parte, finaliter exercitus, quasi mente furibunda per vim ad papam est 
ingressus.” 
 
3 For a succinct overview of the broader political events leading up to the attack on Boniface, see William Chester 
Jordan, Unceasing Strife, Unending Fear: Jacques de Thérines and the Freedom of the Church in the Age of the 
Last Capetians (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 3-7. 
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him away to safer territory. But weeks later, Boniface was dead, the victim of old age and, we 
are told, the stress of the attack. 
 The image of a pope laid low by partisans of the French monarchy is often jarring for 
students. Just eight months before his sudden demise, Boniface VIII had appeared at the height 
of his power. In the midst of a protracted dispute with Philip IV over the king’s desire to tax the 
French clergy, the pope had issued the bull Unam sanctam, perhaps the most strident claim to 
papal power in the two thousand years of the institution’s history. Spiritual authority, Boniface 
argued, forever trumped the power of secular rulers. “We declare, state, define, and pronounce,” 
he concluded in language that thundered loudly—and controversially—throughout Europe, “that 
it is altogether necessary for salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman 
pontiff.”4 In making such claims, Boniface took his place in a long line of popes, theologians, 
and canon lawyers, who argued for the expansion of papal authority over the institutional Church 
and Christian society at large. But where past expressions of expanded papal power had met with 
some success, Boniface’s fell flat. In the wake of the pope’s death, strong, independent papal 
leadership seemed to crumble. In 1305, following the eight-month pontificate of Boniface’s 
successor, Benedict XI, and an interregnum of almost a year, the College of Cardinals raised a 
Frenchman, Raymond Bertrand de Got, to the Chair of St. Peter as Pope Clement V. By 1309, 
Clement had moved the papal court to Avignon, initiating the “Babylonian Captivity,” a seventy-
year period of remarkable French influence in papal affairs. Within just a few short years, the 
papacy, it seemed, had almost ceased to exist as an independent political and religious 
institution. Unam sanctam, denounced by Clement in 1306, did not achieve legitimacy as part of 
                                                
4 Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 2, ed. Emil Friedberg (Graz: Akademische Druck- U. Verlagsanstalt, 1959), col. 1246: 
“Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omni humanae creaturae declaramus, dicimus, diffinimus et pronunciamus omnino 
esse de cessitate salutis.” 
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canon law until the early sixteenth century, and Boniface himself became the subject of 
everlasting scorn and derision when Dante placed him in hell.5 “Is that you already,” cries the 
tormented simoniac Pope Nicholas III in Dante’s Inferno, “are you here already, Boniface?” 
Philip IV would surely have smiled at those lines. 
 The clash between Boniface VIII and Philip IV of France, a well-known incident in the 
history of the European Middle Ages, is not the subject of this dissertation. But in many ways it 
is the logical end point of a historical process that is embedded in every one of the pages that 
follow. At the turn of the fourteenth century, the “Outrage of Anagni” revealed poignantly a 
growing chasm between the efficacy of secular and ecclesiastical political power in Europe. In 
the preceding centuries, the institutional Church, secular rulers of many kinds, cities, towns, and 
even trade confederations such as the German Hanse all experimented with new ways of 
collecting revenue, administering justice, mobilizing manpower, regulating commerce, and 
reforming a wide array of social, political, economic, and religious practices and behavior. And 
by the thirteenth century, it was becoming clear that some were more successful in this endeavor 
than others. In a classic article from 1940, Joseph Strayer elegantly argued that secular rulers 
gradually gained the upper hand over their ecclesiastical counterparts by developing more 
effective administrative tools.6 “Efficient lay governments,” he wrote, “were dangerous to the 
church because they could become efficient only by obtaining a practical monopoly of political 
power in the districts which they controlled.” When this occurred, “the mere exercise of this 
power, even without a deliberate plan, would tend to transfer primary allegiance from the church 
                                                
5 Bernard Schimmelpfennig, The Papacy, trans. James Sievert (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 
196-197; Dante Alighieri, Inferno, trans. Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 
Canto XIX: 52-53, p. 347. 
 
6 Joseph R. Strayer, “The Laicization of French and English Society,” Speculum 15 (1940), pp. 76-86. 
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to the state.”7 It was this process of “laicization”, Strayer noted, that Boniface VIII encountered 
so powerfully—and problematically—in his protracted conflict with Philip IV.8 
 Strayer’s basic argument about the gradual transfer of popular loyalty from the Church to 
secular rulers has had remarkable staying power in histories of the Middle Ages, in part due to 
the continued significance of his seminal essay, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, 
which reiterates much of the same argument.9 And yet, for historians of the medieval Church, 
something about this argument seems amiss. Was the Church—headed by the papacy—not 
equally successful in developing new and ever more complex administrative tools to achieve its 
own ends? For much of the last century and a half, in fact, the Church has been seen consistently 
as one of the great success stories of administrative experimentation, growth, and centralization. 
It is a story of political and spiritual ambitions that forced the institution to think of new and 
creative ways to implement its will. 
 Beginning with the accession of the reformer Leo IX (1049-54), the story goes, a newly 
reinvigorated papacy began to make increasingly broad—even strident—claims to power over 
the institutional Church and European society. These claims manifested themselves most 
                                                
7 Ibid., p. 78. 
 
8 Ibid., p. 85. 
 
9 Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
Strayer was not alone in arguing that effective administration drastically increased the real political power of secular 
monarchies in the High Middle Ages. For similar—and in many cases, more fully developed—arguments in the 
same vein see, for example, John W. Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal 
Power in the Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Thomas N. Bisson, The Crisis of the 
Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2009); Judith Green, The Government of England Under Henry I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986); William Chester Jordan, Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade: A Study in Rulership (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979); Adam J. Kosto, Making Agreements in Medieval Catalonia: Power, Order and 
the Written Word 1000-1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Hiroshi Takayama, The 
Administration of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily (Leiden: Brill, 1993); W. L. Warren, The Governance of Norman 
and Angevin England, 1086-1272 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). 
 
 5 
potently in twenty-seven dictates—the Dictatus Papae—that Gregory VII (1073-85) famously 
laid out (albeit with no explanation as to their purpose) in the official register of his 
correspondence. Gregory, whose fiery temperament was apparent in nearly every action he took 
as leader of the Western Church, was not a man to mince words.10 By virtue of his position as the 
successor of St. Peter, he claimed, among other things, the authority to depose not just bishops, 
but even emperors; use the imperial insignia; hold a monopoly on general councils; absolve 
subjects from fealty to the wicked; and have Europe’s princes literally kiss his feet.11 For 
decades, historians have debated whether Gregory crafted the Dictatus Papae as a “blueprint for 
papal absolutism,” or, as one noted scholar has suggested, as a means of defining “the emergency 
powers inherent in the Roman see to enable it to take action for the reform of the church.”12 But 
the longue durée of papal history shows that the core ideas underpinning Gregory’s statements 
gradually infused theoretical expositions of papal power.13 A little more than a century after 
Gregory VII articulated a new conception of papal authority, Innocent III (1198-1216) stretched 
the theoretical boundaries of that authority in new and profoundly important ways.14 A century 
                                                
10 The most thorough exploration of Gregory VII’s pontificate remains H.E.J. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998). 
 
11 Das Register Gregors VII, ed. Erich Caspar, vol. 2, MGH ES, vol. 2 (Munich: Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 
1978), pp. 201-208; The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 1073-1085: An English Translation, trans. H.E.J. Cowdrey 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 149-150. 
 
12 Colin Morris, The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church 1050-1250 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 112. 
 
13 Robert L. Benson, “Plenitudo potestatis: Evolution of a Formula from Gregory IV to Gratian,” Studia Gratiana 
14 (1967), pp. 195-217; Brian Tierney, The Origins of Papal Infallibility, 1150-1350: A Study on the Concepts of 
Infallibility, Sovereignty and Tradition in the Middle Ages (Leiden: Brill, 1972); Walter Ullmann. The Growth of 
Papal Government in the Middle Ages: A Study in the Ideological Relation of Clerical to Lay Power, 3rd ed. 
(London: Methuen, 1970); John A. Watt, The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the Thirteenth Century: The 
Contributions of the Canonists (New York: Fordham University Press, 1965). 
14 The literature on Innocent III is enormous, but an excellent exposition of the pope’s theory of papal monarchy can 
be found in Kenneth Pennington, Pope and Bishops: The Papal Monarchy in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries  
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), pp. 13-42. 
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after that, Boniface VIII (1294-1303) pushed those boundaries to their absolute extremes by 
expounding a vision of papal theocracy more radical than anything the West had ever seen.15 
 Theoretical power, however, is one thing; actual power is another. The papacy could not 
simply rely on stronger rhetoric to achieve its aims; it required an administrative machinery to 
set its policies in motion, a fact the earliest reform popes (from Leo IX onward) recognized with 
remarkable clarity. This is the second part of the story of growing papal power. Beginning in the 
second half of the eleventh century, the argument continues, papal institutions began to grow in 
number, scope, and complexity. Legates—delegated agents of the pope—began to crisscross the 
European continent, bringing the pope’s words and will to the many corners of Christendom; 
councils held under papal authority promulgated important laws and reform measures; the papal 
chancery—which produced first dozens, then hundreds, then thousands of letters each year—
expanded rapidly; and papal justice gradually came to local communities far removed from 
Rome through a remarkable system of delegated arbitration. Scholars of the papacy, of the 
Church, and of medieval Europe do not dispute these developments, and there is little reason that 
they should. The papacy is perhaps the most thoroughly documented of all medieval institutions, 
and the remarkable amount of documentary and narrative evidence shows all too clearly that 
papal institutions expanded greatly over the period 1050 to 1250. But were they effective? Did 
the growing papal administrative system have the ability to make real the will of its masters?16 
                                                
 
15 See above, p. 2. 
 
16 In using the phrase “administrative system” I do not mean to imply a rational bureaucracy whose component parts 
necessarily worked together in the modern sense. On the contrary, the phrase is meant to encapsulate a number of 
administrative “tools”—the letters, delegated agents, councils, law, among others—that the papacy used in an effort 




Many scholars of the Middle Ages have provided a largely unequivocal answer to the 
aforementioned questions: yes. Yes, expanding papal administrative institutions gave the bishops 
of Rome the power to reach into the far corners of Christendom with ever more frequency and 
potency. And at the heart of this development was the crucial process of institutional 
centralization. Variations of this argument appear everywhere in synthetic treatments of the 
period, many authored by some of the more distinguished scholars of the last half century.17 But 
a recent history of medieval Christianity perhaps sums up the general argument best of all, and it 
is worth quoting in its entirety: 
Papal power was also augmented by the appointment of legates (who had usually 
attained the status of cardinal). These were men understood to possess the power 
of the papacy and to pact on the pope’s behalf. They spread all over Christendom, 
bringing Rome’s authority and prestige to all the major cities and towns of Europe 
and some small ones too. They presided over small local councils, heard legal 
cases, received monies for the pope, and mediated conflicts—sometimes national 
and international conflicts. When they felt unable to decide a case, or when a 
conflict seemed impossible to resolve, the legate would send the case back to 
Rome—yet again enhancing papal authority and prestige. Through decretals and 
legates, the pope very much ceased to be a distant, venerable figure not active 
locally in each diocese. In fact, the tentacles of papal power now seemed to reach 
into every diocese of Christendom, even the most remote. To be sure, not 
everyone in the dioceses, least of all their heads, was entirely euphoric about this 
development. The losers in this development were of course the bishops and 
archbishops, who slowly and grimly observed their customary prerogatives and 
powers eaten away by the encroaching, all-powerful center. At the ecclesio-
cultural level, this is a momentous development. The traditional localism of the 
                                                
17 Robert Bartlett, The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950-1350 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 243, 250; Norman Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages: A Completely 
Revised and Expanded Edition of Medieval History, the Life and Death of a Civilization (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 1994), pp. 418-420; Johannes Fried, Das Mittelalter: Geschichte und Kultur (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008), 
p. 166; C. Warren Hollister, Medieval Europe: A Short History, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), pp. 228-
229, 231, 236; Maurice Keen, A History of Medieval Europe (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 91; 
Jacques Le Goff, Medieval Civilization 400-1500, trans. Julia Barrow (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 101; 
John H. Mundy, Europe in the High Middle Ages 1150-1300, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 2000), pp. 212-217; 
Barbara Rosenwein, A Short History of the Middle Ages, 4th ed. (North York: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 
pp. 169-170; Richard W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages (New York: Penguin Books, 




Middle Ages was giving way—and rapidly—to an inexorable tide of 
centralization.18 
 
Not all scholars are willing to offer so strong an argument about the efficacy of papal 
power in this period. Some have tempered their comments by noting the limitations of pre-
modern technology, and the thorny problem of increasingly powerful secular monarchs, whose 
interests often clashed with those of the bishops of Rome. Even though “the papacy developed a 
range of mechanisms by which it could extend its jurisdiction into the localities especially from 
the eleventh century onwards,” Kathleen Cushing admits in a recent essay on the limits of papal 
authority, “the papacy would often find it difficult to control its representatives in the world 
beyond Rome.”19 C. Warren Hollister echoes this view. “Even at its height,” Hollister observed, 
“papal authority remained limited in many ways—by the growing power of the Western 
monarchies, by the fragility of royal promises of good behavior, and by the longstanding 
difficulties in enforcing papal reform measures throughout the length and breadth of 
Christendom.”20 Efficiency increased, but problems remained. Secular rulers were developing 
administrative tools just as quickly as the papacy, allowing them to exert greater control over the 
regions under their jurisdiction. “Nevertheless,” Hollister argues only pages later, “looking at the 
high medieval Church from the broadest possible perspective we see a religious institution with a 
cohesion, independence, and political leverage unmatched in all history.”21 Even Richard 
                                                
18 Kevin Madigan, Medieval Christianity: A New History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 293-294. 
Italics are mine. 
 
19 Kathleen G. Cushing, “Papal Authority and Its Limitations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Christianity, 
ed. John H. Arnold (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 517. 
 
20 Hollister, Medieval Europe, p. 231. 
 




Southern, one of the most astute chroniclers of medieval society, came to the following 
conclusion about the High Middle Ages: 
This was the golden age of government, and especially of papal government, 
before the system had been choked with the vexations of politics and 
complications of over-elaboration. Much that was done had no practical effect. 
Much that was effected would in any case have happened. Yet, when every 
allowance has been made, we may still say that the papal machinery of 
government was as effective as any government could be before the late 
nineteenth century. The papal curia of the thirteenth century was, by any 
standards that were applicable before the days of modern mechanical aids and 
salaried officials, a large and efficient organization.22 
 
The basic narrative articulated here and in many other histories of both the medieval papacy and 
the High Middle Ages has remained surprisingly consistent over the last century.23 But is it 
accurate? Did the popes really possess as much concrete power as many have claimed? 
The Task Ahead: 
 The chapters that follow offer a critical reevaluation of this dominant narrative of papal 
history by analyzing how—and to what extent—the bishops of Rome were able to realize their 
authority over the years 1050 to 1250, the period generally considered to be the apogee of the 
papacy’s power and prestige. Four case studies allow us to see papal policy-making and 
implementation in action at different chronological points and in different areas of Europe. 
Chapter Two examines papal efforts to arbitrate the primacy dispute between the archdioceses of 
Canterbury and York in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. Chapter Three delves into 
the efforts of Alexander III (1159-81) to unite the Church under his leadership after the 
damaging—and protracted—papal schism that began in 1159. Chapter Four considers how the 
papacy sought to implement the reform decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 during the 
                                                
22 Southern, Western Society and the Church, p. 121. Italics are mine. 
 




pontificate of Honorius III (1216-27). And, finally, Chapter Five analyzes how Gregory IX 
(1227-41) sought to undermine Frederick II during the papacy’s dangerous conflict with the 
empire in the second quarter of the thirteenth century. 
Each of these cases, the broad brushstrokes of which will be familiar to many students of 
the Middle Ages, provides a unique opportunity to study how the papacy sought to translate its 
will into concrete action. But in dissecting these four different examples of papal policy-making 
and implementation, it is important to note upfront what this study is and—crucially—what it is 
not. The growth and development of a sophisticated ideology of “papal monarchy” naturally 
underpinned every pope’s efforts to inject himself into a wide array of spiritual, political, social, 
and economic matters—including the four cases just mentioned. The story of that ideological 
development, however, has been told elsewhere on many occasions and often with great skill and 
depth of learning.24 Similarly, the following study does not try to present a comprehensive 
overview of papal administrative institutions in this formative period, even though such 
institutions were undoubtedly central to any of the papacy’s efforts to implement policy 
throughout Christendom. Many excellent scholars have studied the origins, development, and 
                                                
24 For general studies of the papacy in the High Middle Ages, see Geoffrey Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy 
(London: Thames & Hudson, 1992); Morris, The Papal Monarchy; I.S. Robinson, The Papacy, 1073-1198: 
Continuity and Innovation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Schimmelpfennig, The Papacy; Walter 
Ullmann, A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2003); Harald 
Zimmermann, Das Papsttum im Mittelalter: eine Papstgeschichte im Spiegel der Historiographie: mit einem 
Verzeichnis der Päpste vom 4. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Ulmer, 1981). Important, if at times controversial, 
studies of the idea of papal monarchy include Pennington, Pope and Bishops; Brian Tierney, The Origins of Papal 
Infallibility, 1150-1350: A Study on the Concepts of Infallibility, Sovereignty and Tradition in the Middle Ages 
(Leiden: Brill, 1972); Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages; Watt, The Theory of Papal 
Monarchy in the Thirteenth Century. Finally, for geographically focused studies of the papacy that still cover a 
broad array of topics, see Z.N. Brooke, The English Church & the Papacy: From the Conquest to the Reign of John 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Raymonde Foreville, Le pape Innocent III et la France (Stuttgart: 
A. Hiersemann, 1992); Johannes Laudage, Alexander III. und Friedrich Barbarossa (Cologne: Böhlau, 1997); 
L'église de France et la papauté, Xe-XIIIe siècle: actes du XXVIe colloque historique franco-allemand organisé en 
coopération avec l'École nationale des chartes par l'Institut historique allemand de Paris, Paris 17-19 octobre 
1990, ed. Rolf Grosse (Bonn: Bouvier, 1993); Peter Linehan, The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth 




function of the papal chancery,25 papal legates,26 papal councils,27 and papal judicial 
institutions28 in the High Middle Ages.29 What follows, then, is not a retelling of the history of 
papal ideology or papal institutions. Instead, it is a study of the institutional effectiveness of the 
administrative tools available to the bishops of Rome in this period of medieval history. 
Institutional effectiveness. What does that phrase mean? How, precisely, do we judge the 
effectiveness of an institution in a premodern context? In each of the case studies that follow, it 
is easy enough to identify a general policy outcome that the papacy wished to secure, but some 
of those outcomes are more clear-cut than others. As it sought to negotiate a resolution to the 
Canterbury-York primacy dispute, for example, the papacy’s ultimate goal was unmistakable: an 
                                                
25 Christopher R. Cheney, The Study of the Medieval Papacy Chancery: the second Edwards Lecture delivered 
within the University of Glasgow on 7th December, 1964 (Glasgow: Jackson, 1966); Reginald Poole, Lectures on 
the History of the Papal Chancery Down to the Time of Innocent III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1915); Jane E. Sayers, Papal Government and England During the Pontificate of Honorius III, 1216-1227 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Brigide Schwarz, Die Organisation kurialer Schreiberkollegien 
von ihrer Entstehung bis zur Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1972). 
 
26 Kriston Rennie, The Foundations of Medieval Papal Legation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Paul C. 
Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives in Scotland: Legates, Nuncios, and Judges-Delegate, 1125-1286 
(Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1997); Robert C. Figueira, “The Medieval Papal Legate and His Province: 
Geographical Limits of His Jurisdiction,” in Plenitude of Power: The Doctrines and Exercise of Authority in the 
Middle Ages: Essays in Memory of Robert Louis Benson, ed. Robert C. Figueira (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 73-
105; R.A. Schmutz, “Medieval Representatives: Legates, Nuncios and Judges-Delegate,” Studi Gratiani 15 (1972), 
pp. 441-63. 
 
27 Raymonde Foreville, Latran I, II, III et Latran IV (Paris : Éditions de l'Orante, 1965); Georg Gresser, Die 
Synoden und Konzilien in der Zeit des Reformpapsttums in Deutschland und Italien von Leo IX. bis Calixt II., 1049-
1123 (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2006); Karl Joseph von Hefele and Henri Leclercq, Histoire des conciles d'après les 
documents originaux, 11 vols. (Hildesheim: G. Olms Verlag, 1973); Hans Wolter, Lyon I et Lyon II (Paris, Éditions 
de l'Orante, 1966). Two particularly useful studies of specific councils and their larger political, institutional, and 
religious milieu include Robert Somerville, Pope Urban II’s Council of Piacenza: March 1-7, 1095 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) and Robert Somerville, Pope Alexander III and the Council of Tours (1163): A Study of 
Ecclesiastical Politics and Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 
 
28 Peter Herde, Audientia litterarum contradictarum; Untersuchungen über die päpstlichen Justizbriefe und die 
päpstliche Delegationsgerichtsbarkeit vom 13. bis zum Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts, 2 vols. (Tübingen: M. 
Niemeyer, 1970); Jane E. Sayers, Papal Judges Delegate in the Province of Canterbury, 1198-1254: A Study in 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and Administration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
 
29 For an excellent overview of papal institutions (before the thirteenth century) that references much of the more 
specialized scholarship noted above, see Robinson, The Papacy. 
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end to further arguments about the primacy. The restoration of peace between two archdioceses 
is a tangible outcome that is easily identifiable when it occurs. But in other cases, such as the 
implementation of the reforms of the Fourth Lateran Council, what was a reasonable end result 
of the papacy’s efforts? Was the publication of every reform decree in every Christian diocese 
sufficient? Or was it necessary to ensure that bishops and other clerics actually followed those 
decrees, which in turn required a more complex system of administrative reporting and follow-
up? Those two goals are related, but also quite different. Just as the papacy faced challenges in 
implementing policy during the period 1050 to 1250, so, too, does the historian in evaluating the 
results of those implementation efforts. Normally, a wide variety of plausible outcomes might 
doom efforts to understand common features in the contours of papal power. But a particular 
analytical framework allows us to determine the institutional effectiveness of the papacy in these 
various policy realms, in spite of the differences that exist between the four cases. That 
framework is the analysis of papal communication practices and strategies. 
 The study of communication provides us with a critical tool with which to evaluate the 
institutional effectiveness of the papacy, because, by nature, communication grapples with both 
process and outcomes. Communication, of course, is a broad term with many meanings. Letters, 
conversation, artwork, ceremony, social relationships, even coins are all means of 
communication, because they all facilitate the exchange of information and ideas. Surprisingly, 
therefore, the history of medieval communication has often been told as a largely unidimensional 
story of written communication, literacy, and documentary practices.30 But new ways of 
                                                
30 A brief look at Marco Mostert’s impressive bibliographies reveals the heavy emphasis on literacy and 
documentary practices. See A Bibliography of Works on Medieval Communication, ed. Marco Mostert (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2012); New Approaches to Medieval Communication, ed. Marco Mostert (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999). One 
of the best known and most widely cited examples of scholarship focusing on literacy and documentary practices 




conceptualizing communication and communication practices have expanded the scope of this 
term. During the last twenty years, scholars such as Michael McCormick and Gerd Althoff, 
among others, have begun to change the way we define communication in the field of medieval 
European history, both as an object of study and as an analytical tool.31 Historians now see it as a 
highly dynamic process that involves the movement of people and ideas, and the creation of 
networks and bonds between people, places, institutions, and even entire economies. 
 This change in the way that medievalists think about communication, while admirable, has 
largely taken place without engaging the broader field of communication studies, which has itself 
undergone a parallel evolution in recent years. Scholars of communication once focused their 
attention primarily on technological changes, such as the shift from orality to literacy, or from 
writing to print.32 But new ideas about interconnectivity, networks, and even spatial relationships 
have reshaped our understanding of communication as a process and its broader impact on the 
development of human society.33 At times, the language of this communications literature can 
                                                
 
31 Gerd Althoff, Family, Friends and Followers: Political and Social Bonds in Medieval Europe, trans. Christopher 
Carroll (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); David Brégaint, Vox regis: Royal Communication in High 
Medieval Norway (Leiden: Brill, 2016); Jennifer R. Davis, Charlemagne’s Practice of Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015); Martin Gravel, Distances, rencontres, communications: réaliser l’Empire sous 
Charlemagne et Louis le Pieux (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012); Karl Leyser, Communications and Power in Medieval 
Europe: The Carolingian and Ottonian Centuries (London: Hambledon Press, 1994); Michael McCormick, Origins 
of the European Economy: Communications and Commerce, A.D. 300-900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001); Sophia Menache, The Vox Dei: Communication in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990); Writing and the Administration of Medieval Towns, ed. Marco Mostert and Anna Adamska (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2014). 
 
32 Classic studies of these shifts include Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002); 
Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record; Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, 2 
vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
 
33 See, for example, Craig Calhoun, “The Infrastructure of Modernity: Indirect Social Relationships, Information 
Technology, and Social Integration,” in Social Change and Modernity, ed. Hans Haferkamp and Neil J Smelser 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 205-236; Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd 
ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000); David Singh Grewal, Network Power: The Social Dynamics of 
Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Robert McNeill and William H. McNeill, The Human 
Web: A Bird’s-Eye View of World History (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003). 
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seem arcane, even foreign, to students of past societies. Discussions of communication hubs and 
nodes, vectors, degrees of separation, and integration (to name just a few topics) might sound 
more appropriate to a study of physics or transportation theory.34 But many of these concepts, 
which revolve around how individuals, groups or systems interact with one another, can be 
extraordinarily productive in helping us to understand a wide variety of social, political, 
economic, and even religious practices and processes. The idea of a “super hub”, for example—a 
locus of communication that becomes more important than other similar hubs because of its 
particular location or makeup—can help us to understand how certain figures become more 
important than others in an intellectual or economic network.35 Historians of all fields can profit 
from engaging with these ideas, taking from them what is useful, and leaving behind what is 
not.36 Some fields of historical study have already been transformed by harnessing 
communication theory. Students of Early Modern European history, for example, have readily 
                                                
 
34 A marvelous introduction to many of the key theoretical concepts that are now foundational to communications 
literature is Albert-László Barabási, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means 
(New York: Plume, 2003). 
 
35 See the useful discussion of “super hubs” in ibid., chapter 7. 
 
36 Literature incorporating this language of communication has ballooned, in part due to increased attention—both 
in the academy and the larger public sphere—on globalization and the impact of new mass communication and 
social media technologies. But for just a small sampling of the varied approaches taken by historians and scholars of 
communication, see: Charles E. Clark, “The Press the Founders Knew,” in Freeing the Presses: The First 
Amendment in Action, ed. Timothy E. Cook (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), pp. 33-50; 
Susan J. Douglas, Listening In: Radio and the American Imagination (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2004); Daniel R. Headrick, When Information Came of Age: Technologies of Knowledge in the Age of Reason and 
Revolution, 1700-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Friedrich Kittler, Optical Media, trans. Anthony 
Enns (Malden: Polity Press, 2010); Ronald R. Kline, “Cybernetics, Management Science, and Technology Policy: 
The Emergence of ‘Information Technology’ as a Keyword, 1948-1985,” Technology and Culture 47 (2006), pp. 
513-535; Joshua Meyrowitz, No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behavior (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986); Andrew Pettegree, The Book in the Renaissance (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2010); Will Slauter, “Forward-Looking Statements: News and Speculation in the Age of the American 
Revolution,” The Journal of Modern History 81 (2009), pp. 759-792; JoAnn Yates, Structuring the Information 





adopted this approach over the last thirty years, with remarkable results.37 How something was 
communicated has become just as important to our understanding of past societies as what was 
being communicated in the first place. 
 This broad approach to the study of communication has informed all of the following case 
studies on papal policy-making and implementation in the High Middle Ages. Communication 
serves as a means of understanding a series of crucial administrative processes that lay at the 
heart of the papacy’s efforts to implement policy and make its will felt throughout Christendom. 
How could popes and the members of the papal Curia put ideas and reforms into practice and 
enforce decisions, while overcoming the troublesome obstacles of travel, distance, and delegated 
authority? What role did institutional and personal bonds play at a time of conflicted loyalties 
and political and spiritual upheaval? Why did institutional centralization pay dividends in some 
cases while it failed entirely in others? These questions of administrative effectiveness, 
implementation, and enforcement, are, at their heart, bound up with important questions about 
communication media, personal and institutional relationships, networks, and the gathering and 
dissemination of information. A closer look at these communicative processes and strategies 
reveals the inner workings of an institution whose administrative superstructure has been well 
                                                
37 Even a minute selection of the existing bibliography reveals the breadth of research in this field. See, for example, 
Christopher A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-
1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Robert Darnton, “An Early Information Society: News and 
the Media in Eighteenth-Century Paris,” The American Historical Review 105 (2001), pp. 1-35; Robert Darnton, 
Poetry and the Policy: Communication Networks in Eighteenth-Century Paris (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2010); Natalie Zemon Davis, The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2000); Anthony Grafton, “A Sketch Map of a Lost Continent: the Republic of Letters,” in Worlds Made by Words: 
Scholarship and Community in the Modern West, ed. Anthony Grafton (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2009): 9-34; David A. Hancock, “The Triumphs of Mercury: Connection and Control in the Emerging Atlantic 
Economy,” in Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, ed. Bernard Bailyn and 
Patricia L. Denault (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 112-140; James Van Horn Melton, The Rise of 
the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Jacob Soll, The Information 
Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009); 
Harry S. Stout, “Religion, Communications, and the Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,” William and 




documented but perhaps less well understood. On paper—or perhaps parchment—the papacy 
looks very much like the centralized, bureaucratic, and even extraordinarily effective institution 
that historians have painted over the last century and a half. But such a view is highly 
misleading. 
 The purpose of this study is not to turn a story a story of success wholly into one of doom 
and gloom. Instead, it seeks to temper the widespread and longstanding notion that the papacy’s 
trajectory over the period 1050 to 1250 was characterized by continued institutional growth, 
sophistication, and effectiveness. Indeed, the principal argument of the pages that follow is that 
historians have consistently overstated the papacy’s ability to implement policy during this 
crucial period in European history. To be sure, the bishops of Rome learned a great deal in these 
two centuries. They developed new administrative tools and changed the way they used others. 
And, gradually, they came to grips with the important role that communicative mechanisms 
would play in translating their will into action. But failures were as notable and numerous as 
triumphs. The foundations of papal power were not as firm as Gregory VII, Innocent III, and—





ARBITRATING AD NAUSEAM:  
Papacy, Primacy, and the Dispute Between Canterbury and York, 1070-1131 
 
“But let them arrange with joint deliberation and concordant action whatever needs to be done, 
out of zeal for Christ, let them decide what is right with one mind, and complete what they have 
decided without disagreeing with each other.”1 
 
-Gregory the Great to Augustine of Canterbury (June 22, 601) 
 
A Dispute Made by a Pope: 
 
 September and October are pleasant months in much of Western and Southern Europe. 
The summer heat, extreme at times, has largely dissipated. Excessive rainfall is uncommon. And 
vestiges of the long summer evenings remain, even as the season turns cloudy and cooler, the 
days beginning their long descent into the cold and dark of winter. It is, in many ways, ideal 
traveling time, or so Archbishops Lanfranc of Canterbury and Thomas of York must have 
thought in the fall of 1071 as they made the long journey from England to the center of Latin 
Christendom at Rome.2 Both men were new to their archiepiscopal rank, and they had set out 
together to collect their pallia—the sign of their newfound positions—from the hands of Pope 
Alexander II.3 Under normal circumstances, such a journey—even such a long journey—would 
                                                
1 Gregorii I papae Registrum epistolarum, ed. Paul Ewald and Ludo Moritz Hartmann, MGH ES, vol. 1 (Munich: 
Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 1978), p. 312: “communi autem consilio et concordi actione, quaeque sunt pro 
Christi zelo agenda, disponant, unanimiter recta sentient et ea quae senserint non sibimet discrepando perficiant.” 
 
2 Lanfranc and Thomas arrived in Rome by late October 1071, and so their journey must have begun either in 
September or, at the latest, early October. Travel times between England and Italy varied, but the two men would 
have been accompanied by at least a reasonably sized entourage, slowing their pace. The Letters of Lanfranc, 
Archbishop of Canterbury, ed. and trans. Helen Clover and Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Clarendon Pres, 1979), no. 7 
[p. 43]; JL 4692. No recent biography of Thomas exists, but for Lanfranc’s life and career, see H.E.J. Cowdrey, 
Lanfranc: Scholar, Monk, and Archbishop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
 
3 An archbishop’s receipt of the pallium, a finely woven wool vestment worn over the shoulders, was a highly 
significant—and deeply symbolic—act that simultaneously conferred power on the recipient while reinforcing the 
authority of the pope who gave it. For more on the pallium, see Steven A. Schoenig, “The Papacy and the Use and 
Understanding of the Pallium from the Carolingians to the Early Twelfth Century,” unpublished doctoral 
dissertation (Columbia University, 2009). There is a small amount of evidence to suggest that Alexander II may 
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likely have been a happy duty for two men facing a new stage in their careers and a new set of 
challenges. But even as they navigated the English Channel, crisscrossed the winding roads of 
France, and traversed the Alps into Italy, there was tension, and perhaps even outright hostility, 
between these two clerics. Unbeknownst to contemporaries, they were about to become the first 
combatants in a protracted legal battle that would go on for the next six decades. 
When the two Anglo-Norman clerics entered the Eternal City, that battle had, in many 
ways, already begun. The previous year, William the Conqueror, England’s new Norman 
monarch, had appointed Thomas and Lanfranc to their respective posts in rapid succession.4 Yet 
when Thomas traveled to Canterbury to be consecrated by Lanfranc, who had himself only 
recently received consecration, the archbishop of Canterbury, “following the practice of his 
predecessors,” we are told, “asked [Thomas] for a written profession of obedience, fortified by 
an oath of loyalty.”5 Thomas balked at the demand. Both men, he argued, were archbishops, 
equal in stature and dignity. Why should one man submit to the other? Archbishops in Europe 
                                                
have sent a pallium to the newly appointed archbishop shortly after Thomas’ nomination by William the Conqueror. 
However, the evidence is thin, and it seems much more likely that Thomas received his pallium from the pope’s 
hands alongside Lanfranc in 1071. See H.E.J. Cowdrey, “Thomas I of York and the pallium,” Haskins Society 
Journal 11 (1998), pp. 31-41. 
 
4 For a useful overview of the Norman Conquest’s immediate effects on the English Church under William the 
Conqueror and his son, William II, see Frank Barlow, The English Church, 1066-1154 (London: Longman, 1979), 
pp. 54-76. The basic story of what was to become known as the “Primacy Dispute” between the archiepiscopal sees 
of Canterbury and York features in many larger histories of the English Church in the Middle Ages. However, there 
are, surprisingly, very few narratives of the entire sixty years of the dispute. The most thorough, if somewhat dated, 
account remains Margarete Telle Dueball, Der Suprematstreit zwischen den Erzdiözesen Canterbury und York 1070-
1126, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der englischen Kirche im Zeitalter des Gregorianismus, Historische Studien 184 
(Berlin: Emil Ebering, 1929). Another highly useful, if rather brief, overview can be found in Hugh the Chanter, The 
History of the Church of York, 1066-1127, ed. and trans. Charles Johnson, M. Brett, C.N.L. Brooke, and M. 
Winterbottom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. xxx-xlv. 
 
5 Letters, no. 3 [p. 40]: “A quo cum Lanfrancus scriptam de oboedientia sua cum adiectione iurisiurandi 
professionem custodito antecessorum more exposceret.” The edition of this text, like all editions in the Oxford 
Medieval Texts Series, contains the original Latin text and an English translation on the facing page. In what 





had collected such professions from their diocesan bishops regularly since the seventh century, 
with the custom particularly ingrained in England since the eighth.6 But while it was common for 
archbishops to seek the status of primate, the papacy almost never granted such requests.7 As 
such, Thomas refused to provide the profession of obedience “until he could read evidence of the 
claim and could see witnesses testifying to its antiquity; in short, until he should hear good 
reason why he should do it justly and reasonably, without prejudice to his own church.”8 This 
tenacious resolve, however, dissipated rapidly. Lanfranc convinced William the Conqueror of his 
position, and the English monarch quickly ordered Thomas to submit. “Misled by bad advice and 
terrified by threats,” one chronicler tells us, the archbishop of York “sadly and unwillingly 
yielded.”9 He made his profession and was duly consecrated. But months later, as he traveled 
with Lanfranc to Rome amidst the changing seasons, Thomas stewed at what he saw as a grave 
injustice. Yes, he had professed his obedience to the archbishop of Canterbury, but surely 
something had to be done. The time had come to appeal to the pope. 
 Until Lanfranc and Thomas arrived in Rome in the fall of 1071, the “Primacy Dispute”—
as scholars have come to call it—was essentially an internal matter of English ecclesiastical 
                                                
6 Canterbury Professions, ed. Michael Richter, Canterbury and York Society 67 (Torquay: The Devonshire Press, 
1973), p. xi. 
 
7 HCY, p. xxxiii. As the editors observe in note 4, in 1097, Ivo of Chartres railed against the idea that one 
archbishop should require a profession of obedience from another archbishop. In fact, Gregory VII granted primatial 
rank to the archbishop of Lyons in 1079, but the circumstances of that decision were somewhat unique. See The 
Register of Pope Gregory VII, 6.34, pp. 315-316; Peter R. McKeon, “Gregory VII and the Primacy of Archbishop 
Gebuin of Lyons,” Church History 38 (1969), pp. 3-8. 
 
8 Letters, no. 3 [pp. 40-41]: “respondit Thomas se id nunquam facturum, nisi prius scriptas de hac re auctoritates 
legeret, nisi testes huius antiquitatis assertores cerneret, postremo nisi congruas super hac re rationes audieret quibus 
id iuste et rationabiliter sine suae aecclesiae preiudicio facere deberet.” 
 
9 HCY, pp. 6-7: “Sic ergo consilio deceptus, minis territus, inuitus et dolens tandem facere concessit.” For Hugh’s 




politics. That changed when Thomas brought the issue before the aging Pope Alexander II.10 
Thomas’s decision to seek papal arbitration rested on sound logic. But that logic had more to do 
with the historical foundations of the dispute itself than with the authoritative position of the 
papacy in the 1070s, a period when the institution was only just beginning to assert itself with 
more vigor after several centuries of relative listlessness.11 In articulating his cause before 
Alexander II, Thomas reminded the pope that “the churches of Canterbury and York were equal 
to each other in status, and that according to the constitution of St. Gregory neither should be 
subject to the other in any way.”12 Here, Thomas referred to a papal letter of June 22, 601, in 
which Gregory the Great had told Augustine of Canterbury, the founder of the English Church (if 
such a title is even appropriate), that the newly created archbishop of York “should be in charge 
of the bishops consecrated by him, in such a way that he is not at all subordinate to the 
jurisdiction of the bishop of London.”13 Further, Gregory had written, “in the future, let there be 
                                                
10 For the career of Alexander II, see Tilmann Schmidt, Alexander II. (1061-1073) und die römische Reformgruppe 
seiner Zeit (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1977). 
 
11 Later sections of this chapter will grapple more explicitly with the papal reform of the late eleventh and early 
twelfth centuries, a widely studied period that was essential to the reinvigoration of papal ideology and institutions. 
Overviews of this period can be found in abundance, but all modern accounts are necessarily in dialogue with 
Augustin Fliche’s monumental—if dated—examination of the period. See Augustin Fliche, La Réforme 
Grégorienne, 3 vols. (Paris: E. Champion, 1924). Other particularly useful, and remarkably varied, analyses of the 
papal reform movement and its broader implications include: Uta-Renate Blumenthal, The Investiture Controversy: 
Church and Monarchy from the Ninth to the Twelfth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1988), chapters 3-5; Yves Congar, “Der Platz des Papsttums in der Kirchenfrömmigkeit der Reformer des 11. 
Jahrhunderts,” in Sentire Ecclesiam, Festschrift Hugo Rahner, ed. Jean Daniélou and Herbert Vorgrimler (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1961), pp. 196-217; Kathleen G. Cushing, Reform and the Papacy in the Eleventh Century: Spirituality and 
Social Change (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), chapter 4; John Gilchrist, “Was There a Gregorian 
Reform Movement in the Eleventh Century?” Canadian Catholic Historical Association: Study Sessions 37 (1970), 
pp. 1-10; Colin Morris, The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), chapters 4, 5, and 7; Walter Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages: A Study in the 
Ideological Relation of Clerical to Lay Power, 3rd ed. (London: Methuen, 1970), chapters 9-11, and 13. 
 
12 Letters, no. 3 [pp. 42-43]: “dicens Cantuariensem aecclesiam atque Eboracensem parem ad se inuicem honorem 
habere, nec alteram alteri secundum beati Gregori constitutionem debere ullatenus subiacere.” 
 
13 Gregorii I papae Registrum epistolarum, p. 312: “post obitum vero tuum ita episcopis quos ordinaverit praesit, ut 
Lundoniensis episcopi nullo modo dicioni subiaceat.” 
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that distinction of rank between the bishops of the cities of London and York, that he who will 
have been ordained first should be considered senior.”14 Here, Gregory made an error. The 
mention of London posed an interpretive problem for medieval thinkers.15 Was Gregory 
conflating Canterbury and London, perhaps harkening back to the days of Roman rule, when 
London was the capital of the island? In such a scenario, the archdioceses of Canterbury and 
York would be equal in stature, as Thomas now argued. Or did Gregory mean that York and 
London would serve as independent archbishoprics, with a third archbishop—that of 
Canterbury—ruling over them? The letter’s ambiguity was at the root of the whole primacy 
dispute.16 Now, in 1071, a problem of papal making came home to the papacy. For the next sixty 
years, the ghost of Gregory the Great would loom large over the papacy’s efforts to resolve this 
protracted dispute, until the matter was finally decided in favor of York. In an odd twist of fate, 
the pope who had done so much to expand papal authority in the late sixth and early seventh 
centuries caused a problem that laid bare remarkable deficiencies in the power of his eleventh- 
and early twelfth-century successors. 
Amidst a rapidly changing political landscape in the decades around 1100, the dispute 
between Canterbury and York presented the papacy with a key opportunity to validate its 
                                                
 
14 Ibid.: “Sit vero inter Lundoniae et Eburachae civitatis episcopos in posterum honoris ista distinctio, ut ipse prior 
habeatur, qui prius fuerit ordinatus.” 
 
15 In 798, for example, Cernwulf, king of Mercia, wrote to Pope Leo III expressing concern and some degree of 
confusion about whether Canterbury or London (or both) should have metropolitan rank. Leo’s reply confirmed the 
primacy of Canterbury, but made no mention of York at all, perhaps contributing to further confusion by the time 
that Lanfranc and Thomas brought the issue to Alexander II. See English Historical Documents, vol. 1: c. 500-1042, 
ed. Dorothy Whitelock (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), nos. 204 and 205. William of Malmesbury later 
quoted both letters in his history of the English kings, although he did so without clarifying how the issue should be 
decided. See William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum Anglorum: The History of the English Kings, vol. 1, ed. and 
trans. R.A.B. Mynors, R.M. Thomson, and M. Winterbottom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 125-133. 
 
16 Dueball, Der Suprematstreit zwischen den Erzdiözesen Canterbury und York, pp. 10-11. 
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newfound claims to centralized power.17 The stakes were high. As more and more people looked 
to Rome for answers on a wide array of legal questions, the papacy had to produce results.18 By 
arbitrating a conflict far from the center of Christendom, the pope could show not only the reach 
of his authority, but also the imposing nature of that influence. In considering this case, however, 
it is important not to become distracted by some of the larger political issues stemming from the 
dispute, which often read like a single battle in the larger war between Church and State at the 
turn of the twelfth century. Historians have told that story—and told it often. However, what has 
gone unnoticed in studies of the period is the central role that communications played in shaping 
the contours of the conflict. Arbitration is, by nature, a process that involves a great deal of back 
and forth. But—crucially—it is also a communicative process. The papacy needed to collect 
information about the York-Canterbury dispute, verify and process that information, 
communicate a judgment back to the parties involved, and then grapple with any challenges to 
that judgment, which in turn could lead to the need for more information and more 
communication. At the turn of the twelfth century, the papacy had at its disposal a number of 
communicative tools with which to tackle this complex process. But, as we will see, those tools 
often proved ineffective. The papacy only began to make headway in arbitrating the conflict 
                                                
17 The most famous articulation of these claims came from Gregory VII in the Dictatus papae. These twenty-seven 
statements on the privileges and powers of the papacy appear in Gregory’s register, but there is no evidence that 
they circulated widely. Still, in these theses, as H.E.J. Cowdrey terms them, it is possible to see a concrete effort to 
articulate a broader mission for the papacy as the papal reform movement gained traction in the late eleventh 
century. Even if the text of these theses did not circulate widely, the ideas that they expressed soon found a place in 
more mainstream theories of papal power. For a brief, but useful, discussion of the Dictatus papae, see H.E.J. 
Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, 1073-1085 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 502-520. For the text of the Dictatus 
papae, see The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 1073-1085: An English Translation, trans. H.E.J. Cowdrey (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 149-150. 
 
18 Morris, The Papal Monarchy, pp. 212-213. As many historians have noted, the papacy largely governed by 
rescript, meaning that it was, in most cases, a reactive institution rather than a proactive one. In spite of this fact, 
however, there can be little doubt that the papal reformers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries welcomed 




when Calixtus II developed a communication strategy that used the tools available to him in a 
systematic way. From the moment, then, that Thomas of York brought the matter before 
Alexander II, the mechanisms of papal communication—and their use or misuse—played an 
absolutely fundamental role in how the case unfolded. 
If the method of communication—whether a person, a written instrument, or some other 
mechanism—is vital to the transfer of information and ideas, so, too is the maintenance of a 
political space in which that method of communication operates.19 In one sense, this point seems 
intuitive. How can a messenger deliver a letter if he cannot reach the recipient because of a war 
or banditry, or because the letter’s addressee simply refuses to accept the letter for some reason? 
The point, however, remains an important one. Communication and politics are bound up with 
one another in powerful ways. The papacy, then, had two tasks. On the one hand, the pope and 
his advisors had to decide how and when to communicate with the parties involved in the case—
an ever-shifting cast of archbishops, kings, and monks, among others. And, on the other, they 
had to work hard to create and maintain a political environment that facilitated such 
communication. As it turns out, the papacy of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries was 
                                                
19 The idea that communication media play a crucial role in the way that information is both collected and passed 
between people and places is not a new one. The classic theoretical exploration of this notion—and one that almost 
all studies of communication grapple with at some level—is Marshall McLuhan, Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of 
Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962). The relationship between politics and 
communication is a vast topic with an equally vast literature. For a few excellent studies of this relationship in 
various historical contexts, see Christopher A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social 
Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Michael Clanchy, From 
Memory to Written Record, 1066-1307, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993); Robert Darnton, “An Early 
Information Society: News and the Media in Eighteenth-Century Paris,” The American Historical Review 105 
(2001), pp. 1-35; Harold A. Innis, Empire and Communications (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972); 
Richard R. John, Network Nation: Inventing American Telecommunications (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2010); James Van Horn Melton, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001); Jacob Soll, The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009); Yael A. Sternhell, “Communicating War: The Culture of Information 
in Richmond During the American Civil War,” Past & Present 202:1 (2009), pp. 175-205; Harry S. Stout, 
“Religion, Communications, and the Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,” William and Mary Quarterly 
34 (1977), pp. 519-541; Chris Wickham, “Fama and the Law in Twelfth-Century Tuscany,” in Fama: The Politics of 
Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe, ed. Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003), pp. 15-26. 
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not entirely up to either challenge. The bishops of Rome already possessed many of the 
communicative tools that would underpin their efforts to implement policy in later chapters of 
this study. But they had not yet learned to wield those tools in an integrated or systematic way. 
The result for the archdioceses of Canterbury and York was a protracted, messy, and almost 
comical sixty years of uncertainty and strife. 
A Thorny Dispute and a Thornier Narrative: 
 The primacy dispute between the archdioceses of Canterbury and York was a 
complicated, even odd, affair. It began with two men, continued with their successors, and 
gradually expanded to include the cathedral chapters of Canterbury and York, two generations of 
English bishops, the new Anglo-Norman monarchy, and, of course, the papacy. The question of 
one archbishop’s “primacy” over another was at some level one of legal rights: the right of one 
man—one member of the ecclesiastical hierarchy—to impose his will on another.20 The Church 
was, and always has been, a hierarchical organization, and organizations with a definable 
hierarchy are prone to quarrels over who will—and who should—sit atop the food chain. But 
primacy was not just about legal rights and protocols. It was also about status and pride, not just 
that of the two men who occupied these archbishoprics but also the institutions and people 
affiliated with them. If Lanfranc and Anselm of Canterbury cared about their primacy over the 
archbishops of York, so too, it seems, did many of the nameless clerics and monks who served 
under, and beside, these men. Clerics affiliated with the archdiocese of York were just as 
adamant about their independence from the “oppressive” rule of Canterbury. To speak of two 
“parties”—one supporting Canterbury, the other York—is not just a whimsical effort to apply 
                                                
20 Horst Fuhrmann, “Studien zur Geschichte mittelaterlicher Patriarchate,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 




modern terminology to the Middle Ages. It is, by all accounts, an accurate reflection of how 
contemporaries viewed the dispute, particularly those men who chronicled it.21 
 This brings us to the question of sources and their inherent bias. Unlike later chapters of 
this study, which have at their core a large corpus of documentary sources and letters, the present 
chapter relies heavily on narrative sources, particularly Hugh the Chanter’s History of the 
Church of York and Eadmer’s History of Recent Events in England.22 Documentary sources are 
plagued by their own set of problems, but narrative accounts—even those written in close 
proximity to the events they describe—are particularly thorny. This is especially true of the 
histories written by Hugh and Eadmer. Eadmer wrote his history while serving as chief secretary 
to his master, Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury (1093-1109).23 The work is both a remarkable 
account of Anselm’s actions and personality, and an encomium to the man who was to end up a 
saint. But it would be foolish to ignore the intensely political dimension to this work. Eadmer 
originally crafted his history in four books describing the period down to Anselm’s death in 
1109. Later, however, he decided to add additional material to cover Canterbury’s continued 
fight for its legal rights over the archdiocese of York.24 Hugh the Chanter’s history was even 
                                                
21 One has only to read the two major narrative accounts of the dispute, Hugh the Chanter’s History of the Church of 
York and Eadmer’s History of Recent Events in England, to realize that both men were deeply invested in the causes 
of their respective patrons. 
 
22 HCY; Eadmer, Historia Nororum in Anglia, Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain During the Middle Ages, 
ed. Martin Rule (London: Longman & Co., 1884); Eadmer’s History of Recent Events in England, trans. Geoffrey 
Bosanquet (London: The Cresset Press, 1964). In what follows, I use Bosanquet’s translation when quoting Eadmer, 
except where noted. 
 
23 For the personal and intellectual relationship between Eadmer and Anselm, see, generally, Richard W. Southern, 
Saint Anselm and His Biographer: A Study in Monastic Life and Thought, 1059-1130 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1963); Richard W. Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). A more recent interpretation of Eadmer’s work can be found in Sally N. Vaughn, 
“Eadmer’s Historia Novorum: A Reinterpretation,” Anglo-Norman Studies 10 (1987), pp. 259-289. 
 




more blatantly tied to the dispute between Canterbury and York. “The man,” Hugh lamented at 
the very beginning of his account, “who would relate all the unhappy accidents and bitter 
misfortunes which befell the city and church of York after the conquest of England by William, 
duke of Normandy, would find his story both painful and long.”25 Immediately thereafter, he 
launches into a vivid description of the context and beginnings of the dispute with Canterbury. 
 The intensely political nature of Eadmer and Hugh’s histories necessitates particular 
delicacy in the way we use and interpret these sources. Normally, independent documentary 
evidence could be used to correlate certain pieces of information from these accounts, tempering 
their inherent bias in the process.26 But even that is a challenge, because Eadmer and Hugh are 
also our chief sources for a good chunk of the documentary material relating to the primacy 
dispute. Both chronicles record the full text of letters and charters—some genuine, others 
obviously forged—to and from popes, archbishops, kings of England, and members of the 
cathedral chapters of Canterbury and York. Every available scrap of papal material is essential to 
any proper understanding of the papacy’s broader efforts to arbitrate the primacy dispute. Yet we 
must treat those texts that we have with kid gloves. Aside from the register of Gregory VII, we 
have no authoritative contemporary compilation of papal letters in this period. Some of the papal 
letters that Eadmer and Hugh quote exist in other copies, but a few do not. The source base for 
the primacy dispute is already reasonably small compared to the other three case studies that 
                                                
25 HCY, pp. 2-3: “Casus aduersos et infortunia acerba que post deuictam a Willelmo Normannorum duce Angliam 
urbi Eborace et eccelesie contigerunt, si quis omnia velit enarrare, plena est dolore narracio et prolixo.” 
 
26 Unfortunately, the corpus of surviving documentary evidence from the archiepiscopal sees of Canterbury and 
York is not of much help in analyzing papal involvement in the primary dispute. See English Episcopal Acta, vol. 5: 
York, 1070-1154, ed. Janet E. Burton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); English Episcopal Acta, vol. 28: 
Canterbury, 1070-1136, ed. Martin Brett and Joseph A Gribbin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). For an 
edition of papal letters to Scotland in this period, many of which are referred to below in relation to the archdiocese 
of York, see Scotia pontificia: Papal Letters to Scotland before the Pontificate of Innocent III, ed. Robert Somerville 




make up this dissertation. As such, the following pages tread carefully when dealing with both 
the narrative and documentary evidence, relying to a considerable extent on years of scholarship 
examining the authenticity of this material. 
Opening Salvos—The Council of Winchester (1072) and Its Immediate Aftermath: 
 The papacy’s initial effort to put an end to the dispute between Canterbury and York was 
in some ways uncharacteristically cautious. When Alexander II met with Thomas and Lanfranc 
in the fall of 1071, the situation was ripe for activist papal intervention. Both archbishops had 
traveled to the heart of Christendom. They prostrated themselves at Alexander’s feet before 
receiving directly from the pope’s hands the symbol of their new status.27 And, if we believe 
Eadmer, the pope openly claimed his position of authority as the successor of the Prince of the 
Apostles, telling Lanfranc that, “it is right that in reverence for St. Peter you should come here to 
obtain the pallium to which you are entitled.”28 The papal reform movement that had begun 
roughly a decade earlier is more often associated with the names of Leo IX, Gregory VII, and 
Urban II, but Alexander II was in his own right an important proponent of reform, one who did 
not shy away from controversy or the vigorous espousal of papal authority.29 Given the context, 
then, it might come as something of a surprise that Alexander chose not to decide the matter right 
                                                
27 Hugh the Chanter and the anonymous author of the Canterbury memorandum make no mention of the 
archbishops prostrating themselves before Alexander, but Eadmer does (HNA, p. 11). An archbishop’s reception of 
the pallium from the pope was a deeply symbolic act, one that gained increased significance during the papal reform 
movement of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. The pallium, in fact, became a means by which the 
papacy asserted its independence and power. See Schoenig, “The Papacy and the Use and Understand of the 
Pallium,” chapters 8 and 9, particularly pp. 400-454. 
 
28 HNA, p. 11: “Hinc quod ad te pertinet ‘ob reverentiam Beati Petri te exequi par est.’” Bosanquet’s translation is a 
bit of a stretch in this particular instance, but ultimately, I believe it accurately conveys the general meaning of the 
Latin original. Eadmer’s account is, as I have already stated, a problematic account, but I see no reason to doubt his 
recreation of the events at Rome. Indeed, given that Alexander did not quash Thomas of York’s claims right then 
and there, Eadmer had less reason to portray the pope in a favorable light than, say, Hugh the Chanter, who does not 
even mention the two archbishops’ trip to Rome. 
 




then and there.30 Instead, after Lanfranc and Thomas had each presented their arguments for and 
against the primacy of Canterbury, Alexander “ruled that this case should be heard in the land of 
England and settled there by the testimony and judgment of the bishops and abbots of the whole 
kingdom.”31 To that end, “as was right and proper in a holy and skillful ruler,” the pope “issued a 
written directive that an assembly of the bishops, abbots and other persons of religious 
profession in the land of England should hear the case for both sides, consider it and reach a 
decision.”32 
 The result of Alexander’s written directive was the Council of Winchester, which decided 
in favor of Canterbury when it convened in England at Easter in 1072.33 The outcome, however, 
is less important for our purposes than the processes that underpinned it. Sadly, Alexander’s 
written instructions for the council do not survive. But the mere fact that the pope issued them 
reveals a great deal, not only about Alexander’s thought process but also the way that various 
communication media worked with one another to advance the arbitration. Written instructions 
imply a degree of procedural precision. The pope could have given oral instructions to Lanfranc 
                                                
30 Dueball, Der Suprematstreit zwischen den Erzdiözesen Canterbury und York, p. 24, in particular, suggests that 
Lanfranc must have been disappointed by this outcome, because he wanted a swift resolution to the matter. 
 
31 Letters, no. 3 [p. 42]: “decreuit Alexander papa oportere hanc causam in Anglica terra audiri, et illic tocius regni 
episcoporum et abbatum testimonio et iudicio definiri.” 
 
32 Ibid., no. 4 [p. 50]: “Quibus de rebus vos sicut sanctum prudentemque pastorem decuit et oportuit per scriptum 
sententiam promulgastis quatinus conuentis Anglicae terrae episcoporum abbatum ceterarumque religiosi ordinis 
personarum utriusque parties rationes audiret, discuteret, definiret.” The emphasis in the above translation is my 
own. 
 
33 Negotiations to end the primacy dispute seem to have taken place at two back-to-back events: the first at 
Winchester, the second at Windsor. The fact that the council sat twice provides evidence for the seriousness of the 
case, but also the need to collect and process as much information as possible. Although two meetings took place in 
close proximity to one another, for the sake of clarity I will refer only to the Council of Winchester in the following 
pages. The relevant documentary evidence for the Council of Winchester has been cited in Letters. However, this 
same material, with occasional commentary, can also be found in Councils and Synods: With Other Documents 
Relating to the English Church, vol. 1, part 2: 1066-1204, ed. D. Whitelock, M. Brett, and C.N.L. Brooke (Oxford: 




and Thomas.34 Instead, he committed those instructions to writing. We know nothing about how 
these instructions were used, but it seems logical to assume that they were read out as the 
Council of Winchester convened, providing attendees with evidence of the papacy’s decision to 
arbitrate the dispute, while also establishing a process that partisans on either side of the issue 
would accept by virtue of their continued attendance. For arbitration to work, of course, both 
sides have to acknowledge the legitimacy of the process and the arbiter who establishes it. From 
the papacy’s perspective, written instructions helped to achieve both ends. Through a single 
written document, Alexander signaled his deep-seated interest in shaping—and controlling—the 
arbitration while simultaneously providing evidence of his authority to those attending the 
council. 
 Alexander’s instructions were in themselves a communicative mechanism, which in turn 
begat another: an ecclesiastical council. The pope believed that a deliberative body of English 
clerics would serve as an effective institutional mechanism to arbitrate the dispute between 
Canterbury and York. The reasons for this were twofold. The need for some kind of political 
consensus was paramount. A meeting of English bishops and abbots was a chance to discuss the 
matter, bridge the divide between Lanfranc and Thomas, and—with luck—come to a mutually 
agreeable decision that would mend the rift between England’s two most prominent clerics. 
However, beyond a broader political motive, such a meeting or council had a decidedly practical 
purpose: to collect and process additional information about the historical relationship between 
the provinces of Canterbury and York. When the proposed meeting took form in the Council of 
Winchester the following year, the assembled clerics spent time reviewing ancient privileges and 
                                                
34 A papal legate, Hubert, was present at the Council of Winchester (see below), but he was already operating in the 
Anglo-Norman realm when Lanfranc and Thomas had their audience with Alexander II in Rome. As such, the pope 
could not have given Hubert oral instructions for the council. 
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charters that supposedly supported each side. Hugh the Chanter, Eadmer, and Lanfranc all agree 
on this point, albeit in different degrees of detail. So, too, does the author of the Canterbury 
memorandum, a document produced at Lanfranc’s behest for the papacy sometime between 1073 
and 1075.35 Hugh, who barely mentioned the Council of Winchester in his chronicle, probably 
because its outcome was not favorable to York’s cause, nevertheless admitted that through false 
means “it had been proved and recognized that the archbishop of York was bound to make his 
profession by oath to the archbishop of Canterbury.”36 The language implies that the council 
evaluated some kind of evidence, and our other narrative accounts fill out this picture. Shortly 
after Lanfranc “humiliated Thomas himself and reduced him to the level of his predecessors,” 
Eadmer writes in language that drips of partisan fervor: “he has himself left a written record 
authenticated by the royal seal, the truth of which is confirmed by the assent of the whole 
realm.”37 The next paragraph introduces readers to a host of documents—real and forged—that 
were, it seems, the basis of that written record.38 According to the author of the Canterbury 
memorandum, Lanfranc’s position on his own primacy over Thomas “was established and 
demonstrated by written proofs of various kinds.39 Lanfranc was even more explicit. When in 
April of May of 1072 he wrote to Alexander II to report on the Council of Winchester, the 
                                                
35 Letters, no. 3 [pp. 38-49]. The memorandum was compiled from various sources, including Lanfranc’s letter to 
Alexander II. 
 
36 HCY, p. 8: “Monachi Cantuarienses cartam scripserunt, et regis sigillo surrepcione et dolo adquisito sigillauerunt, 
causa scilicet uentilatam esse inter duos archieposcopos coram rege et episcopis et primoribus Anglie, et ostensum et 
cognitum esse Eboracensem archiepiscopum Cantuariensi debere cum iura mento professionem facere.” 
 
37 Eadmer, Historia Novorum in Anglia, p. 16: “et quemadmodum ipsum Thomam ad mensuram antecessorum 
suorum humiliaverit…ipse etenim inde veritate plena et totius regni assensu confirmata sub testimonio regii sigilli 
scripta reliquit.” 
 
38 Ibid., pp. 16-19. 
 




archbishop of Canterbury listed specific texts that the council had examined, including excerpts 
from Bede’s Ecclesiastical History of the English People and, “as the cornerstone of our entire 
case,” a list of papal letters, “which were given or sent to the rulers of the church of Canterbury 
and the kings of the English at one time or another for various reasons.”40 
 As it turns out, the papal letters and privileges listed by Lanfranc were either forgeries or, 
what is more likely, documents that supported Canterbury’s cause less definitively than the 
archbishop cared to admit.41 The debate about Canterbury’s production and use of forged 
documents has received more than its fair share of attention in historical scholarship, but the 
intricacies of that tortuous debate lie beyond the scope of this discussion. The important point 
about the Council of Winchester is that it initiated a process of information collection and 
reporting that underpinned the papacy’s effort to arbitrate the dispute. Both the papacy and the 
disputing parties recognized that the outcome of the debate rested on crucial information that the 
papacy had not had access to the year before. Alexander had employed a specific tool—a 
council—to bring together a host of clerics, who would then collect and evaluate this 
information, exchange ideas, and come to a decision. But was that the sum total of the papacy’s 
effort? Having called the council and articulated its mission, did the papacy’s arbitration end 
there? 
 At one level, it seems a remarkable statement of political decentralization that the papacy 
would choose a council in far-off England as its preferred mechanism to arbitrate a dispute 
                                                
40 Ibid., no. 4 [p. 52]: “Ultimum quasi robur totiusque causae firmamentum prolata sunt antecessorum uestrorum 
Gregorii, Bonefacii, Honorii, Vitaliani, Sergii, item Gregorii, Leonis, item ultimi Leonis priuilegia atque scripta, 
quae Dorobernensis aecclesiae presulibus Anglorumque regibus aliis atque aliis temporibus variis de causis sunt 
data aunt transmissa.” 
 
41 Ibid., no. 7 [p. 53]. For a detailed discussion of the Canterbury forgeries, as well as a useful overview of the 
historiographical debate about those documents, see Richard W. Southern, “The Canterbury Forgeries,” The English 
Historical Review 37 (1958), pp. 193-226.  
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between two archbishops who had been only recently at the papal court in Rome. But while 
Alexander loosened his reins on the process, he could not let them go completely. In an era when 
an ever increasing number of individuals and institutions—both ecclesiastical and secular—
looked to Rome for patronage and answers to important legal questions, a decision to forgo any 
role in the arbitration process would have undermined the papal reformers’ newfound attempts to 
centralize Church governance in the hands of the bishops of Rome.42 It should come as no 
surprise, then, that when the Council of Winchester convened in 1072, the pope had in 
attendance a representative of the papal court: Hubert, a papal legate who had been operating in 
the Anglo-Norman realm since 1070.43 Sadly, information on Hubert is scarce, and we know 
virtually nothing of his role at the Council of Winchester or in the larger process of arbitrating 
the dispute between Lanfranc and Thomas. He subscribed the Winchester agreement in 1072, 
along with William the Conqueror, Queen Matilda, Lanfranc and Thomas, and a host of Anglo-
Norman bishops and abbots.44 But the text provides no further detail other than the fact that 
Hubert assented to the verdict in favor of Canterbury.45 In the wake of the council, Lanfranc’s 
report to Alexander makes no mention of the legate’s role.46 And Hugh the Chanter and Eadmer 
are just as silent. Whatever his role, however, he was likely in direct competition with Lanfranc 
                                                
42 For a useful overview of the expansion of papal justice in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, see I.S. Robinson, 
The Papacy 1073-1198: Continuity and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 179-208. 
 
43 Helene Tillmann, Die päpstlichen Legaten in England bis zur Beendigung der Legation Gualas (1218) (Bonn: H. 
Ludwig, 1926), pp. 15-17. 
 
44 Letters, no. 3 [p. 49]. The text of the agreement, complete with the list of those who subscribed it, appears in the 
Canterbury memorandum. It was obviously written up as a separate documented, but was folded into the 
memorandum by the author of the latter text. 
 
45 Ibid., p. 46. 
 




himself. In a letter from October 1071, Alexander II told William the Conqueror that he had 
given Lanfranc special powers that, in effect, made the archbishop of Canterbury a standing 
legate in England. “The personal and apostolic authority,” Alexander wrote, “that we have 
delegated to him for the conduct and conclusion of disputes is such that whatever he may decide 
in these affairs, so long as it is just, can thereafter be considered no less firm and binding than if 
the matter had been concluded in our presence.”47 That the letter specifies a dispute between the 
archbishop of York and the bishop of Dorchester suggests that Lanfranc’s “personal and 
apostolic authority” did not extend to the primacy dispute. This, then, left an opening for Hubert 
at the Council of Winchester, even if we do now know the extent of his mission. Although both 
men may have been able to claim the mantle of the pope’s representative, Hubert’s mere 
presence is still instructive. Several sources referred to him as the pope’s designated legate, and 
the title was important. This was an era of change, when the papacy employed legates with ever 
increasing frequency in an attempt to bring its will to the far corners of Christendom.48 In 
Hubert, Alexander signaled his desire to maintain a papal presence at the Council of Winchester, 
even if the event was largely stage-managed by Lanfranc and, as we shall see, William the 
Conqueror. 
 The fact that Hubert attended the Council of Winchester but made little impact on 
contemporary accounts of the event raises an important question: Even when the papacy took 
steps to control the arbitration, were those efforts effective? Did centralized Roman authority 
have the power to shape the flow of events at the local level? Or did local power players still 
                                                
47 Ibid., no. 7 [p. 62]: “In causis autem pertractandis et diffiniendis ita sibi nostrae et apostolicae auctoritatis uicem 
dedimus, ut quicquid in eis iusticia dictante determinauerit, quasi in nostra presentia definitum deinceps firmum et 
indissolubile teneatur.” 
 





hold a crucial trump card? Answers to these questions are not as clear-cut as we might wish. The 
pope had called for the council to meet. He provided written instructions as to its task. His name 
and office were evoked as the council convened.49 And Hubert’s presence—even if it was more 
passive than anything else—undoubtedly added a sense of gravitas to the proceedings by 
offering a personal connection to the papal court. Perhaps the legate even played more of a role 
than we know, although, if so, it is strange that none of our sources say so.50 Finally, Lanfranc’s 
report to Alexander in the wake of the council underscores the general notion that the papacy 
was the ultimate arbiter of the whole affair. “Nor have I neglected,” Lanfranc wrote to the pope, 
“to send a copy [of the council’s agreement] to you, to whom the holy Church throughout all the 
world has indisputably been committed, so that from this and the other documents sent you may 
clearly understand what you should confirm in the tradition of your predecessors to me and to 
Christ Church, whose government in is my hands.”51 Having laid out the evidence for 
Canterbury’s claim along with the ultimate determination of the Council of Winchester, Lanfranc 
now asked “that it be expressed as a privilege by grace of the apostolic see in due form and 
without delay, so that here too there may be an open declaration of the strength of your love for 
                                                
49 Letters, no. 3 [p. 44]; ibid., no. 4 [p. 50]. 
 
50 It is tempting to argue that each of the major narrative sources had cause to downplay the papacy’s role because 
of the way events turned out. Yet such an argument fails to hold up to scrutiny. Hugh the Chanter barely mentions 
the Council of Winchester at all, perhaps because his source material was limited, but more likely because the 
outcome of the council was not to his liking. Still, by the time Hugh was writing in the early decades of the twelfth 
century, the papacy increasingly fell on the side of York, giving Hugh less ammunition against the authority of 
Rome. In the same vein, Eadmer would have had cause to discuss the Council of Winchester in detail (he doesn’t), 
but the papacy’s turn against the cause of Canterbury in the first two decades of the twelfth century also might have 
encouraged him to downplay the role of the papacy in arbitrating the whole affair. As such, Lanfranc’s letter and the 
Canterbury memorandum are probably are best witnesses to the events of 1072 and their immediate aftermath. Both 
authors had every reason to play up papal involvement, and yet they did not do so. This strikes me as reasonably 
convincing evidence that the papal legate, Hubert, was not terribly influential in the proceedings. 
 
51 Ibid., p. 54: “Cuius exemplar uobis quoque quibus sanctam totius mundi aecclesiam constat esse commissam 
transmittendum curaui, ut ex hoc atque aliis quae transmissa sunt perspicue cognoscatis ex more antecessorum quid 




me.”52 A written document from the papal court was vital, Lanfranc believed, to put an end to his 
quarrel with Thomas. Taken together, this evidence suggests that the papacy was the prime 
mover in this arbitration. And yet, there are also compelling reasons to doubt this conclusion. 
 In many ways, the Council of Winchester had been a triumph for Lanfranc and his cause. 
After the council made its ruling, Thomas of York capitulated, recognized Canterbury’s primacy, 
and made another profession of obedience to Lanfranc and his successors.53 The text of Thomas’ 
profession survives in the Canterbury memorandum, and in it Thomas unequivocally admitted 
defeat, acknowledging not only the result but also the process by which it had come about. “It is 
right,” he said, “that every Christian should be subject to Christian laws, not opposing by 
arguments of any kind what has been soundly established by the holy Fathers.”54 To that end, he 
continued, “I Thomas…having heard and understood the case for doing so, make to you 
Lanfranc, archbishop of Canterbury, and to your successors an absolute profession of canonical 
obedience; and whatever shall be justly and canonically enjoined on me by you or by them I 
promise to observe.”55 Lanfranc’s victory seemed total, and yet, strangely enough, the 
archbishop of Canterbury was plagued by fears that the papacy would not confirm the council’s 
decision. At the same time that he wrote to Alexander II, Lanfranc also sent a personal letter to 
                                                
52 Ibid.: “Quod peto honeste et sine dilatione per indultum sedis apostolicae priuilegium fieri, quatinus ex hoc 
quoque quantum me diligatis euidenter posit ostendi.” 
 
53 Crucially, however, Thomas’ profession was his and his alone. No mention was made that future archbishops of 
York would be asked to make the same profession to Lanfranc or his successors. This was one of the chief reasons 
that the primacy dispute continued to flare up in the first two decades of the twelfth century. 
 
54 Ibid., no. 3 [p. 44]: “Decet christianum quenque christianis legibus subiacere, nec his quae a sanctis patribus 
salubriter instituta sunt quibuslibet rationibus contraire.” 
 
55 Ibid.: “Propterea ego Thomas ordinatus iam Eboracensis aecclesiae metropolitanus antistes auditis cognitisque 
rationibus absolutam tibi Lanfrance Dorobernensis archiepiscope tuisque successoribus de canonica oboedientia 





Hildebrand, the powerful archdeacon of the Roman Church and one of the most important 
reformers at the papal court.56 “I have sent our lord the pope a summary account of the affair,” 
Lanfranc wrote, and “I do earnestly request you to read it with due attention, so that you may as 
a friend fully understand what kind of privilege the apostolic see should ratify and confirm to me 
and my church.”57 Here, Hildebrand obviously served as a back channel in Lanfranc’s 
communications with Alexander II. But the fact that the archbishop of Canterbury felt compelled 
to employ such a back channel is telling. Lanfranc was nervous. Was he right to be? The council 
had convened under Alexander’s auspices and at the pope’s command. Why would the pope now 
hesitate to confirm that council’s decision? 
 As it turns out, Lanfranc’s fears proved valid. The archbishop of Canterbury received no 
reply from Alexander II, but Hildebrand wrote back almost immediately.58 “We were glad to 
receive your legates’ message,” the archdeacon wrote, “but much to our regret we could not 
legally accede to your wish that the privilege should as they requested be sent to you in your 
absence.”59 Such a request, made from afar, was inappropriate and without historical precedent, 
                                                
56 For the career of Hildebrand—later Pope Gregory VII—see Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII. 
 
57 Letters, no. 5 [p. 58]: “Cuius negotii gestionem breuiter ex ordine scriptam domino nostro papae transmisi, quam 
volo et rogo a uobis competenti diligentia legi, quatinus caritas uestra certissimum teneat quid michi aeclesiaeque 
meae sedes apostolica confirmando concedere et concedendo confirmare per priuilegium debeat.” 
 
58 Eadmer records a papal letter from Alexander to Lanfranc, Accepimus a quibusdam, in which the pope seems to 
confirm Canterbury’s primacy by referring to Canterbury as the “metropolitan of all Britain” (metropolis totius 
Britanniae). However, even if this letter is genuine (and there are good reasons to think it is not), it is certainly not 
the privilege that Lanfranc sought. Instead, the letter discusses the cathedral chapter of Canterbury. Eadmer, Historia 
Novrorum in Anglia, pp. 9-21. For a discussion of Accepimus a quibusdam and the competing claims regarding its 
authenticity, see Helen Clover, “Alexander II’s Letter Accepimus a quibusdam and its Relationship with the 
Canterbury Forgeries,” in La Normandie bénedictine au temps de Guillaume le Conquérant, XIe siècle (Lille: 
Facultés catholiques de Lille, 1967), pp. 417-442. 
 
59 Ibid., no. 6 [p. 58]: “Verba legatorum uestrorum gratanter accepimus, sed quod uoluntati uestrae in mittendo 




Hildebrand argued.60 But, he told Lanfranc, “it does seem to us essential that you should visit the 
courts of the Apostles, so that we can discuss this and other problems with you in person and 
decide more effectively how to resolve them.”61 What was going on here? It is possible, as John 
Cowdrey argued, that Hildebrand merely wished to “facilitate communication between the 
apostolic see and a metropolitan.”62 But the fact that the papacy’s answer came not from the 
pope himself but rather a powerful subordinate seems revealing. The papacy’s decision to resort 
to back channel communication suggests that something about the situation made Alexander 
uneasy. It is equally telling that the pope (speaking through his mouthpiece, Hildebrand) now 
requested that Lanfranc travel once more to Rome in order to receive a privilege confirming the 
council’s decision. Even in the late eleventh century, it seems to have been standard practice for 
petitioners to seek papal privileges in person.63 But the papacy’s emphasis on protocol in this 
particular situation is odd. Lanfranc had just been to the papal court the year before, when 
Alexander had “declined the invidious task”—as William of Malmesbury put it—of deciding the 
matter in person.64 Why drag the archbishop of Canterbury back to Rome now? Hildebrand’s 
                                                
60 Ibid. 
 
61 Ibid.: “Unde necessarium nobis uidetur uos apostolorum limina uisitare, quatinus de hoc et ceteris una uobiscum 
efficatius quod opportuerit consulere ualeamus atque statuere.” 
 
62 Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 64. 
 
63 During the pontificate of Urban II (1088-1099), the pope refused to grant a privilege to William, abbot of St. 
Benedict, because “in the Roman church there was no such custom that a privilege be drawn up for any absent 
person” (Sed quia in Romana ecclesia talis consuetudo non fuit ut absenti alicui persone privilegium faceret). Here, 
Urban cited canonical tradition as the justification for refusing such a privilege, but as Robert Somerville and 
Stephan Kuttner note, this practice has yet to be studied in detail. There are other examples where the eleventh-
century papacy flexibility rather than strict adherence to the canonical tradition. Given this, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the papacy traditionally gave out such privileges in person, but that some exceptions to this rule were 
possible. See Robert Somerville and Stephan Kuttner, Pope Urban II, the Collectio Britannica, and the Council of 
Melfi, 1089 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 47-48. 
 




words suggest that the papacy was interested in more than mere protocol. In spite of all that had 
occurred, Alexander wanted to discuss the matter again. But why? 
 Our limited source material for the early stages of the primacy dispute does not provide a 
definitive answer to this question. But if we read between the lines of those sources we have, it 
becomes clear that the papacy had more on its mind than settling matters between Canterbury 
and York. At stake in the dispute was the papacy’s power vis-à-vis the English monarchy and, 
more broadly, royal authority in general. Even though Alexander had done much to inject 
himself into the arbitration of the primacy dispute, he undoubtedly knew that the new Norman 
dynasty of England would play a substantial role as well. Our sources support this notion. 
Indeed, one of the remarkable points of consistency among all of our narrative sources is the 
central role that William the Conqueror was to play in the early stages of the dispute. When 
Lanfranc demanded a profession of obedience from Thomas in 1071, the archbishop-elect of 
York first appealed to William rather than the pope.65 And indeed, when William the Conqueror 
eventually decided that Thomas was in the wrong, it was the king’s anger, we are told—even by 
Thomas’ most prominent supporter!—that forced the archbishop-elect to bow to Canterbury’s 
demand.66 The following year, the Conqueror was present when the Council of Winchester 
convened to decide the dispute.67 Both Lanfranc and the author of the Canterbury memorandum 
described Alexander’s instructions for the Council of Winchester as a meeting of the bishops and 
                                                
65 HCY, p. 4; Letters, no. 3 [p. 40]. William of Malmesbury obviously concurred, because he included a version 
very similar to both of the aforementioned texts in his History of the English Bishops. See William of Malmesbury, 
Gesta pontificum anglorum, vol. 1, ed. and trans. M. Winterbottom and R.M. Thomson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2007), p. 52. 
 
66 HCY, p. 6. 
 




abbots of the English realm.68 Neither made any mention of the English monarchy. And yet 
when both men described what transpired at the council, William was center stage. In his report 
to Alexander II, Lanfranc did not—perhaps could not—downplay the Conqueror’s role. “First on 
your authority,” he wrote to the pope, describing the opening of the council, “we exhorted [the 
council’s attendees] by holy obedience.”69 But then, the archbishop of Canterbury added, “on his 
own authority the king enjoined them by the sworn fealty with which they were bound to him, to 
hear this case with the greatest care and then bring it impartially to a definitive and just 
conclusion.”70 
On his own authority. Lanfranc’s subtle phrasing underscores a fundamental tension in 
the power structures of late eleventh- and early twelfth-century England. Papal and royal 
authority were working towards the same end in this particular instance, but that fact did not 
negate the reality that they could also be (and frequently were) in opposition to one another. The 
papal reform movement of this era stressed, above all else, the separation of ecclesiastical affairs 
from worldly politics. Yet this was an ideal that rarely held up in its entirety at the ground level, 
particularly in England. The English monarchy historically played a large role in the affairs of its 
                                                
68 Letters, no. 3 [p. 44]; ibid., no. 4 [p. 50]. According to the Canterbury memorandum, Alexander said that the 
matter was to be settled “by the testimony and judgment of the bishops and abbots of the whole kingdom” (et illic 
tocius regni episcoporum et abbatum testimonio et iudicio definiri). In his report to Alexander, Lanfranc used much 
the same language: “You issued a written directive that an assembly of the bishops, abbots and other persons of 
religious profession in the land of England should hear the case for both sides (“oportuit per scriptum sententiam 
promulgastis quatinus conuentus Anglicae terrae episcoporum abbatum ceterarumque religiosi ordinis personarum 
utruiusque parties rationes audiret”). 
 
69 Ibid.: “In primis adiurati sunt a nobis ex uestra auctoritate per sanctam oboedientiam.” 
 
70 Ibid.: “deinde regia potestas per semetipsam contestata est eos per fidem et sacramentum quibus sibi colligati 





kingdom’s Church, a fact that the Norman Conquest of 1066 merely exacerbated.71 By the time 
the primacy dispute flared up, William the Conqueror was firmly in control of many aspects of 
ecclesiastical life in his new realm. He appointed bishops and abbots at will, oversaw the 
protection of Church lands, and used churchmen of many ranks in the service of royal 
administration.72 In doing so, he continually advanced reform measures championed by the 
newly resurgent papacy.73 But contemporaries also understood how William conceived of the 
relationship between royal and ecclesiastical authority. Orderic Vitalis tells a wonderful anecdote 
about William’s position on clerics who appealed to an authority other than his own. In 1059, 
several years before the Norman Conquest, Abbot Robert of St. Évroul found himself on the 
receiving end of William’s anger when he was accused of rebelling against the duke of 
Normandy. Robert, believing himself unjustly accused, appealed to Pope Nicholas II, who “gave 
a fair hearing to his plea, and promised him full support in his need.”74 But when Robert returned 
to Normandy in the company of two cardinal legates bearing papal letters, William “flew into a 
                                                
71 For useful overviews of the relationship between Church and monarchy in Anglo-Saxon England and the early 
Norman period, see H.R. Loyn, Anglo-Saxon England and the Norman Conquest, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1991), 
particularly chapters 5, 6, and 8; Barlow, The English Church, particularly chapter 7; David C. Douglas, William the 
Conqueror: The Norman Impact upon England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), chapter 13. On the 
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Z.N. Brooke, The English Church and the Papacy: From the Conquest to the Reign of John (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), chapter 9; Martin Brett, The English Church under Henry I (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1975), chapter 2. 
 
72 David Bates, William the Conqueror (London: Philip, 1989), chapter 10; Douglas, William the Conqueror, 
chapter 13. 
 
73 In his letter to William in October 1071, Alexander II acknowledged the Conqueror’s “outstanding reputation for 
piety among the rulers and princes of the world” and the “unmistakable evidence of your support for the Church: 
you do battle against the forces of simoniacal heresy and you defend the freedom of catholic rites and customs” 
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uestra uirtus impendat non dubia relatione cognoscimus). See Letters, no. 7, p. 60. 
 
74 The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis, vol. 2: Books 3 and 4, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1999), p.94: “At ille compatriotam suum nam genere Francus erat benigniter suscepit, 




violent rage, declaring that he was ready to receive legates of the pope, their common father, in 
matters touching the Christian faith, but that if any monk from his duchy dared to bring a plea 
against him he would ignore his cloth and hang him by the cowl from the top of the highest oak-
tree in the wood near by.”75 Upon hearing of William’s anger, Orderic tells us with caustic 
honesty, Robert “beat a hasty retreat and took refuge near Paris with a kinsman of his.”76 A 
decade later, William’s assertive reorganization of the English Church in the years after the 
Conquest suggests that his temperament had not mellowed. He was a man who respected the 
Church and the papal office, but his power in England was something that Alexander II, and later 
Gregory VII, could ill afford to ignore. 
Taking into account the relationship between royal and ecclesiastical power in England, 
Alexander II’s decision not to confirm the verdict of the Council of Winchester looks 
increasingly like an effort to push back against royal authority. The council had met under 
Alexander’s auspices and, by all accounts, had performed the task given to it. So why not simply 
confirm its decision? Hildebrand argued that such a privilege could only be granted to someone 
who appeared in person at the papal court.77 By and large, historians have accepted Hildebrand’s 
word, even though the custom he describes usually had to do with the confirmation of existing 
papal privileges, not the issuance of new ones.78 When confirming existing written documents, 
                                                
75 Ibid.: “vehementer iratus dixit se quidem legatos papae de fide et religione christiana ut communis patris libenter 
suscepturum; sed si quis monachorum de terra sua calumniam sibi contrariam inferret, ad altiorem querum uicinae 
siluae per capicium irreuerenter suspensurum.” 
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77 See above, n. 58-61. 
 
78 Two of the most thorough narrative overviews of the primacy dispute state merely that it was standard practice 
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the papacy admittedly needed to proceed with caution, because of the widespread proliferation of 
forgeries. If a petitioner came to Rome in person, he or she could present the document for 
inspection before the papacy chose whether to confirm its contents.79 But Lanfranc’s request for 
a papal privilege was different. He had asked not for the confirmation of an existing papal 
document but rather the ratification of the Council of Winchester’s findings. The pope’s decision 
to refuse this request (at least temporarily) was not about a document; it was about displaying his 
own power. Lanfranc’s report showed all too clearly that William the Conqueror had overseen 
the Council of Winchester. Now, Alexander intended to make a statement about his own 
authority by forcing Lanfranc to return to Rome. 
For reasons that are not altogether clear, Lanfranc never made that journey and, as a 
result, never received the papal confirmation he craved. It is possible that he chafed at the idea of 
traveling back to Rome less than a year after he had made the long and arduous trip with 
Thomas. The length, effort, and cost of the journey surely weighed on him, particularly given 
that the outcome of such a journey was uncertain. Hildebrand’s letter suggested that the papacy 
was ready to confirm the Council of Winchester’s decision if Lanfranc visited the papal court. 
But the wording also mentioned reopening the discussion. Lanfranc must have pondered the 
meaning of that line as he decided whether or not to make the trip. Yet even while he stewed, 
Lanfranc also must have realized that for the time being the dispute had been settled comfortably 
in his favor. For the next two decades, Lanfranc and Thomas ruled their respective archdioceses 
in peace, whether because Thomas simply viewed his oath—which he had now made not once, 
but twice—as inviolable, or because William’s seal of approval on the agreement had been 
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sufficient to silence those who opposed Canterbury’s primacy. For the moment, the English 
Church was at peace. 
The first stage of the primacy dispute, which lasted from 1070 until 1072, consisted of a 
rapid progression of events that set the tone for the next six decades of legal limbo. As these 
events unfolded, certain key elements of the dispute became clear. First and foremost, the papacy 
believed it had a vested interest in arbitrating the matter. Alexander had taken on the task of 
orchestrating a mutually acceptable resolution; he had provided instructions to the English 
Church on the way to reach that resolution; and by refusing to confirm the Council of 
Winchester’s decision he had—in a manner that may strike us as counterintuitive—made clear 
that the papacy was the only institution capable of ending the dispute once and for all. 
Underpinning these actions were a series of important communicative processes that involved 
the transmission, collection, processing, and validation of information. Thomas’ physical journey 
to Rome led to an audience with the pope. That audience led to written papal instructions for a 
process of arbitration. Those instructions in turn led to the Council of Winchester, a multifaceted 
communicative tool designed to collect and process evidence about the historical roots of the 
primacy dispute. The council’s decision was laid out in written form, and was transmitted back 
to the papacy. Finally, for the entire matter to be settled, the papacy needed to validate that 
decision in writing. 
At each stage of this process, however, there was an opportunity for something to go 
wrong. This brings us to a second observation about the early stage of the dispute: the relative 
fragility of papal power in a political context dominated by a strong secular ruler. That the new 
Anglo-Norman monarchy would play some role seems almost a given. After all, it is no 
coincidence that Thomas of York’s first instinct had been to seek the aid of William. But when 
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the papacy became involved in the matter beginning in 1071, nothing about its approach 
suggested that William the Conqueror was to play a substantive role in the arbitration. Even 
though Alexander II’s written instructions for the Council of Winchester do not survive, none of 
the extant evidence articulates a role for the English king. When Alexander wrote to William in 
October 1071, he mentioned an argument between Thomas of York and the bishop of 
Dorchester, but nothing about the primacy dispute. Apparently, Alexander had given Lanfranc 
some oral message to be delivered to the English king, which Helen Clover and Margaret 
Gibson, the editors of Lanfranc’s letters, suggest covered the pope’s instructions for the Council 
of Winchester.80 It seems unlikely that the pope would have written out instructions for 
arbitraitng a minor ecclesiastical dispute while simultaneously communicating orally his 
instructions for a more prominent one. But even if Clover and Gibson are correct, the pope’s 
decision to address William through Lanfranc simply underscores how tenuous the 
communication of papal authority could be. Lanfranc, one of the two litigants in the case, had a 
close personal relationship with William the Conqueror. As David Douglas observes, the 
association between these two men “was to be so close that it is always difficult, and sometimes 
impossible, to decide whether the policy, which, in England, they jointly implemented, was 
inspired by the one or the other.”81 Everything we know about Alexander’s written instructions 
for the Council of Winchester suggest that the papacy wished the arbitration process to be 
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impartial. If the pope did employ oral instructions as well, particularly using Lanfranc as their 
carrier, there was substantial room for a liberal—and even incorrect—interpretation of the pope’s 
words. 
As a result of these factors, the communication of the pope’s authority and his 
instructions for arbitrating the primacy dispute stumbled at various points. His written 
instructions for the Council of Winchester were carried out, but with the English king playing a 
role that the pope almost certainly had not articulated. The Council of Winchester came to a 
decision—one that even Thomas of York ultimately accepted—but did not sufficiently bear the 
stamp of papal approval, even with the pope’s representative in attendance. As a result, Lanfranc 
(and, we must assume, others around him) felt the need for additional papal confirmation. 
Finally, the papacy, reacting to the unfolding political situation, refused to grant that 
confirmation, making its decisions seem inconsistent at best. Even having initiated this 
arbitration process, Hildebrand’s letter shows conclusively that the papacy was open to 
discussing the matter more. For the moment, the primary litigants had tied up the matter. But in 
the years ahead, those threads would unravel faster than anyone could imagine. 
Dispute Renewed—Confusion and a Cacophony of Voices: 
 The first stage of the primacy dispute between Canterbury and York was not the neat and 
tidy affair that the papacy may have wished, but it paled in comparison to what transpired over 
the next six decades. Thomas of York and Lanfranc of Canterbury remained at peace during the 
latter’s lifetime, even though the dispute continued to simmer. In 1093, however, the 
appointment of Anselm of Bec to the archbishopric of Canterbury raised that simmer to a steady 
boil. Although Thomas had made a profession both to Lanfranc and his successors, Lanfranc’s 
death seems to have caused the archbishop of York to reconsider his position. Eadmer and Hugh 
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the Chanter differ somewhat in their accounts of Anselm’s consecration, but both suggest that 
Thomas questioned Anselm’s primacy. According to Eadmer, an enthusiastic supporter of 
Anselm, Thomas objected to the election writ that described Anselm as “metropolitan of 
Britain.” Instead, Eadmer claims, Thomas suggested—somewhat implausibly, since doing so 
reinforced the necessity of his submission to Anselm—that the “Church of Canterbury is primate 
of the whole of Britain, but not metropolitan.”82 True to form, Hugh the Chanter’s account 
bolsters the Yorkist cause in more strident language. Upon hearing that he was to consecrate 
Anselm as “primate of all Britain,” Hugh says that Thomas “withdrew, entered the vestry and 
took off his pontificals.”83 When the bishop of Winchester asked what he was doing, Thomas 
replied: “Since there are only two metropolitans in Britain, one of them cannot be primate except 
over the other. If I personally and improperly submitted, whether for love or for fear, with a 
young man’s folly, I am now free. I will consecrate no man primate.”84 Here, the two narrative 
accounts differ even more wildly. Hugh claims that Anselm agreed to receive consecration as 
“metropolitan” but not as “primate.”85 Eadmer, predictably says just the opposite.86 The semantic 
technicalities of both passages cannot obscure a larger, more important point: in spite of the 
Council of Winchester two decades earlier, the institutional relationship between the two 
archdioceses was still unclear. Up to this point, papal arbitration had been ineffective. 
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 Anselm’s elevation to the archbishopric of Canterbury complicated matters, but the year 
1100 was the real turning point in the second stage of the primacy dispute. In that year, the cast 
of characters changed dramatically. Thomas of York died, and Henry I assumed the English 
throne. The first event threw into even greater confusion the legal question of whether Thomas’ 
profession from 1072 had bound him alone or his successors as well. The second event 
undermined papal efforts to answer that question, because Henry continually injected himself 
into the controversy, undercutting at every turn the papacy’s efforts to communicate its will. 
Between 1093 and 1119, when Calixtus II assumed the papal throne, the papacy’s response to 
the primacy dispute was disorganized at best. The papacy’s arsensal of communicative tools—
letters, delegated agents, and face-to-face meetings between the pope and various litigants—
routinely failed to function as they should, in large part because of an unstable political situation 
and the proliferation of parties involved in the case. A nascent papal communications 
infrastructure could not withstand these challenges. In the later twelfth and early thirteenth 
centuries, as later chapters of this study will discuss, a series of large-scale communicative 
challenges forced the papacy to use the tools in its possession in new and interesting ways, albeit 
with mixed success.87 But for the archdioceses of Canterbury and York those developments were 
too far in the future to have any lasting impact on their current predicament. 
 As noted above, papal efforts to communicate with the parties involved in the primacy 
dispute depended, at least in part, on the maintenance of a political space that allowed for the 
movement of communicative tools, such as people and letters. Yet in the years around 1100 the 
relationship between Rome and England was fraught with political disruptions thanks to the 
Investiture Controversy. The story of that conflict has been told on many occasions, and it need 
                                                




not be told again here.88 For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that this larger—and more 
famous—conflict over the relationship between Church and State (sacerdotium and regnum) had 
trickle-down consequences that affected all other routine business that the papacy needed to 
conduct. As the pope engaged in a ferocious game of tug of war with secular rulers throughout 
Europe, litigants seeking aid from the bishop of Rome became casualties. If we believe the 
emotional accounts handed down to us by Eadmer and Hugh the Chanter, the archdioceses of 
Canterbury and York suffered as deeply as any. 
 The political relationship between England and Rome during these two decades 
dramatically reduced the effectiveness of papal communicative mechanisms by limiting the 
physical movement of people. At many points in the ongoing dispute, representatives of 
Canterbury and York (whether the archbishops themselves or other agents), papal legates, and 
other messengers were chastened, delayed, or blocked outright as they tried to move from place 
to place, negotiate with various parties, and deliver written and oral messages. The chief culprit 
in this case was Henry I of England, the youngest son of William the Conqueror who had seized 
the English throne in 1100 after the death of his older brother, William II. Henry proved a 
remarkably effective ruler, in turns both efficient and ruthless.89 William of Malmesbury 
described him as “capable in administration and obstinate in defense,” a man whose “hatreds and 
                                                
88 Blumenthal, The Investiture Controversy, particularly pp. 142-159; Norman F. Cantor, Church, Kingship, and 
Lay Investiture in England, 1089-1135 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958). For broader overviews of the 
Investiture Controversy and the relationship between the papacy and the empire at this time, see Morris, The Papal 
Monarchy, pp. 109-173; Robinson, The Papacy, pp. 398-441; Schimmelpfennig, The Papacy, trans. James Sievert 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 130-150. The excellent bibliography in Blumenthal, The 
Investiture Controversy, pp. 174-181 fills out this picture considerably. 
 
89 Judith A. Green, The Government of England under Henry I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); 
Judith A. Green, Henry I: King of England and Duke of Normandy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
C. Warren Hollister, Henry I, edited and completed by Amanda Clark Frost (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2001); Richard W. Southern, “The Place of the Reign of Henry I in English History,” Proceedings of the British 




his friendships were maintained to any extreme, the one serving as outlets for his great fits of 
range, the other for his kingly generosity, as he plunged his enemies in misery, and exalted 
friends and supporters until all were jealous of them.”90 This ferocity of spirit manifested itself in 
good measure during the primacy dispute. 
 At various points in his narrative of the primacy dispute, Hugh the Chanter describes how 
Henry blocked representatives of the archdiocese of York from traveling to Rome to consult with 
the pope. A particular victim of royal power was Thurstan, whose struggle to assume the 
archbishopric of York between 1114 and 1120 formed the core of Hugh’s history. Shortly after 
his election in 1114, Thurstan tried to appeal to the pope after Ralph, archbishop of Canterbury, 
demanded the standard profession of obedience from him. Hugh’s protagonist successfully made 
it to Normandy, “but [Ralph] sent after him to the king golden nets and silver bolts to catch him 
and block his way to Rome.”91 Two years later, when Thurstan tried to resign his office in 
frustration over the protracted dispute with Canterbury, he asked Henry’s permission to travel to 
Rome. “But though he pressed his request in person and through others,” Hugh tells us, “the king 
would not agree.” Instead, Thurstan “was kept in Normandy, away from England, as if under 
guard on a long chain.”92 Meanwhile, the bishop of Exeter, “who had been sent to Rome by the 
king to plead against [York],” made his journey to and from Rome with relative ease.93 Hugh 
                                                
90 William of Malmesbury, Gesta regum anglorum, vol. 1, p. 742: “erat ille in rebus suis prouidendo efficax, 
defendendo pertinax…odii et amicitiae in quamlibet tenax, in altero nimio irarum estui, in altero regiae 
magnanimitati satisfatiens, hostes uidelicet ad miseriam deprimens, amicos et clientes ad inuidiam efferens.” 
 
91 HCY, p. 60: “set archiepiscopus misit post eum ad regem recia aurea et obieces argenteas, quibus retento Romam 
properanti uia obstrueretur.” 
 
92 Ibid., p. 76: “Romam eundi licenciam a rege quesiuit, cui sepe per se et per alios instanti rex non adquieuit. Ab 
Anglia long acathena retentus in Normannia quasi sub custodia detinebatur.” 
 




intimates that Ralph, archbishop of Canterbury, was behind the king’s decision to hinder 
Thurstan’s movements.94 But even if he was, it was Henry’s power that prevented Thurstan from 
making his journey. A few years later, similar events transpired. In January 1119, Gelasius II 
neared the city of Tours as he journeyed through France on his way to a meeting with the French 
king. However, when Thurstan “besought the king to let him go there,” Henry “would have none 
of it.”95 The Anglo-Norman monarchy had often tried to control the movement of prominent 
clerics as a means of asserting control over the English Church.96 Hugh lamented how this 
development disrupted Thurstan’s communications with the pope. “Just as our elect could by no 
means get leave to go to Popes Paschal and Gelasius, he quite failed to get it to go to Pope 
Calixtus, though he repeatedly begged and prayed the king for it.”97 Of course, a personal 
meeting between the pope and Thurstan was not guaranteed to have any tangible effect. But “the 
nearer the pope came to France, the more did Archbishop Ralph [of Canterbury] fear lest 
[Thurstan] should approach him.”98 Henry I, it seems, was happy to indulge the Canterbury 
party. His efforts successfully put significant distance between Thurstan and the one man whose 
help could advance his cause. In doing so, we see in an explicit example how a favorable 
                                                
94 Ibid., p. 80. 
 
95 Ibid., p. 100: “Post Epiphaniam audito papam Turonis regi Francorum mandasse ut illic die designato ei 
occurreret, sacerdos noster obnixe regi supplicabat quatinus eum illuc ire dimitteret; set nullatenus uoluit.” 
 
96 For example, Eadmer notes that Anselm asked for similar permission to go to Rome in 1097. William II refused, 
and, as a result, Anselm cancelled his proposed trip. HNA, pp. 79-80. 
 
97 HCY, p. 108: “Sicut electo nostro ad papam Paschalem et Gelasium ire non licuit, sic et ad Calixtum eundi 
licenciam a rege sepius quesitam et suppliciter postulatam nequaquam optinuit.” 
 





political climate was absolutely essential to the free flow of information and people that was 
necessary to the resolution of the dispute. 
 These political hindrances to travel made a difficult process even more so. Today, it is 
easy to forget how difficult travel once was, even when political disputes, wars, and other 
impediments of human creation stood in the way. Weeks, sometimes months passed every time a 
letter or person traveled between England and Rome, a distance of more than 900 miles as the 
crow flies.99 And travelers in the Middle Ages were not crows. They traveled, and sometimes 
trudged, down endless winding roads, across rivers and mountains, all while subject to weather 
that determined in large part how quickly—and by what route—they could move.100 Whether by 
means of a letter or an oral message, every act of communication that took place during the 
primacy dispute was the product of many hours of human labor. This was true even in a 
                                                
99 Estimating travel time in the premodern world is a difficult task, in part because of the lack of concrete 
information in many cases, and in part because travel speeds could vary widely. Based on a variety of sources, many 
of them papal, Yves Renouard calculated that it took, on average, twenty days for someone to travel from Rome to 
Paris in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Other sources, such as the register of Eudes Rigaud, the 
thirteenth-century Franciscan archbishop of Rouen, offer additional information. Faster speeds were undoubtedly 
possible in times of great urgency, but we must also assume that many journeys took longer as well. A single 
traveler on horseback rides at a very different pace from a caravan. Yves Renouard, “Information et transmission des 
nouvelles,” in L’histoire et ses méthodes, ed. Charles Samaran (Paris: Gallimard, 1961), p. 115; The Register of 
Eudes of Rouen, trans. Sydney M. Brown, ed. Jeremiah F. O’Sullivan (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1964). For an analysis of how historians can use sources like Eudes’ register for information about travel, see Yves 
Renouard, “Routes, étapes et vitesses de marche de France à Rome au XIIIe et au XIVe siècles d’après les itinéraires 
d’Eudes Rigaud (1254) et de Barthélemy Bonis (1350),” in Études d’histoire médiévale, vol. 2, ed. Yves Renouard 
(Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1968), pp. 677-697. A useful discussion of the speed of both land and sea travel, some of 
which builds on Renouard’s work, can be found in Michael McCormick, Origins of the European Economy: 
Communications and Commerce, A.D. 300-900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 474-476, 481-
483. As McCormick notes, “Routes plotted ‘as the crow flies’ offer only a rough yardstick for minimal speeds or 
time required for travel, since even modern roads through variegated terrain rarely follow straight lines (p. 475).” 
 
100 By the Later Middle Ages, travel infrastructure had improved dramatically with the construction of new bridges, 
the opening of new passes through the Alps, and the establishment of new roads. Still, fifteenth-century travelers 
hardly had access to the Autobahn, and their predecessors in the eleventh and twelfth centuries dealt with travel 
infrastructure that was poor at best. For marvelous overviews of the realities of medieval travel and the changing 
nature of travel infrastructure in the High Middle Ages, see Peter Spufford, Power and Profit: The Merchant in 
Medieval Europe (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2002), chapter 4; Jean Verdon, Travel in the Middle Ages, trans. 




favorable political climate. In 1117, Ralph of Canterbury sought his own audience with the pope 
in the Eternal City, but the journey to the center of Latin Christendom took a physical toll. The 
archbishop fell ill in France, and “it was after a long time and with difficulty that he resumed his 
journey with his companions, still in poor health.”101 The journey across the Alps complete, one 
of Ralph’s traveling companions, Herbert, bishop of Norwich, promptly took to his bed “and 
could go no further for the moment.”102 Such difficulties, even in a favorable political climate, 
could bring the flow of information to a standstill. In 1115, Paschal II finally received letters that 
the chapter of York had written in support of Thurstan’s election to their archbishopric—letters, 
it should be added, that had been drafted and sent more than a year earlier.103 
 If we pause to consider how the movement of letters and people lay at the heart of efforts 
to end the primacy dispute, suddenly the number of parties involved in such communication 
becomes important. Initially, the primacy dispute had a limited cast of characters that included 
Lanfranc, Thomas, and Alexander II. However, the number of people involved quickly ballooned 
as the arbitration process unfolded over subsequent decades. William the Conqueror, the legate 
Hubert, and the attendees of the Council of Winchester all played a role in the first phase of the 
dispute.104 But while the number of primary litigants never changed, Hugh the Chanter and 
Eadmer both suggest that other parties began to influence how the dispute unfolded in the early 
twelfth century. As Hugh tells the story, the issue of Canterbury’s primacy was all-consuming 
                                                
101 HCY, p. 82: “unde post longum et uix, nec bene conualescens, ceptum iter cum suis arripuit.” 
 
102 Ibid.: “Transcensis Alpedibus in Lumbardia Herbertus episcopus, egritudine ualide percussus, ulterius tunc ire 
non ualuit.” 
 
103 Ibid., pp. 60, 66. 
 
104 The role of England’s bishops and abbots, however, was limited to the council itself. There is no evidence that 




for the monks of Canterbury. “They think on it while awake,” he wrote, “and dream of it in their 
sleep, and pine away for grief at the loss of the profession.”105 Given this, Thomas II’s election to 
the archbishopric of York in 1108 prompted Canterbury’s monks “to hint to their own 
archbishop, advise, and urge him to take thought now how to restore to his church what he had 
lost.”106 In a similar vein, Eadmer describes the “machinations” of York’s canons as they sought 
to prevent Thomas II from coming to Canterbury for consecration, fearful that their archbishop 
would submit to Canterbury.107 Even if we assume a healthy dose of hyperbole in our narrative 
sources, there can be no doubt that the cathedral chapters of both archdioceses inserted 
themselves into the dispute. In 1102, for example, the dean of the York cathedral chapter served 
as a back channel representative in negotiations between Gerard, archbishop of Canterbury, and 
John of Gaeta, the papal chancellor who would become Pope Gelasius II in 1118.108 And in 
1117, the canons of York sent Thurstan a secret letter that, they hoped, would provide the pope 
with crucial details of their archbishop’s continued dispute with Canterbury and the English 
monarchy.109 
 The proliferation of parties involved in the dispute, and the ever-changing cast of 
characters, further disrupted established channels of communication. Unsurprisingly, more 
people made for a more complex communicative environment where individual means of 
                                                
105 Ibid., p. 26: “monachi tamen Cantuarienses, quod iniustum affectare et inpudenter petere non desistunt, set 
uigilando cogitantes, dormiendo sompniantes, de perdita professione dolore tabescunt.” 
 
106 Ibid.: “Thoma igitur in archiepiscopum electo, monachi suo archipiscopo suggerunt, monent, incitant quatinus 
modo de restituendo ecclesie sue quod perdiderat cogitet.” 
 
107 HNA, p. 203. 
 
108 HCY, p. 28. 
 




communication proved to be less than effective. Eight popes reigned as the primacy dispute 
unfolded between 1071 and 1131, a number that, in and of itself, highlights both the papacy’s 
difficulty in ending this conflict and the challenges the institution faced as its leadership changed 
constantly.110 Changing leadership brought different personalities and skills to the office, which 
in turn altered the contours of institutional and personal relationships between the pope and the 
other parties involved. All of this made it difficult for the papacy to develop, let alone 
communicate, a consistent policy. Alexander II initially believed that the English Church should 
solve the problem of the primacy dispute. Then, in refusing to confirm the Council of 
Winchester’s decision, he reaffirmed the papacy’s larger role in crafting a solution. Gregory 
VII’s personal relationship with Lanfranc and William the Conqueror deteriorated rapidly during 
the course of his pontificate, cutting him off from regular communication with both men.111 
Perhaps as a result of this, he never addressed the matter of the primarcy dispute. Yet at the same 
time, Gregory showed a willingness to inject himself into such a debate when he used the papal 
office to confirm a similar primacy for the archdiocese of Lyons in 1079.112 Perhaps Lanfranc 
would have gained a similar privilege for Canterbury if his relationship with Gregory had not 
become so strained. 
                                                
110 The eight popes in question are: Alexander II (1061-1073, Gregory VII (1073-1085), Urban II (1088-1099), 
Paschal II (1099-1118), Gelasius II (1118-1119), Calixtus II (1119-1124), Honorius II (1124-1130), and Innocent II 
(1130-1143). While there is ample evidence that all eight men injected themselves into the dispute in on way or 
another—albeit with different levels of intensity and frequency—there is no record that Victor III (1086-1087) did 
so at all. 
 
111 Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 465-467. In March 1079, Gregory implored Lanfranc to come to Rome. 
Lanfranc evaded the issue and never made the journey. See The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 6.30, pp. 312-313; 
Letters, no. 38, pp. 128-131. 
 




Papal vacillation on the issue of the primacy continued in the decades that followed. A 
curious letter of Urban II, quoted by Hugh the Chanter, suggests that the pope may have come 
around to the side of York by 1093/1094. If the letter is genuine—and scholarly consensus now 
suggests that it is—then Urban chastised Thomas of York for professing obedience to the newly 
consecrated Anselm of Canterbury “contrary to the decree of the blessed Gregory [the Great] 
and—crucially—“without consulting the bishop of Rome.”113 Read one way, this letter would 
seem to settle the matter in favor of York. And yet less than a decade later, Paschal II seems to 
have reversed course. Writing twice to Anselm of Canterbury in April 1102 and again in 
November 1103, he referred to, and then confirmed, the archbishop’s “primacy.”114 Paschal’s 
language was somewhat ambiguous, and neither letter mentioned York at all. But then, in 
December 1102, Paschal wrote to Gerard of York, instructing him to make a profession of 
obedience to Anselm.115 Referring back to the decision of the Council of Winchester—which 
Paschal’s predecessor, Alexander II, had refused to confirm—the pope said that “what was so 
decided at that time we also wish, by God’s command to be kept firm and unimpaired.”116 Was 
this proof positive of Canterbury’s primacy? Hardly! By 1108-9, the two parties had resurrected 
                                                
113 HCY, p. 10: “tu post acceptum ab apostolica sede pallium, post iuratam, sicut mos est metropolitanis, fidelitatem, 
inconsulto Romano pontifice Cantuariensi episcopo tuam ecclesiam indebite subdidisti, et cartam ei professionis 
contra decretum beati Gregorii fecisti.” For the history of the letter, see ibid., pp. xxxix-xl; Dueball, Der 
Suprematstreit zwischen den Erzdiözesen Canterbury und York, pp. 42-43. 
 
114 S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia, t. 2, vol. 4, ed. F.S. Schmitt (Stuttgart: Friedrich 
Frommann Verlag, 1984), nos. 222 and 303 [pp. 124-125, 224-225]. 
 
115 This was somewhat odd given that, in December 1100 or early 1101 Paschal had written to the suffragan 
bishiops of York, exhorting them to observe their archbishop. The move seems to have been intended to bolster the 
position of York, and yet two years later Paschal seemed to confirm Canterbury’s primacy. For Paschal’s letter to 
York, see Scotia pontificia, no. 1 [p. 19]. 
 
116 Ibid., no. 283 [p. 200]: “Unde et nos, quod tunc temporis definitum est, volumus, auctore deo, firmum 
illibatumque servari.” I have used the English translation found in The Letters of Saint Anselm of Canterbury, vol. 2, 




the dispute, the papacy was involved yet again, and, due to changing political relations between 
the Paschal II and the English monarchy, the bishop of Rome backed off his former commitment 
to Canterbury.117 It is always tempting to view the papacy—like any governmental institution, 
past and present—as monolithic, even unchanging. But the temperament of individual popes 
mattered. Changing political circumstances mattered. The papacy’s take on the primacy dispute 
changed over time, as did its approach to resolving that dispute. And all the while, it failed to 
bring about any meaningful resolution. 
 As it turns out, an inconsistent message was only one part of the papacy’s seeming 
powerlessness to arbitrate the primacy dispute in the period 1093 to 1119. At the heart of shifting 
papal policy lay a fundamental inability on the part of the institution to communicate its 
intentions in a clear or programmatic manner. The chief mechanisms of papal communication, 
letters and delegated agents, consistently proved unreliable. 
 Although papal letters of the period frequently request—even plead—that the primary 
litigants of the primacy dispute make the long journey to Rome for a personal audience with the 
pope, the papacy also readily employed delegated agents to carry its messages and to serve as 
judge in place of the pope himself. Hubert, the legate who attended the Council of Winchester in 
1171, was the first such figure to play a role in the primacy dispute, but he was not the last. In 
1100, Paschal II appointed Guy, archbishop of Vienne and the future Pope Calixtus II, as legate 
to the Anglo-Norman realm.118 His tenure, however, was brief. When Guy arrived in England, 
                                                
117 Dueball, Der Suprematstreit zwischen den Erzdiözesen Canterbury und York, pp. 55-67. 
 
118 Because of the dearth of source material, there is some debate about the precise date of Guy’s legation. Helene 
Tillmann argues for a brief period in 1100. Martin Brett, building his analysis on the histories of William of 
Malmesbury and Eadmer, and the letters of Anselm, argues for a brief period in 1100, before Anselm returned at the 
end of the year. Beate Schilling concurs. Mary Stroll suggests 1101. I am most convinced by Brett’s analysis and, as 
a result, have followed him and Schilling in dating Guy’s legation to 1100. Tillmann, Die päpstlichen Legaten in 
England, p. 22; Brett, The English Church under Henry I, p.35; Beate Schilling, Guido von Vienne-Papst Calixt II. 
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Eadmer tells us, “all were astonished, as everyone knew that it was a thing unheard of in Britain 
that anyone should exercise authority over them as representing the pope except the archbishop 
of Canterbury.”119 Here, Eadmer was not just betraying his partisan sympathies. Archbishops of 
Canterbury (including Lanfranc) had long claimed to hold a permanent papal legation as part of 
their primacy over Britain. Indeed, when he heard of Guy’s legation, Anselm of Canterbury 
wrote urgently to Paschal II complaining of the move.120 Anselm’s complaints, however, may 
not have been necessary, for Guy’s legation was short-lived and ineffective. “Consequently, as 
he came so he went back,” Eadmer says, “not recognized by anyone as legate and without having 
acted in any way as such.”121 
 Nine years after Guy’s brief foray into the primacy dispute, Paschal II sent another legate 
to England: Ulrich, a cardinal priest and member of the papal Curia.122 Ulrich’s primary task was 
to bring a pallium for the newly consecrated Thomas II of York.123 But according to Hugh the 
Chanter, the story was not quite as simple as that. Hugh suggests that Henry I, frustrated by the 
ongoing dispute between Canterbury and York, “besought the holy father to send to England a 
just and discreet legate a latere to bring the pallium to the archbishop elect, and to decide the 
                                                
(Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1998), pp. 354-357; Mary Stroll, Calixtus II (1119-1124): A Pope Born to 
Rule (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 77. 
 
119 HNA, p. 126: “Quod per Angliam auditum in admirationem omnibus venit, inauditum scilicet in Britannia cuncti 
scientes, quemlibet hominum super se vices apostolicas gerere, nisi solum archiepiscopum Cantuariae.” 
 
120 S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia, t. 2, vol. 4, p. 112. 
 
121 HNA, p. 126: “Quapropter sicut venit ita reversus est, a nimine pro legato susceptus, nec in aliquo legati officio 
functus.” 
 
122 Tillmann, Die päpstlichen Legaten in England, pp. 23-24. 
 
123 Ibid.; Brett, The English Church under Henry I, p. 48. 
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cause between the two metropolitans by canon law.”124 Traditionally, the Anglo-Norman 
monarchy had been wary of papal legates who could challenge their own influence over the 
English Church, so it is difficult know whether Henry actually played a role in requesting 
Ulrich’s legation, as Hugh suggests.125 Still, what happened after Ulrich’s arrival is not in 
dispute. Hugh had every reason to play up the papacy’s role in arbitrating the primacy dispute, 
and yet the picture he paints of Ulrich’s legation underscores the idea that Paschal’s legate made 
little, if any, substantive impact. When Ulrich arrived at the royal court to hear the case, he was 
immediately sidelined. Instead of approaching the legate, the monks of Canterbury approached 
Henry, “making greater offers, and promising more than anyone could easily believe, even 
granting that he might keep the archbishopric in his own hands as long as he liked without any 
complaint from them.”126 When Henry reminded them that Ulrich had been sent to decide the 
case, Canterbury’s monks suggested to the king that he adjudicate the matter instead.127 Thomas 
II and the monks of York more readily took advantage of Ulrich’s presence, but after multiple 
attempts to influence the legate, they grew frustrated by his unwillingness to decide the matter. 
Eventually, Thomas II capitulated and made his profession to Canterbury. Shortly thereafter—
almost inexplicably—Ulrich, who had just refused to decide one way or another, “ordered the 
archbishop…to present himself before the pope to answer for having made his profession, 
                                                
124 HCY, p. 38: “Quapropter paternitati sue supplicabat ut quemlibet a latere suo uirum iustum et discretum in 
Angliam mitteret, qui electo archiepiscopo palleum deferret, et causam inter duos metropolitanos canonice 
decideret.” 
 
125 By the time Hugh wrote his history, York was very much aligned with the papacy, so it would have been 
beneficial for him to bolster the papacy and its agents at every turn. 
 
126 Ibid., p. 40: “Deinde conueniunt ad regem episcopi et abbates et monachi Cantuarienses, multa offerentes, plura 
quam facile quis credere uelit promittentes, archiepiscopatum quoque quamdiu uellet in propria manu tenere sine 
querela eorum concedentes.” 
 
127 Ibid.: “Legato dicetis rem diligencius perscrutatam et melius conditam aliter esse quam putaueratis, neque, ut 
speramus, uoluntati uestre contra conabitur.” 
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contrary to the ruling of St. Gregory and the sentence of the Roman court.”128 Uncertainty and 
indecision once again reigned supreme. 
 Even if Eadmer and Hugh exaggerated slightly in their accounts of these legations, both 
highlight a fundamental problem with the papacy’s decision to communicate through delegated 
agents. As Guy’s case shows, a legate, acting as the papacy’s official mouthpiece, was only as 
powerful as he was perceived to be. At least one of the litigants in the primacy dispute (Anselm 
of Canterbury), and quite possibly a much broader swath of the English Church, did not accept 
his power to speak on behalf of the pope. As a result, he was silenced. Ulrich’s legation is more 
complicated. This legate made it to England and was, apparently, available to hear arguments put 
forward by representatives from Canterbury and York. But he played second fiddle to the king, 
just as Hubert had done with William the Conqueror nearly forty years earlier. And even when 
he began to play a role, he offered neither conclusive guidance for the litigants nor a definitive 
judgment to end the case. In both of these cases, legates proved ineffective communicators of the 
pope’s will. 
 We do not know what Paschal II thought of these failed legations, but a fascinating 
anecdote earlier in Eadmer’s narrative highlights how frustrated the pope and his advisors must 
have felt when the communicative tools available to them failed to work as they should. In the 
course of a lengthy discussion of the political dispute between Paschal II, Henry I, and Anselm 
of Canterbury over the question of lay investiture, Eadmer paused to consider a particular 
episode that revolved around the sending and reception of papal letters. In 1101, Henry I, 
frustrated by Anselm’s obstinate objection to his investiture of bishops and abbots, sent three 
                                                
128 Ibid.: “Cumque digredi deberent, cardinalis precepit archiepiscopo ex auctoritate sancte Romane ecclesie, diem 
illi statuens, quatinus domino pape presenciam suam exhiberet, super hoc satisfacturus quod contra statutum beatis 
Gregorii et contra sentenciam curie Romane professus erat.” 
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bishops to Rome to seek papal adjudication. When the three men (including the newly minted 
archbishop of York, Gerard) reached the Eternal City after a long and arduous journey, they 
“explained verbally to the pope each in his own way the trouble that was the reason for their 
coming, and they humbly asked for a decision which would put an end to such a disastrous state 
of affairs.”129 But when these three English bishops returned to England bearing Paschal’s 
letters, Henry—probably aware that the decision was not favorable to his cause—refused to even 
accept or read the written letters. What followed is best left to Eadmer’s own words:  
So the contents of the letter did not become known to us at that time. But the more 
carefully it was then kept secret, the more widely it was published abroad only a few 
days later. But, when the letter addressed to Anselm had been read and re-read to all 
who cared to hear it, the bishops who had come from Rome interposed and said that 
the pope had given them verbal instructions which differed from that letter and even 
from the letter which they had brought for the king. When asked what instructions, 
they declared on their honor as bishops that the pope himself had sent by them a 
purely verbal message to the king to the effect that…in the matter of the investiture 
of churches he would treat the king leniently and would not lay upon him any penal 
sentence of excommunication if he invested duly ordained persons by presentation of 
the pastoral staff. The reason why he was unwilling to grant him the gift of this high 
privilege by written document was, they said, that he was afraid that if this came to 
the knowledge of other princes, they would claim the same right for themselves in 
contempt of papal authority. When those who had been sent on Anselm’s side spoke 
out against this, declaring that the pope had not given verbally any instruction which 
was in any way contrary to the letter…one side sought to maintain that, as against 
the uncertainty of mere words, the written document authenticated by the pope’s seal 
and the words of the monks should be unhesitatingly believed; the other side on the 
contrary that credence should be given to the assertion of three bishops rather than to 
what was only a sheepskin marked with black ink and weighted with a little lump of 
lead.130 
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 61 
 What Eadmer described in this brief, but fascinating anecdote, was no less than a process 
by which specific communicative mechanisms were subject to interrogation and analysis. What 
was more valid, a letter or the word of a delegated representative? How could one tell? Was there 
a way to verify and, where necessary, reconcile different sets of information presented orally and 
in writing? And how should one proceed when such information appeared irreconcilable? 
Anselm, apparently, admitted that in the absence of any agreement between the written and oral 
word, “the better course seems to be to consult the pope on this question, rather than to make a 
hasty decision on a matter which casts down so much doubt.”131 In short, the parties involved 
could not work through the disparity between the two communication media. For an answer, they 
had to return to the source. This, of course, was a nightmare scenario for the papacy, as Paschal 
understood all too well. It seems that the pope had not, in fact, given the three bishops verbal 
instructions. When he found out what had occurred, he was furious. “The bishops,” he wrote to 
Anselm in December 1102, “who, while lying, protested that they were telling the truth, now that 
the truth, which God himself is, has been brought into the discussion, we shut out from the grace 
of St. Peter and from fellowship with us until they make amends to the Church of Rome and 
acknowledge the gravity of their offence.”132 
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 Ultimately, the aforementioned anecdote has little to do with the specifics of the primacy 
dispute between the archdioceses of Canterbury and York. And yet, it serves as a convenient 
summary of the many problems that plagued that dispute and the efforts to resolve it. Throughout 
the period 1093 to 1119, the papacy’s efforts to serve as an arbitrator repeatedly fell victim to a 
series of communicative problems. Legates and messengers were prevented from traveling, thus 
inhibiting—and in some cases preventing altogether—their ability to collect and deliver crucial 
information. The proliferation of parties involved in the dispute made it difficult for the papacy 
to control the arbitration process. Changing papal leadership—and a constantly changing 
political relationship between England and Rome—meant that the papacy’s message remained 
inconsistent at best, driven in large part by the situation on the ground. And, finally, those legates 
and messages that did make it to their destinations were constantly subject to a process of 
interrogation and interpretation that could always alter, or even subvert, the will of the far-off 
bishop of Rome. In middle years of the primacy dispute, the papacy perhaps recognized these 
challenges, but it also could not meet them. The parties involved in the dispute remained as 
intractable as ever, and the bishops of Rome could do little to resolve their differences. “Time 
went on,” Hugh the Chanter lamented, conveying the inevitable fatigue that the conflict had 
generated, “letters were sent and returned on both sides: envoys came and went.”133 
The Final Chapter—Calixtus II and the Beginnings of a Communication Strategy: 
 By the year 1119 neither side in the ongoing primacy dispute had much to celebrate. A 
half-century after the dispute first broke out, the archdioceses of Canterbury and York were 
arguing as vociferously as ever. In fact, the situation had deteriorated somewhat. The gradual 
diminishment of the Investiture Controversy in England had aligned the interests of Canterbury 
                                                




and the English monarchy, which felt it could better control the English Church through one 
cleric—a primate of all Britain—rather than two.134 Now, Henry I and Ralph, archbishop of 
Canterbury, united against Thurstan, the man elected to the see of York in 1114.135 In Thurstan, 
the man who stands at the epicenter of Hugh the Chanter’s narrative, the cause of York seems 
finally to have found a suitable champion. Immediately after his election, Ralph refused to 
consecrate Thurstan without a profession of obedience. The latter immediately went on the 
offensive, pushing for further papal intervention. And, in spite of years of failure, the aging 
Paschal II agreed. The pope now had less reason to court Henry I, the controversy over 
investitures behind them, but regardless, those who witnessed and were involved in the primacy 
dispute surely asked: Would anything prove different this time around? 
 At first, nothing changed. When Henry and Ralph heard that Thurstan intended to appeal 
to the pope in Rome, they blocked him from making the journey.136 In spite of this fact, however, 
Thurstan’s letter of appeal eventually arrived in Rome a year after it had been sent. The pope 
considered the case and, in a marked reversal, issued a letter supporting the York cause. “We 
therefore confirm the election of your elect,” Paschal wrote to the clergy and Church of York, 
“which, as you assure us, was canonical. But we altogether forbid the profession of subjection, 
which is due to the church of Rome only, to be exacted from or given by him.”137 The pope 
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wrote a similar letter to Ralph of Canterbury, condemning any effort on the archbishop’s part to 
exact a profession of obedience from his counterpart in York.138 Such letters should have ended 
the affair, but they did not. Ralph, rejecting the verdict, decided to push his case in person before 
the pope in Rome, and Henry I indulged his efforts.139 There was more back and forth between 
the litigants, the English monarchy, and the pope (first Paschal II and then, after 1118, Gelasius 
II). Nothing, it seemed, had changed. The same political dynamics reigned supreme. The 
papacy’s mechanisms for communicating its will still could not achieve their ends. 
 This changed in 1119. In that year, Calixtus II ascended to the papacy, and the primacy 
dispute between Canterbury and York entered its final phase. Almost overnight, we see the 
gradual emergence of a definable papal communication strategy. From the start, Calixtus II 
understood that a multifaceted approach to arbitration was the only way to put an end to the 
dispute once and for all. He brought deep administrative experience to the papal office, having 
served as archbishop of Vienne for more than thirty years and papal legate on several 
occasions.140 His time as a delegated official of the pope may have been the most useful in 
tackling the primacy dispute, because it was Calixtus, then known as Guy, archbishop of Vienne, 
who had served as Paschal II’s short-lived legate to England in 1100. Guy’s legation had been a 
failure, but it undoubtedly allowed him to take stock of the dispute’s basic contours. When he 
took up the papal office in 1119, it seems clear that he had learned from the mistakes of his 
predecessors. 
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 Calixtus’s new approach to the arbitration involved many of the same tools, but used in 
an integrated manner. In 1119, as he prepared to hold a major Church council in the city of 
Reims, Calixtus wrote to the three major parties in the dispute: Ralph of Canterbury, Thurstan of 
York, and Henry I.141 To Henry, whose assent was needed for the clerics to travel, Calixtus 
struck a conciliatory tone. “The question of the profession,” he wrote, “which has so long been in 
dispute between the archbishop of Canterbury and the elect of York is grievous to the apostolic 
see and causes serious injury to the church of York.” Given this, he continued, “we ask your 
majesty, as we have done in other letters, to allow these our brethren to come to the council for 
which we have summoned them, so that, by God’s help, that lengthy dispute may attain its due 
end in the presence of ourselves and our brethren.”142 To Ralph, the pope reiterated the papacy’s 
mandate that Thurstan of York be consecrated without having to make a profession of obedience. 
“But,” Calixtus wrote, offering a carrot as well, “if you deem you have any other claim to make 
in his cause, let it be determined at the time of the General Council…after carefully hearing the 
arguments on both sides.”143 Finally, to Thurstan, the pope betrayed his true sentiments. “We 
grieve, as is due, with you and with the church of York…that you have so long borne such 
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serious discomforts because of the exaction of the profession,” and “we absolutely forbid you, 
brother, by this present letter, to make [Ralph] any profession.”144 
 In seeking the attendance of both archbishops at the coming Council of Reims, Calixtus 
seems to have put Henry in a bind. As Hugh the Chanter observed, “the king saw that he could 
not decently keep [Thurstan] any longer, because the pope had summoned both the archbishop 
and Thurstan to the council, and he commanded him not to delay them.”145 Henry relented, and 
Ralph and Thurstan made their way to Reims. Calixtus had already succeeded where his 
predecessors had failed: he had broken, at least temporarily, the English monarchy’s grip on the 
process while simultaneously ensuring a face-to-face meeting with both litigants. This laid the 
groundwork for the next element of his strategy. At the Council of Reims, Calixtus took a bold 
step and finally consecrated Thurstan as archbishop of York. In doing so, he explicitly ignored 
Henry’s warning that if Thurstan received consecration from the pope, “he should never return to 
his dominion.”146 Still, that was a problem for a different day. For the moment, Calixtus was 
slowly, methodically, moving the arbitration along. Ralph and Thurstan were now both officially 
archbishops. The time had come to pacify the Canterbury party. 
 Knowing full well that Henry still held most of the important cards, Calixtus went to 
work. Not long after the Council of Reims, Calixtus agreed to meet the king of England in 
person. Mary Stroll, following Hugh the Chanter, argues that Thurstan was the prime mover 
behind the pope’s decision to meet Henry, but we need to remember that Hugh had a vested 
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interest in building up Thurstan’s role as much as possible.147 Based on what was to follow, it 
seems more likely that Calixtus had arranged the meeting. Calixtus’s legate, Cono, bishop of 
Palestrina, played a key role in arranging the summit at Gisors in November 1119, and the 
agenda included much more than the primacy dispute.148 When the two men finally met, Calixtus 
proceeded cautiously. Now that he had consecrated Thurstan, the pope “besought Henry, as a 
good king and loyal son of the Church of Rome, to receive his archbishop…with peace and 
affection for the love and honor of God and the holy Roman Church and to suffer him to remain 
quietly in his church and do the work of God.”149 Unsurprisingly, Henry resisted, arguing that he 
could not go back on his word to prevent Thurstan’s return.150 The pope tried again, but 
ultimately, Hugh tells us, “he thought it more proper to fight with darts from a distance than to 
strike this time hand to hand with the sword, and to turn a friendly conference to a parting in 
anger.”151 
 Calixtus had faced a setback, but in the wake of the meeting at Gisors he did not give up. 
Reversing his previous position, he now committed to using his apostolic authority to pressure 
Henry into accepting Thurstan as archbishop of York. “If [the king] will not immediately receive 
[Thurstan] and permit him to abide in peace in the church to which he was consecrated, the 
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church of Rome can by no means omit to execute justice with all the rigor of canon law.”152 This 
was a strong statement, stronger than almost any papal statement on the dispute to date. 
Curiously, Calixtus chose not to send this message to Henry in writing, but rather through an 
intermediary, Geoffrey, archbishop of Rouen, who apparently did not deliver it.153 This prompted 
Calixtus to put Cono, his legate, back to work.154 Unlike past legates who had tried to intervene 
in the primacy dispute, Cono apparently served as an effective communicator of the pope’s will. 
When Ralph and Henry tried once again to exact a profession from Thurstan, Hugh tells us, they 
“thought they would obtain their request more easily in [Cono’s] absence,” suggesting that the 
papal legate was a force with whom they would have to reckon.155 Cono kept in touch with 
Thurstan throughout his legation, and he displayed remarkable initiative in tackling the 
negotiations.156 
 Up to this point in the dispute, Calixtus had met with Thurstan and Ralph, consecrated 
the archbishop of York, negotiated with Henry, and employed a legate to influence the parties 
involved. Now the pope did what none of his predecessors had been willing to do: On March 11, 
1120, he issued a binding written privilege in favor of York.157 After confirming York’s 
customary privileges, Calixtus sought to end the primacy dispute once and for all: 
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Desiring further, under the Lord, that the ancient dignity of the Church of York be 
preserved unimpaired, and cleaving to the decision of our predecessors of holy 
memory, Urban, Paschal, and Gelasius, pontiffs of Rome, we decree by apostolic 
authority that in future the archbishop of Canterbury shall not demand any profession 
from him of York, nor the archbishop of York make one to him of Canterbury, not—
something wholly forbidden by the blessed Gregory—be in any way subject to the 
jurisdiction of him of Canterbury; rather, according to the constitution of the same 
father, ‘this distinction of honor should always be maintained between them, that 
whichever is first ordained be regarded as first.’ If the archbishop of Canterbury 
withholds from the elect of York the hand of consecration—which they owe each 
other in turn according to the custom of their churches laid down by Pope 
Honorius—the elect of York may be consecrated by his own suffragans, according to 
the common usage of the Church, and the rule of our father Gregory, and the order of 
our late Pope Paschal, of holy memory.158 
 
It was the privilege that Lanfranc had so coveted five decades earlier, but not the result that he, 
nor any of his successors at Canterbury, had wished. Past popes had expressed their opinions one 
way or the other in a series of letters, but a solemn privilege, subscribed by the pope and his 
cardinals, was the most potent written statement that the papacy could make. “If in the future any 
person,” the privilege concluded, “religious or lay, knowing the terms of this our constitution, 
shall temerariously attempt to thwart it, and despite two or three warnings fails to make proper 
satisfaction, he shall lose the dignity of his power and rank, knowing that the wickedness he has 
done makes him guilty before God the judge, and he shall be cut off from the most blessed body 
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and blood of our Lord and God, the Redeemer Jesus Christ, and be subject to rigorous vengeance 
at the last judgment.”159 
 This written privilege in favor of York should have ended the affair immediately, but past 
popes had probably thought the same about their letters in favor of one side of the other. Where 
Calixtus differed from his predecessors was in his keen understanding of how image and public 
opinion could shape a favorable political outcome. Even before he issued the privilege in favor 
of York, the pope kept Thurstan close, traveling around France with him. The two men 
consecrated altars and dedicated churches together, and Thurstan participated actively in papal 
processions and liturgical celebrations on Christmas and at the Epiphany.160 Calixtus offered to 
make Thurstan a papal legate in England. The archbishop, however, “besought [the pope] not to 
enjoin on him a task as a result of which he would further irritate the king, who was already 
hostile.”161 Finally, the pope granted Thurstan the use of his pallium outside his own 
ecclesiastical province of York, a mark of particular favor.162 In each case, Calixtus sought to 
place a mantle of legitimacy on Thurstan’s shoulders. Hugh the Chanter undoubtedly 
exaggerates when he describes the “sobbing and weeping” induced by Thurstan’s eventual 
departure from the papal court. But there can be little doubt that the archbishop of York’s close 
association with the papacy increased his standing. “In the wanderings of his exile,” Hugh notes 
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with a distinct air of truth, “[Thurstan] came to know and be known by so many great and 
distinguished people: first and most important the pope and the Roman curia, then archbishops, 
abbots, clerks, monks, princes, nobles, knights, and men of every sort and degree.”163 Even while 
the papacy employed more forceful mechanisms of administrative communication, it also made 
use of symbolism, apparently to great effect. 
 How did Calixtus II’s arbitration strategy play out? Did his more aggressive and unified 
use of various communication media—the written word, delegated agents, personal meetings, 
and political symbolism—bear fruit? In many ways, it did. Although Ralph of Canterbury and 
Henry I of England continued to reject the pope’s efforts on behalf of Thurstan of York, Calixtus 
achieved a major victory when Thurstan finally returned to England and took possession of his 
archdiocese around Easter in 1121.164 In the fall of same year, Henry I assembled the bishops and 
barons of the realm to discuss the primacy, among other matters.165 Once again, Henry, “acting 
on behalf of the archbishop of Canterbury,” Hugh tells us, ordered Thurstan to make a profession 
of obedience to Ralph.166 Thurstan refused, citing Calixtus’ privilege issued the year before.167 
Henry then inspected a copy of the privilege. “When this had been shown and read to the king,” 
Hugh writes, “and when he saw that he was ordering something which the pope forbade on pain 
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of anathema…he was almost driven to tears.”168 Hugh’s account smacks of melodrama, but his 
ultimate point stands: Henry and the Canterbury party were running out of excuses. The king 
encouraged Thurstan “to show the privilege, by means of his company, to the bishops of whom 
many were at court,” a clear sign that he felt the archbishop of York now had a legitimate 
case.169 If Henry’s support for Canterbury was eroding, albeit gradually, where did that leave the 
dispute? 
 Ralph of Canterbury died in 1122, but in the years that followed, his successor, William 
of Corbeil, continued to argue Canterbury’s case in England and Rome. When he traveled to 
Rome to receive his pallium from Calixtus in 1123, he brought with him a series of documents—
now known definitively to be forgeries—that supposedly supported Canterbury’s primacy.170 
Upon inspecting these documents, however, Calixtus and his advisors determined that they were 
fakes because they were not written in the style of the Roman chancery and had no lead bulls 
attached to them.171 Hugh suggests that members of the papal Curia actively derided the 
increasingly desperate attempts made by Canterbury’s representatives.172 He had reason to 
downplay Canterbury’s efforts as much as possible, but he was right that York’s cause was 
increasingly on sure footing. Although the matter came before the papacy again in the years 1125 
to 1126, when Honorius II agreed to re-examine the case, Calixtus’ privilege had put the nail in 
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Forgeries,” pp. 193-226. 
 
171 Ibid., pp. 192-194. 
 
172 Ibid., p. 194. 
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Canterbury’s coffin. On December 9, 1128, Honorius confirmed Calixtus’ privilege in its 
entirety.173 Three years later, a new pope, Innocent II, did the same.174 Canterbury’s opposition 
melted away. Six decades after it had first begun, the primacy dispute finally came to an end. 
Conclusion: 
 The primacy dispute between the archdioceses of Canterbury and York was in many 
ways an embarrassing episode for the papacy. As Louis VI observed at one point, “In the 
archbishop of York’s case, Rome will either be honored or much dishonored.”175 The latter 
seems like a fairer assessment. For sixty years, repeated papal attempts to arbitrate the dispute 
ended in failure, even as pope after pope sought to bring the matter to some kind of resolution. 
As the preceding pages have shown, there were many reasons for this, but chief among them was 
the papacy’s inability to implement and control a series of communicative processes that 
underpinned the arbitration. The usual tools of communication available to the late eleventh- and 
early twelfth-century papacy—letters and privileges, councils, meetings, and delegated agents—
all proved ineffective at one point or another. A difficult, ever-changing, political landscape 
consistently disrupted papal communications, highlighting in profound ways how the papacy’s 
exercise of power was hindered by larger factors that it could not control. To some extent, this 
interplay between politics and communication brings to mind the age-old debate about the 
chicken and the egg. Did the political situation in England (particularly the strong position of the 
Anglo-Norman monarchy) prevent the papacy’s efforts to communicate its will? Or did an 
inability to communicate prevent the papacy from controlling the political situation, which, in 
                                                
173 Papsturkunden in England, vol. 2, part 2, ed. Walther Holzmann (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1936), 
no. 12 [pp. 147-148]. 
 
174 Ibid., no. 13, pp. 148-150. 
 
175 HCY, p. 134: “In causa Eboracensis archiepiscopi Roma aut honorata erit aut multum dishonorata.” 
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turn, undermined its effort to act as an effective arbitrator? Ultimately, it is impossible—and 
perhaps futile—to make a concrete distinction between the two spheres of politics and 
communication. Each shaped the other at every stage of the primacy dispute. It is clear, however, 
that the papacy of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries had not yet developed a 
communications infrastructure that could manage far-flung legal and political disputes. The 
bishops of Rome possessed the right tools but only gradually began to use them to greater effect 
when Calixtus II devised a communication strategy for doing so. The papal reform movement of 
the mid-eleventh century had catapulted the figure of the pope to newfound heights, as more and 
more people—near and far from the Eternal City—sought his aid, protection, and justice. But as 
the long, tortured primacy dispute between Canterbury and York reveals, the papacy had much to 





THE TIES THAT BIND:  
Alexander III, Ecclesiastical Networks, and the Papal Schism of 1159 
 
“In this way I communicated the signs of my wishes to those around me, and entered more 
deeply into the stormy society of human life.”1 
 
-St. Augustine, Confessions 
 
The Schism of 1159 as a Problem of Communication: 
 
 For Roland of Siena, a longtime member of the papal Curia and the man just elected as 
Pope Alexander III, the morning of September 7, 1159 brought worry and above all uncertainty.2 
Four days earlier, following the death and burial of Pope Adrian IV, the cardinals had convened 
at the Lateran according to tradition to elect a new occupant for the Chair of St. Peter.3 Their 
deliberations lasted for three days, and on September 6 the majority backed Roland, cardinal 
priest of St. Mark and the man who had served as papal chancellor for six years under Popes 
Eugene III, Anastasius IV, and Adrian IV. Most observers would have found Roland’s ascent to 
the papacy unsurprising given his distinguished decade of service to the Curia. The cardinals had 
selected one of their most prominent colleagues, a man who was well positioned to take control 
of the growing papal bureaucracy. But then something odd happened. According to Cardinal 
                                                
1 Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 11. 
 
2 Alexander III’s early life and career have proven thorny issues for historians, who traditionally—and incorrectly—
associate him with the author of a famous commentary on Gratian’s Decretum. However, John T. Noonan and 
Rudolf Weigand have debunked this theory. See John T. Noonan, “Who was Rolandus?” in Law, Church and 
Society: Essays in Honor of Stephan Kuttner, ed. Kenneth Pennington and Robert Somerville (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), pp. 21-48; Rudolf Weigand, “Magister Rolandus und Papst Alexander III,” 
Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht 149 (1980), pp. 3-44. For general, if somewhat dated, treatments of 
Alexander’s early life, see Marshall Baldwin, Alexander III and the Twelfth Century (New York: Newman Press, 
1968); Marcel Pacaut, Alexandre III: étude sur la conception du pouvoir pontifical dans sa pensée et dans son 
oeuvre (París: J. Vrin, 1956); Hermann Reuter, Geschichte Alexanders des Dritten und der Kirche seiner Zeit, 3 
vols. (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1860-64). 
 
3 The best reconstruction of events surrounding the papal election of 1159 can be found in Timothy Reuter, “The 




Boso, a member of the Curia who likely witnessed the conclave, two of the cardinals rejected 
Roland, who had taken the name Alexander III, and put forward their own candidate, Octavian, 
cardinal priest of St. Cecilia and a keen advocate for closer papal ties with Emperor Frederick I. 
As the prior of the deacons prepared to place the papal mantle on Alexander’s shoulders, 
Octavian, “who had long since aspired to the Apostolic Chair,” we are told, “rushed forward in 
such madness and recklessness that, delirious, he violently snatched the mantle from Alexander’s 
shoulders with his own hands, and tried to carry it off with him through the roaring tumult.”4 In 
the chaos that followed, Octavian “surrounded himself completely with a crowd of armed men” 
and forced Alexander and his supporters to seek refuge elsewhere.5 For several days, Alexander, 
seemingly powerless when confronted by the Roman mob, hid behind closed doors while 
Octavian was proclaimed Pope Victor IV. And so, Boso noted, “there was great sadness among 
the clergy and anguish among the judges, grief among the old men, and great wonder among the 
common people.”6 As he took in what had occurred, Alexander surely shared in all of these 
emotions. 
 Boso’s Vita Alexandri III remains an intensely partisan account of the election of 1159, 
one that smacks of sensationalism. Rahewin of Freising, the twelfth-century cleric who 
continued an equally partisan biography of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, nevertheless noted in 
                                                
4 Le Liber pontificalis: texte, introduction et commentaire, vol. 2., ed. L. Duchesne (Paris: E. Thorin, 1892), pp. 
397-398: “Unde Octavianus, qui ad apostolicam iamdiu cathedram aspiraverat, post ubi se ipsum vidit spe concepta 
sic defraudari, in tantam vesaniam audatiamque prorupit, quod mantum ipsum tamquam arrepticius a collo eius 
propriis manibus violenter abstulerit et secum inter tumultuosos fremitus asportare temptaverit.” An English 
translation can be found in Boso’s Life of Alexander III, trans. G.M. Ellis (Totowa: Rowan and Littlefield, 1973). 
Accounts of the papal election of 1159 abound, but two recent treatments are worthy of note: see John Doran, “‘At 
last we reached the port of salvation’: The Roman Context of the Schism of 1159,” in Pope Alexander III (1159-81): 
The Art of Survival, ed. Peter D. Clarke and Anne J. Duggan (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), pp. 51-98; 
Johannes Laudage, Alexander III. und Friedrich Barbarossa (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1997), pp. 103-123. 
 
5 Le Liber pontificalis, p. 398: “Et quoniam solatio episcoporum et cardinalium omnino carebat, armatorum turbe 
ipsum undique circumdabant.” 
 
6 Ibid.: “Erat autem in clero magna tristitia, in iudicibus dolor, in senibus mestitia et in plebe ammiratio nimia.” 
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calmer tones that, “after [Adrian’s] death, the cardinals, divided against one another in strife, tore 
the unity of the Church through a double election.”7 But regardless of which account strikes the 
more accurate tone, one thing is clear: on the morning after the events of September 7, 1159 
Christendom awoke to two rival popes for the third time in a century.8 Fate suddenly handed 
Alexander III the most difficult challenge of his life. 
 From the very start, the papal schism of 1159, which would last for the next twenty years, 
presented Alexander III with a communications problem of enormous scale.9 In the days and 
weeks that followed the disputed election, the pope had to address a number of urgent matters, 
but chief among them was the need to spread the news of his election in order to gain support for 
his cause. Legitimacy—or at least the aura of legitimacy—was vital. If Alexander wished to rule 
the Church, he needed to secure the allegiance of the most powerful ecclesiastical and secular 
leaders of the day while minimizing support for his rival. But how to achieve this? The bases of 
Alexander’s social power—to use a classic phrase coined by John French and Bertram Raven—
were in many ways strikingly limited.10 With his legitimacy in question, he could not necessarily 
                                                
7 Ottonis et Rahewini Gesta Friderici I. Imperatoris, ed. G. Waitz, MGH SS, vol. 46 (Hannover: Hahn, 1912), p. 
291: “Post cuius obitum cardinale in seditionem conversi gemina electione scindunt unitatem.” Otto of Freising and 
Rahewin, The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, trans. Charles Christopher Mierow and Richard Emery (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1953). 
 
8 Papal elections had also resulted in schism in the 1080s and, most recently, in 1130. 
 
9 Reuter argues that the Schism of 1159 was, at its most basic level, a diplomatic problem. He acknowledges that 
diplomacy went hand in hand with communication, but at the same time he largely overlooks the communicative 
mechanisms, processes, and technologies that underpinned Alexander’s diplomatic efforts. For a summary of 
Reuter’s view, see Reuter, “The Papal Schism, the Empire and the West,” pp. i-vii, 1, 197-213. 
 
10 This classic sociological formulation of social power is a useful, if imperfect, tool for historians analyzing the 
basis and use of power (whether political, religious, social, etc.) in any time period, and it has clarified my own 
thinking about the specific challenges that Alexander faced as he sought to deal with a divided Church. See John 
R.P. French and Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” in Studies in Social Power, ed. Dorwin Cartwright 
(Ann Arbor: Research Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research, 1959), pp. 150-167. For revisions 
and updates to this model, see Bertram Raven, “A Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence: French and 
Raven 30 Years Later,” Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 7 (1992), pp. 217-244. 
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influence, reward, or even coerce those whose support he needed. But he could try to convince 
them. Alexander’s livelihood, then, depended on his ability to spread the news of his cause; 
collect information about those who opposed him; and undercut Octavian and his supporters 
wherever and whenever he could. These were difficult challenges even in the best of times, but 
Alexander’s precarious physical situation made them even more so. In the wake of the chaotic 
double election, an angry Roman mob of Octavian’s supporters chased Alexander from the 
Lateran. It was only through relative luck that he managed to escape the city by September 15 or 
16.11 Now he was adrift with no permanent base of support. As he struggled to gain his footing, 
news of the schism spread quickly throughout Rome, Italy, and Europe, and the pope’s position 
deteriorated further as clerics of all orders began to choose sides. The conflict divided political 
and spiritual loyalties, bred uncertainty and even outright conflict, and threatened the efficacy of 
papal—and, indeed, Church—authority throughout Europe. Alexander needed to stop the 
bleeding, and quickly. 
 So how would he do so? The communicative tools available to Alexander at this, the very 
beginning of his shaky pontificate, were ones that Alexander II, Paschal II, and Calixtus II, 
among others, had known of and used in their protracted efforts to end the primacy dispute 
between Canterbury and York at the turn of the twelfth century. Letters, delegated agents, and 
councils remained standard tools in the papacy’s communicative arsenal. But the deployment of 
those tools, as the previous chapter has shown, could be difficult and largely ineffectual if not 
done in a systematic way. The very nature of the schism, of course, made even basic 
communication more difficult. Half a century earlier, Calixtus II and his predecessors had 
grappled with political roadblocks that required a communication strategy based on reiterating 
                                                
 
11 Reuter, “The Papal Schism, the Empire and the West,” p. 12. 
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the same basic message again and again in an integrated manner. Alexander III had to overcome 
similar political obstructions while also dealing with the challenges of communicating rapidly 
and across great distances. Divided loyalties and hostile geographic regions created pockets of 
resistance that could impede the movement of the papal court, papal agents, and papal 
messengers bearing letters. Alexander needed to master the tools of communication while 
simultaneously navigating these thorny problems. In short, he needed a communication strategy. 
And a strategy he had. 
During the years 1159 to 1164—the most dangerous period of the twenty-year schism, 
when Victor IV was still alive12—the central tenet of Alexander III’s communication strategy 
was the creation, maintenance, and use of networks—networks of local clerics, of papal agents, 
and of secular officials and rulers, all of whom he needed to bolster his position.13 A large 
number of letters from the period show the pope targeting key individuals whose status and 
position enabled them to disseminate Alexander’s message, collect information, and influence 
important political and ecclesiastical leaders. These men (and at least one woman!) served as 
crucial hubs in a burgeoning communications network that spanned the continent and, in some 
                                                
12 While Victor IV’s death in 1164 did not end the papal schism, it significantly dented the legitimacy of the 
imperial party’s cause. Alexander III continued to have opponents until the Peace of Venice in 1177, but these men 
were increasingly viewed as puppets of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. Jochen Johrendt, “The Empire and the 
Schism,” in Pope Alexander III (1159-81): The Art of Survival, pp. 113-114; Reuter, “The Papal Schism, the Empire 
and the West,” pp. 119-120; I.S. Robinson, The Papacy, 1073-1198: Continuity and Change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 487-489; Berhard Schimmelpfennig, The Papacy, trans. James Sievert (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 155. 
 
13 The study of networks has descended on historical scholarship like a deluge, spanning many different historical 
disciplines, chronologies, and regions of the world. At times, works of history founded on this approach have 
produced groundbreaking, even stunning, results that provide entirely new ways of looking at the past. Even a 
minute selection of the existing bibliography reveals the breadth of research in this field. See the bibliography in 
Chapter 1, n. 37. Historians, of course, must necessarily exercise caution when employing network analysis, as 
David Bell has noted recently, but the study of networks remains particularly central to the history of 
communication in any time and place. For a cautionary note on the use of the network metaphor, see David A. Bell, 




cases, the Mediterranean to the Holy Land.14 In doing so, he built on the legacy of Calixtus II, 
who had employed a more integrated communication strategy than his predecessors when 
tackling the primacy dispute. And in many ways, Alexander achieved the ends he sought. By the 
end of 1164, the pope’s position had improved greatly, because the majority of Europe’s secular 
and ecclesiastical leaders had recognized him as the legitimate leader of Western Christendom. 
Yet even in relative triumph, Alexander’s communication strategy revealed challenges that 
continued to plague the papacy. The use of networks was a clever—perhaps even brilliant—
tactical move on the pope’s part. However, at many points during those years, Alexander’s 
reliance on those same networks revealed how decentralized the papacy remained, and the 
remarkable degree to which the bishops of Rome still relied on local officeholders as they sought 
to make their will felt throughout Europe. 
Spreading the News—Aeterna et incommutabilis and Quest for Legitimacy: 
 As he mulled the disastrous double election that had occurred on September 7, 1159, 
Alexander’s thoughts quickly turned to definitive action. His first task, of course, was to spread 
the news of his election. This was a time-honored tradition for new popes, but one that took on 
special urgency in 1159.15 And it was at this particular moment that the new pope’s six years of 
service as papal chancellor undoubtedly paid dividends. In addition to an in-depth knowledge of 
the mechanisms of papal letter-writing, Alexander also likely enjoyed the loyal support of his 
                                                
14 In network theory, a hub is a particularly visible and well-connected node (or connector) that links things together 
in a larger network. There is a vast literature on this aspect of network theory, but an elegant and highly readable 
summary can be found in Albert-László Barabási, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and 
What It Means (New York: Plume, 2003), pp. 55-64. 
 
15 For examples of earlier election encyclicals and announcements, see JL 4771, 5348, 5807, 6635, 6682, 7404, 




former chancery clerks, leaving his opponent, Victor IV, without a trained writing staff.16 
Immediately, Alexander put the chancery to work. A flurry of letters left the now-transient papal 
court. Chief among these was a lengthy encyclical, Aeterna et incommutabilis, which announced 
Alexander’s election, condemned Victor IV and his supporters with a sentence of 
excommunication, and requested the obedience of all those who read or heard the new pope’s 
words.17 Between late September and the middle of December, versions of this letter made their 
way at least to various individuals and groups of clerics in England, Scotland, France, Germany, 
and central and northern Italy.18 Alexander was unable to send copies to every bishop in 
Christendom (as surely he would have wished to do), but his coverage was nonetheless 
impressive. The list of recipients, far from arbitrary as some have suggested, includes prominent 
leaders of the most influential churches in Europe; men with close connections to powerful 
monarchs; and even the nascent faculties of law and theology at Bologna and Paris, 
respectively.19 
                                                
16 Reuter, “The Papal Schism, the Empire and the West,” p. 25. 
 
17 For studies of Aeterna et incommubailis, its recensions and distribution, see Robert Somerville, “The Beginning 
of Alexander III’s Pontificate: Aeterna et incommutabilis, and Scotland,” in Miscellanea, Rolando Bandinelli, Papa 
Alessandro III, ed. Filippo Liotta (Siena: Accademia senese degli intronati, 1986), pp. 357-368; Reuter, “The Papal 
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18 Somerville, “The Beginning of Alexander III’s Pontificate,” pp. 358-366. The addressees included: Archbishop 
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Reuter, “The Papal Schism, the Empire and the West,” p. 24. But given the list of recipients he has uncovered, this 
seems highly unlikely. For some of the main recipients, see ibid., pp. 232-235; Somerville, “The Beginning of 




 Aeterna et incommutabilis represented the opening salvo in what was to become a 
protracted and, at times, nasty war of words between Alexander and his supporters on the one 
hand, and the imperial camp led by Victor and, later, Frederick Barbarossa on the other. As both 
Alexander and Victor recognized, the schism was a battle whose outcome would be determined 
(at least in part) by momentum.20 The papal candidate who most quickly and effectively 
managed to gain support for his cause stood the best chance of becoming the accepted leader of 
the Western Church. The fact that Alexander sent out so many copies of Aeterna et 
incommutabilis shows that the new pope understood the importance of getting his message out as 
quickly and thoroughly as he could. His carefully chosen words provide further evidence of this 
fact. Appended to the copy sent to Eberhard, archbishop of Salzburg and perhaps Alexander’s 
sole ally among the German episcopate, was a brief note that singled out for special 
condemnation three of Victor’s supporters: Ivo of St. Martin, Guido of Cremona, and the bishop 
of Ferentini. Alexander excommunicated these men and “all those who knowingly communicate 
[communicaverint] with them.”21 The language here is telling. The Latin verb communicare has 
several meanings, primarily to take communion, but also to communicate, discuss, consult, or 
make common cause. Alexander’s subsequent decisions show a keen understanding of this term 
in all of its complexity. The pope wanted to facilitate his own efforts at communication while 
preventing, wherever possible, those of his opponents. Aeterna et incommutabilis was, therefore, 
an important first step in Alexander’s quest for legitimacy. But it was only the beginning. One 
letter, the pope knew, could not end the schism once and for all. In the days, weeks, and months 
                                                
20 Victor also penned a general letter, albeit one primarily aimed at his most receptive audience, the prelates and 
nobles of Germany. A copy of this letter survives in Ottonis et Rahewini Gesta Friderici I. Imperatoris, pp. 297-299. 
 
21 PL 200, p. 73: “aliosque complices, et principales coadjutores eius, et omnes qui scienter eis communicaverint, 
eidem excommunicationi et condemnationi decrevimus subjacere.” 
 
 83 
that followed, Alexander subsequently diversified his communication strategy by tapping into a 
series of important communication networks that enabled the pope to connect with important 
men and women, cultivate their support, and use them to further his larger political aims. 
A Friend in an Unfriendly Land—Eberhard, Archbishop of Salzburg: 
 
As he considered possible means to end the schism and bind up the Church’s growing 
wounds, Alexander had to take into account a particularly volatile political factor: the position of 
Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the hostility that existed in the large region that he controlled. 
By September 16, little more than a week after the disputed election, Frederick, then staying at 
Cremona in northern Italy, had received word of the dramatic events in Rome.22 And while he 
did not immediately declare for one candidate or the other, most observers knew which man he 
would support. Boso, a key witness in the larger events of the papal schism, wrote that the 
emperor’s closest associates “knew him to be a great friend to Octavian.”23 When Frederick sent 
emissaries to Italy shortly after the election, they showed Octavian the greatest favor even 
though they also negotiated with Alexander.24 Frederick clearly tried to maintain the illusion of 
impartiality by calling for a council to adjudicate the dispute in Pavia early in 1160. But his 
choice for the papal office was clear. Immediately after he learned of the schism, the emperor 
wrote a carefully worded letter to Eberhard, archbishop of Salzburg, in which he urged the 
German cleric—a known sympathizer of the papal party now headed by Alexander—not to be 
hasty in choosing a side. The speed with which he felt it necessary to counter one of Alexander’s 
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23 Le Liber pontificalis, p. 400: “timentes tamen offendere dominum suum quem cognoverant ipsi Octaviano valde 
amicum.” 
 
24 Ibid. The precise date of Frederick’s mission to central Italy is difficult to pin down, but Boso notes that it took 
place between Alexander’s arrival in Terracina (where he was by September 26) and his departure for Anagni 
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most powerful supporters north of the Alps speaks volumes. Alexander would receive no help 
from the emperor. 
Frederick’s involvement in the schism instantly complicated matters for Alexander, 
framing both the way the dispute unfolded and, in large measure, the way the pope attempted to 
deal with it. Although in some ways the dispute boiled down to the personal ambitions of the two 
rival candidates for the papacy, the election was really about much more than that. For more than 
a century, the papacy and the empire, two powers which had once worked together in concert to 
provide political and religious order in Europe, had been growing apart.25 Now, each vied to take 
the upper hand in European affairs. The long history of this shift need not concern us, but its 
general contours are important. By the middle of the twelfth century, new geopolitical fault lines 
had emerged in Europe due to the growing power and ambitions of both Frederick Barbarossa 
and popes such as Adrian IV, who pressed the papacy’s cause with added vigor.26 Other 
European monarchs, such as Louis VII of France and especially Henry II of England, remained 
great powers with tremendous influence and military might. But in one of history’s odd turns of 
fate, the ongoing conflict between empire and papacy increasingly forced even powerful, 
independent monarchs to align themselves with emperor or pope. The papal election of 1159 
                                                
25 Historians have often written of this shift by focusing on the role of the so-called Investiture Conflict that became 
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Ehre Friedrich Barbarossas: Kommunikation, Konflikt und politisches Handeln im 12. Jahrhundert (Darmstadt: 




exacerbated this problem. What began as a largely internal conflict within the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy quickly became a sectional dispute with powerful geopolitical repercussions. 
As he sought to unite the Church under his leadership, then, Alexander had to contend 
not only with Victor IV and his immediate ecclesiastical supporters, but also monarchs, nobles, 
and independent towns and communities throughout Europe. This fact, of course, made 
Alexander’s attempts to communicate with Europe’s secular and ecclesiastical leaders even more 
difficult. Half a century earlier, as they attempted to arbitrate the dispute between Canterbury and 
York, the bishops of Rome had struggled to maintain a political and geographic space in which 
the free movement of agents and letters—their primarily communicative tools—was possible.27 
A similar problem now confronted Alexander III. Some areas of Europe were friendly to the 
pope’s cause; others hostile. If the papacy’s message—whether in the form of a letter, an agent, 
or even a personal papal visit—could not reach its intended audience, how could it prove 
effective? Clearly, before he could engage in productive acts of communication, Alexander had 
to take stock of his political standing in various regions of the continent. 
 Doing so was probably more difficult than we might imagine. The political landscape that 
Alexander III faced at the beginning of his pontificate varied considerably throughout 
Christendom. In France the new pope encountered an amenable monarch and a potent 
ecclesiastical ally in the figure of Henry, brother of the king, bishop of Beauvais, and later 
archbishop of Reims, a man who held the king’s ear and worked tirelessly on behalf of the 
papacy. In the Angevin realm Alexander found a prominent if less prolific ecclesiastical 
supporter in Arnulf, bishop of Lisieux, while Henry II proved consistently receptive to his cause, 
endorsing him even when papal intervention in the Becket affair soured the king’s view of the 
                                                




papacy in general.28 León-Castile, Hungary, and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem all joined the 
Alexandrian cause in good order, albeit after France and England.29 By January 1161, Alexander 
could boast that, “both the Church of the East…and also the whole Church of the West, of the 
French, English, and Spanish, with their kings, archbishops, bishops, and all the clergy and 
people, condemned the aforementioned schismatic [Victor] and his principal supporters with 
perpetual anathema.”30 After more than a year of worry and painstaking labor, the pope’s relief 
was palpable. The majority of Christendom, he wrote, “unanimously and magnificently received 
us as spiritual father and supreme pontiff, humbly offering to us all obedience and reverence in 
word and deed.”31 The pope’s position in various regions of Europe, as he himself observed, was 
beginning to come into focus. 
 Yet even as Alexander’s political position improved in 1160 and 1161, the Empire 
continued to thwart his attempts to achieve universal recognition as the legitimate pope. Both in 
northern Italy and across the Alps in Germany, Alexander had to contend with a rival pope; a 
                                                
28 For Arnulf of Lisieux’s role, see Myriam Soria Audebert, “La propagande pontificale au temps des schismes. 
Alexandre III à la reconquête de l’unité de l’Église,” in Convaincre et persuader: communication et propagande aux 
XXIIe et XIIIe siècles, ed. Martin Aurell (Poitiers: Université de Poitiers, Centre d'études supérieures de civilisation 
médiévale, 2007), pp. 349-381; The Letters of Arnulf of Lisieux, ed. Frank Barlow (London: Offices of the Royal 
Historical Society, 1939), pp. xl-xli; Robert Somerville, Pope Alexander III and the Council of Tours (1163): A 
Study in Ecclesiastical Politics and Institutions in the Twelfth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1977), pp. 14-15. For the sake of simplicity, I will use the terms England, Anglo-Norman realm, and Angevin realm 
interchangeable, denoting the territories, both in England and on the continent, under the control of Henry II of 
England. 
 
29 For Hungary, see the correspondence between King Geza II and Eberhard, archbishop of Salzburg, in AB, nos. 
78, 79, and 80. 
 
30 PL 200, p. 102 [JL 10645]: “Orientalis namque Ecclesia, in consilio Nazareth, praesente illustri Jerosolymorum 
rege, solemniter celebrato, Francorum, Anglorum, Hispaniarum et tota Occidentalis Ecclesia, cum regibus, 
archiepiscopis, episcopis, et toto clero et populo suo, praedictum schismaticum eiusque principales fautores perpetuo 
anathemate damnarunt.” 
 
31 Ibid.: “nosque in patrem spiritualem et summum pontificem ex communi fama et transcriptis litteris, quae tibi per 
latorem praesentium destinamus, poteris evidenter cognoscere, unanimiter et magnifice receperunt, omnem nobis 




hostile and extremely powerful monarch; and—crucially—an unsupportive ecclesiastical 
hierarchy that remained largely loyal to Frederick Barbarossa and his chosen candidate for the 
papacy. Germany remained a bastion of support for Victor IV, one that Alexander needed to 
breach if he was to achieve universal recognition. But at every turn, Germany’s ruler, Frederick 
Barbarossa, actively sought to undercut the beleaguered pontiff. In a land of few friends, 
Alexander targeted a single member of the ecclesiastical hierarchy whose network would allow 
the pope to communicate indirectly with a large number of clerics and laymen. The man at the 
center of that network was Eberhard of Salzburg. 
 Eberhard, who served as archbishop of Salzburg from 1147 until his death in 1164, was 
one of Alexander’s most powerful, vocal, and only supporters in the German lands.32 To 
Rahewin of Freising, the German cleric was “a venerable man, mature in years, pleasingly 
instructed in the letters of the sacred page, of particular faith and singular piety.”33 Through long 
service and the “many virtues and gifts of divine grace,” Rahewin continued, “he had challenged 
many to imitate him, but the feeling of all to love him.”34 Whether Alexander III, Frederick I, 
and Victor IV loved Eberhard remains to be seen, but there is little question that they craved his 
support. All three men eventually reached out to him, with Frederick and Alexander doing so 
immediately following the double election. 
                                                
32 The most recent reconstruction of Eberhard’s life and career can be found in Manfred Feuchtner, “Erzbischof 
Eberhard I. von Salzburg (1089-1164),” in Beiträge zur Geschichte des Bistums Regensburg 19 (1985), pp. 139-284, 
especially pp. 225-269. 
 
33 Gesta Friderici I. Imperatoris, p. 340: “Erat autem idem vir venerabilis aetate maturus, sacrae paginae litteris 
decentissime instructus, fide precipuus, religione singularis.” 
 
34 Ibid.: “His et aliis plurimis virtutibus et divinae gratiae donis plures quidem ad sui imitationem, universorum 




Frederick was the first.35 When the emperor learned of the double election, the news from 
the south had become garbled in transit, and Frederick and his confidant, Eberhard II, bishop of 
Bamberg, clearly believed that the two candidates for the papal throne were Octavian (Victor IV) 
and Bernard, cardinal bishop of Porto, rather than Octavian and Alexander III.36 Writing to 
Eberhard, Frederick ultimately betrayed his sympathies. The archbishop of Salzburg, he knew, 
was a supporter of the papal party now headed by Alexander, and it seems clear that the emperor 
feared that the German cleric would support whomever the papal party had put forward.37 As we 
have seen above, he urged Eberhard not to choose a side too hastily, arguing that he was in the 
process of seeking the advice of the kings of England and France.38 Frederick’s quick and 
decisive action might have swayed a less committed supporter of the papal party, but in this case 
it failed to produce the desired result. When the archbishop’s messenger arrived in Salzburg 
carrying Frederick’s letter in addition to one from the bishop of Bamberg, Eberhard had due time 
to consider his position. But, perhaps mulling the bishop of Bamberg’s advice to “honor God 
before all, and then the debt to the emperor,” he ultimately dealt Frederick a crucial blow.39 By 
                                                
35 Die Urkunden Friedrichs I., vol. 2: 1158-1167, ed. Heinrich Appelt, MGH DD, vol. 10 (Hannover: Hahn, 1979), 
no. 281; a copy of this letter may also be found in AB, no. 39. 
 
36 Ibid., no. 40. 
 
37 For Eberhard’s dealings with papacy and empire prior to the schism of 1159, see Feuchtner, “Erzbischof 
Eberhard I. von Salzburg,” pp. 176-224. 
 
38 Die Urkunden Friedrichs I., vol. 2, no. 281. 
 
39 AB, no. 40: “Vestra nunc interest, ut vos et alii principes populorum congregati cum Deo Abraham id ipsum 




December of the same year, Eberhard had formally congratulated Alexander on his election and 
confidently professed that his opponents’ attacks would come to nothing.40 
 Even while the emperor tried to win over Eberhard, Alexander III began his own 
campaign. The pope was a savvy politician who had dealt with Frederick before. He could not 
have known how Frederick planned to woo the archbishop of Salzburg, but he nonetheless 
recognized Eberhard’s significance in the looming dispute. On October 5, 1159, shortly after he 
had fled Rome and the supporters of Victor IV, Alexander sent Eberhard a copy of his lengthy 
election encyclical, Aeterna et incommutabilis.41 Even though Aeterna et incommutabilis was 
essentially a form letter, it would be foolish to downplay the significance of Alexander’s 
decision to send a copy to Salzburg. Timothy Reuter has argued that “election encyclicals to 
distant parts of Europe were a long-term diplomatic investment” that rarely produced immediate 
results.42 This viewpoint, however, fails to consider how important it was for each of the papal 
candidates to achieve ‘first contact’ with prominent ecclesiastical and secular leaders of the day. 
It is unclear whether Alexander knew of Eberhard’s sympathies towards his cause. If he did, 
Aeterna et incommutabilis probably assured the archbishop of Salzburg that the leader of his 
party was in a strong position. And if he did not, the election encyclical offered him an 
opportunity to sway a prominent churchmen north of the Alps. Either way, it is clear that both 
Frederick and Alexander recognized Eberhard’s significance. In the months and years that 
followed, Frederick—joined in 1161 by Victor IV himself—tried to win the loyalty of the 
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archbishop of Salzburg, while Alexander continued to encourage Eberhard to work for his 
cause.43 
 Eberhard, too, recognized his own importance in the events that unfolded after 1159. A 
keen observer of history and his place in it, the archbishop collected important letters relating to 
the schism and in 1162 sent them to his close friend, Gottfried, the abbot of the Austrian 
Benedictine abbey of Admont, who subsequently brought them together in a single codex.44 This 
collection of letters, the so-called Admonter Briefsammlung (“the Admont letter collection”), 
provides crucial information not only about Eberhard’s relationship with the papacy, but also his 
contacts in and beyond the boundaries of the empire. A close reading of these letters reveals a 
burgeoning communication network centered on the archbishop of Salzburg, Alexander’s main 
hope in a land where he possessed few friends. 
 Between the election of 1159 and Eberhard’s death in June 1164 Alexander sent at least 
six letters to the archbishop of Salzburg.45 This number pales in comparison to the corpus of 
extant letters to Henry of France, brother of Louis VII, bishop of Beauvais (1149-62) and later 
archbishop of Reims (1162-75). In the same period, Alexander sent Henry at least fourteen 
letters that discussed or at least touched on the schism and its various side issues. If letters 
concerning other administrative matters were factored into this count, the number would 
                                                
43 Frederick’s relationship with Eberhard became increasingly hostile when the archbishop refused to accept the 
decision of the Council of Pavia (1160), which had endorsed Victor IV’s candidacy. For the correspondence 
between Frederick and Eberhard, see AB, nos. 46, 49, 52, 55, 56-57, 59, 60-62, 71, and 76. Victor IV’s first extant 
letter to Eberhard dates from January 1161, when he summoned the archbishop of Salzburg and his suffragan 
bishops to a council to be held in Cremona. Germania Pontificia, vol. 1: Provincia Salisburgensis et episcopatus 
Tridentinus, ed. Albert Brackmann (Berlin: Weidmann, 1911), no. 86 [p. 27]. 
 
44 AB, pp. 9-10. 
 
45 One of these letters, from May 1163, Alexander addressed to Eberhard of Salzburg and Hartmann I, bishop of 




skyrocket. Why this striking disparity in volume? Alexander’s prolonged residence in France 
between April 1162 and the end of the period in question surely allowed the pope to take a 
personal hand in ecclesiastical affairs in France, simultaneously providing him with relative 
freedom to contact Henry whenever he felt like it. Eberhard’s situation in the empire was 
trickier. In September 1162, Alexander lamented that he could not visit Eberhard in person “both 
because of the infidelity of the land and the unsuitability of the messengers.”46 The implication 
was clear: Germany was such hostile territory that it was difficult even to send letters there in the 
first place. If the pope could not get regular messages to Germany, those letters that did make it 
across the Alps had to count. 
 As such, it should come as little surprise that Alexander’s letters to Eberhard, while not 
numerous, tended to be lengthy. In the spring of 1160, not long after Frederick Barbarossa’s 
Council of Pavia declared Victor the legitimate pope, Alexander wrote his first letter to Eberhard 
since he had addressed a copy of Aeterna et incommutabilis to the German archbishop the 
previous October. In an obvious attempt to reach an expanded audience, the pope also addressed 
the letter to the archbishop’s suffragans.47 This lengthy missive, which borrowed heavily from 
the text of a letter to Arnulf, bishop of Lisieux, written three days earlier, rearticulated many of 
the arguments that Alexander had already laid out in Aeterna et incommutabilis, but it closed 
with a solemn excommunication of Frederick, Victor IV, and their principal noble and 
ecclesiastical supporters.48 While papal letters that addressed an archbishop and his suffragans 
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were a common occurrence in the Middle Ages, it seems reasonable to conclude that Alexander 
and his advisors intentionally addressed this particular letter to Eberhard and his suffragans, the 
bishops of Brixen, Freising, Gurk, Passau, Regensburg, and Trent.49 Sadly, we do not know if the 
papal chancery sent copies of this letter to those bishops as well. If it did, then the pope 
obviously sought to reach as many members of the episcopacy as possible. If it did not, and only 
one copy of the letter was sent across the Alps, then Alexander’s strategy was clear: Eberhard 
would read the letter and then communicate its contents to those members of the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy directly under him.50 Presumably, those bishops would then do the same for other 
important clerics (and possibly even laymen) in their individual dioceses. This model of 
communication took advantage of the Church’s natural hierarchy as a means of spreading the 
news of Frederick’s excommunication and Alexander’s decision to release the emperor’s 
subjects of their oaths of loyalty to him.51 At the same time, Alexander also took action to 
undercut Frederick’s support by blocking the emperor’s ability to communicate. A week after his 
letter to Eberhard and his suffragans, Alexander wrote again to the prelates in the province of 
Salzburg. They were to shun all nuncios of the “so-called emperor”—anyone whom Eberhard 
excommunicated or would excommunicate in the future—denying them food, drink, shelter, and, 
                                                
49 Series episcoporum ecclesiae catholicae, ed. Pius Bonifacius Gams (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. 
Verlagsanstalt, 1957), p. 257. 
 
50 For a lengthy discussion of the chancery’s practice of sending letters, see Chapter 5. In this particular case, I 
believe that the difficulty in getting a letter to Germany (as Alexander himself acknowledged) probably forced that 
the papal chancery to send only one copy, if that was not already its policy in the first place. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Alexander addressed individual copies to Eberhard’s suffragans, although given the inevitable loss of 
material from the Middle Ages, such a conclusion is, admittedly, rather tenuous. 
 
51 A similar hierarchical model of communication was employed by the papacy as it sought to communicate and 
implement the reforms of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. In that case, however, the communicative tool was 




above all, an audience.52 Even as Alexander tried to expand his communicative reach within 
Germany, he tried to limit that of his opponents. 
 The strident language of Alexander’s letters from April 1160 reflected a broader strategy 
of isolating Frederick as much as possible. The emperor had been excommunicated—literally cut 
off from communication—and henceforth Alexander would not try to negotiate directly with 
him. Shortly after the double election, Boso tells us, Alexander had made a written overture to 
the emperor, “wishing him in all patience and gentleness to return to his love of the Church 
according to the words of the blessed Apostle Paul: ‘Do not be conquered by evil, but conquer 
evil with good.’”53 Frederick, however, “greatly inflated with pride and disdain, not only refused 
to receive the letter, but also, possessed, wickedly wished to hang the messengers, if the Duke 
Welf with the Duke of Saxony had not resisted him.”54 Eventually, the emperor received the 
letter, “but it was not deemed appropriate to respond to the pontiff.”55 This snub undoubtedly 
stung. Alexander would have no direct contact with Frederick Barbarossa until eighteen years 
later, when the Treaty of Venice lifted Frederick’s excommunication, ended the schism, and 
affirmed Alexander III as the one, true pope.56 
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53 Le Liber pontificalis, p. 400: “pontifex nuntios cum apostolicis litteris ad eundem imperatorem, in partibus 
Lombardie obsidentem Cremam, humiliter destinavit, cupiens eum ad amorem Ecclesie in omni patientia et 
mansuetudine revocare, secundum beati Pauli apostoli dictum: Noli vinci a malo, sed vince in bono malum.” 
 
54 Ibid.: “At ille nimio superbie fastu inflatus, non solum retinere litteras sprevit, sed tamquam insanus nuntios 
ipsos, nisi dux Welfo cum duce Saxonie sibi restitisset, nequiter suspendere voluit.” 
 
55 Ibid.: “nichil tamen pontifici dignatus est respondere.” 
 
56 To be the best of my knowledge, Alexander sent no letters to Frederick during this period. Admittedly, the 
documentary record is always subject to gaps, but given the magnitude of the schism and the importance of its main 
players, it seems unlikely that any such letter(s) would have gone unnoticed. 
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 Even though Alexander never contacted Frederick directly after 1159, he remained the 
consummate politician, a man who understood the vital need the keep the lines of 
communication open. And here, as in times before, Eberhard of Salzburg proved key. Beginning 
in 1161, Alexander began to urge the archbishop of Salzburg to take a more active role in 
forming public opinion while engaging with the emperor on an informal basis.57 In January of 
that year the pope wrote to Eberhard to announce the news of the recent council of Nazareth, in 
which the eastern Church of Jerusalem had committed to Alexander’s cause. In closing the letter, 
Alexander exhorted Eberhard to action: 
Through frequent admonition and concerned vigilance you should strive to call your 
suffragans and nearby bishops and other people, ecclesiastical and lay, back to 
obedience and devotion to the Church and to us. And you should seek diligently to 
soften the soul of the aforementioned prince [Frederick], and to advise and 
encourage him so that he might return to the bosom of his mother, the Church, and to 
the way of truth…Additionally, your devotion should not delay you in informing us 
through your own letters the position of your church and of the German kingdom, as 
well as the souls and wishes of the men of the same kingdom.58 
 
This call to action encapsulated a three-pronged communication strategy. First, Alexander 
insisted on maintaining an open, albeit indirect, channel with Eberhard’s suffragan bishops and 
nearby clerics and laymen. Alexander could have used his prerogative as pope to attempt direct 
contact with these men and women, putting his case to them as he had numerous times earlier in 
his pontificate through Aeterna et incommutabilis. But he did not. Instead, he decided to speak, 
coax, and cajole through Eberhard, working under the assumption that the archbishop of 
                                                
57 The fact that Alexander actively encouraged Eberhard to reach out to Frederick is interesting, given the latter’s 
status as an excommunicate. While further study would be necessary to understand this particular phenomenon, the 
pope’s decision may indicate a degree of flexibility in how the papacy defined excommunication. 
 
58 AB, no. 65 [pp. 120-121]: “Suffraganeos quoque et vicinos episcopos aliasque personas tam ecclesiasticas quam 
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revocare et in ea propensius solidare. Animum quoque iam dicti principis diligenter mitigare procures et, ut ad 
sinum matris ecclesie et viam redeat veritatis, attentius eum moneas et exhorteris…Preterea statum ecclesie tue ac 




Salzburg could use his local knowledge to get results. Second, the pope asked Eberhard to serve 
as an informal liaison between the papal court (which was now increasingly on the move) and 
Frederick Barbarossa. The language Alexander used—“to advise and encourage [Frederick]”—is 
telling: Alexander was not looking for a messenger to deliver letters; he wanted an intermediary, 
someone who could use his personal relationship with Frederick to influence the emperor over 
time. Third and finally, Alexander thirsted for information. The dissemination of information—
particularly the pope’s case against Victor IV—was crucial, but so too was the collection of local 
information from Germany. Only then could Alexander feel the pulse of public opinion. Only 
then could he adapt his ongoing efforts to secure the loyalty of Frederick, his princes, clerics, and 
people. 
 The basic outlines of this three-pronged strategy again surfaced when Alexander wrote to 
Eberhard a year later in March 1162. Since Eberhard had already been summoned to meet with 
Frederick in northern Italy, the pope noted, “you should go to him, and through apostolic letters 
we ask, advise and exhort you in the Lord to encourage and influence the same emperor in every 
way so that, returning to his heart, he might profitably attend to his soul and return to unity with 
the Catholic Church.”59 Once again, Alexander expected the archbishop of Salzburg to work his 
charms on Frederick in the hope of convincing the emperor to abandon Victor IV. Was this a 
plausible strategy? In many ways, it was. The Admont collection reveals that Eberhard was in 
close contact with Frederick during 1159, 1160 and 1161.60 Frederick originally courted 
Eberhard’s loyalty, but after the archbishop refused to accept the decision of the Council of 
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exhortamur in Domino, quatenus eundem imperatorem horteris modis omnibus et inducas, ut ad cor rediens anime 
sue salubriter consulat atque ad unitatem catholice ecclesie revertatur.” 
 




Pavia, the emperor became increasingly vocal that Eberhard bend to his will. Frederick 
demanded a meeting with Eberhard, which the archbishop carefully avoided until the spring of 
1162, much to the emperor’s annoyance.61 Eberhard eventually relented, thanks in part to 
assurances that he would have safe passage to and from the imperial court. But given the timing 
of his decision to meet Frederick, the spring of 1162, Alexander’s repeated exhortations to 
influence the emperor must have played a role as well. 
 The Admont collection shows that in the early years of the schism Eberhard of Salzburg 
held the emperor’s ear, just as Alexander III hoped he would. Eberhard served as a crucial link 
between the papacy and the imperial court as Alexander and Frederick played an elaborate game 
of chess on the European stage. But the letter collection compiled for Gottfried of Admont 
further reveals the burgeoning information network that had sprung up around the archbishop of 
Salzburg. As the schism unfolded between 1159 and his own death in 1164, Eberhard frequently 
contacted prominent lay and ecclesiastical officials about its problems, complexities, and 
consequences. He traded news with his suffragans, Hartmann I, bishop of Brixen, and Roman, 
bishop of Gurk, while seeking advice from both men.62 He received vital information about the 
Council of Pavia and another unnamed council (perhaps Alexander III’s Council of Tours) from 
Eberhard II, bishop of Bamberg.63 He heard from Ulrich, Frederick’s chancellor, and thanked 
King Geza II of Hungary for his continued support of Alexander’s cause.64 He exchanged letters 
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with prominent members of the papal court, including Hubald, cardinal bishop of Ostia, and 
Hildebrand, papal legate and cardinal priest of the Basilica of the Twelve Apostles.65 And, 
perhaps most interestingly of all, he sought and received news of popular opinion in France from 
Henry, archbishop of Reims, the architect of Alexander’s official recognition in that realm.66 
Alexander relied chiefly on Eberhard, but in doing so he ultimately tapped into an extensive 
information network in and beyond Germany. 
 Eberhard’s own correspondence shows how well connected the archbishop of Salzburg 
was. But it is equally clear that he possessed sources of information beyond those he contacted 
directly. The contents of the Admont collection also include copies of letters that Henry II of 
England, Ferdinand II of León-Castile, and Amalrich, patriarch of Jerusalem, wrote to Alexander 
III; that Fastrad, abbot of the renowned abbey of Clairvaux, and Alexander III, wrote to 
Omnibonus, bishop of Verona; and that Frederick Barbarossa wrote to Conrad, bishop of 
Augsburg.67 It is not altogether clear how Eberhard got his hands on these letters, but given the 
wide range of his contacts and the semi-public nature of most letters at the time, it is easy to 
imagine how a resourceful churchman of Eberhard’s status gathered such information.68 When 
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Alexander urged Eberhard to collect information and report on the situation in Germany, the 
pope had picked the right man for the job.69 
 Up until the end of 1162, Eberhard’s role in the papal schism was important, but 
ultimately informal. That eventually changed. The widespread recognition of Europe’s rulers and 
upcoming preparations for the Council of Tours in May had put the wind at Alexander’s back for 
the time being, and the pope gradually instituted a more assertive policy towards Frederick 
Barbarossa and Victor IV.70 In February 1163 Alexander formally appointed Eberhard as 
apostolic legate to Germany. Addressing the bishops, clergy and people of the German realm, 
Alexander authorized Eberhard to hold public meetings to resolve disputes, reminding his 
audience that they should “devote due reverence and obedience to [the archbishop] as legate of 
the Apostolic See, approach him, and firmly undertake and preserve those things which he will 
have ordered to be done for the honor of God and of the Holy Roman Church.”71 Sadly, the 
written record of Eberhard’s personal commission has not survived the ages. It is precisely the 
type of document that Eberhard would have saved for Gottfried of Admont’s letter collection, 
but the compilation stops abruptly at the end of 1162. Alexander may have appointed Eberhard 
as a legate partly out of gratitude for his past services.72 The pope may also have had specific 
policy objectives in mind for Eberhard, or he may simply have wanted to raise Eberhard’s status 
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within Germany. Eberhard was the most prominent member of the Alexandrian party in 
Germany, but now his status was official.73 Even though the archbishop was now a legate of the 
pope Frederick opposed, the emperor still invited Eberhard to the Imperial Diet held at Mainz in 
March 1163, where the relationship between the two men was, it seems, cordial, even warm.74 
Following this event, the archbishop of Salzburg never again met Frederick in person (he would 
die just over a year later), but the pope still preserved his crucial link with the emperor and with 
the German clergy, nobility, and people. 
 The story of Eberhard of Salzburg ultimately reveals several key trends in Alexander III’s 
communication strategy throughout Germany and, perhaps more broadly, Europe. Alexander’s 
mission in Germany was twofold: convince Frederick that his cause was legitimate, and prevent 
further defections to the camp of Victor IV. Nearly forty years ago, Timothy Reuter correctly 
observed that, “the immediate object of both sides [in the schism] was Frederick.”75 But his 
observation deserves a crucial caveat. For while Frederick’s powerful position loomed over the 
schism, it is vital to remember that after 1159 Alexander never again reached out to the emperor 
directly. Instead, he communicated with Frederick on an informal basis through Eberhard, who 
stood at the center of a vast communication network of clerics and laymen that spanned the 
German Empire and extended well beyond its borders. Eberhard’s network bears no evidence of 
relying on the strong ties of friendship, which often underpinned relationships between clerical 
elites.76 The archbishop surely knew his suffragans fairly well, and may even have been on 
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friendly terms with them. But the links tying Eberhard to Henry of France, archbishop of Reims, 
Hubald and Hildebrand, cardinal legates from Alexander’s Curia, Frederick’s chancellor, Ulrich, 
Geza II of Hungary, and even other bishops in and around Germany were more formal. These 
were important men who had access to those in power, or who were powerful themselves—often 
both. This was the network that Alexander co-opted when he decided to work through the 
archbishop of Salzburg. Alexander never contacted Frederick I or Victor IV directly. Instead, 
through the back channels of power, he contacted everyone else. 
Cultivating Friends—Henry of Reims and Arnulf of Lisieux: 
 The early years of Alexander III’s elaborate diplomatic dance with Frederick Barbarossa 
and Victor IV found the pope always a beat or two out of step. The vast majority of clerics, 
nobles and—it seems—people soundly supported the German emperor and his chosen candidate 
for the papal office. Enemies were everywhere, allies few and far between, and communication 
remained difficult at best. Although Alexander found a potent and well-positioned ally in 
Eberhard of Salzburg, the archbishop was ultimately an anomaly in Germany. Eberhard did his 
best to woo Frederick back to union with Alexander’s faction, but his efforts were always an up-
hill battle. 
 The situation in France and England could not have been more different. Both realms 
were home to powerful, even dominant, Alexandrian factions and—perhaps most important of 
all—monarchs who seemed sympathetic to Alexander’s cause from the start. This more 
congenial environment encouraged the pope to push his cause, and to push it aggressively. In 
part, Alexander’s actions were born of necessity: with Germany lost, the pope desperately 
needed the support of both France and England. But the relative ease of communication also 
aided papal initiatives in both kingdoms. At one level, Alexander communicated more frequently 
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and more broadly in France and England simply because he could. More options provided him 
with the opportunity for a more flexible communication strategy. The political situation in both 
realms facilitated the movement of people and letters in a way that remained almost impossible 
in Germany. But here, too, as in Germany, Alexander augmented the traditional communicative 
tools available to him by working through two specific individuals who were themselves at the 
center of broader ecclesiastical and secular networks. Those men were Henry, archbishop of 
Reims, and Arnulf, bishop of Lisieux. 
 In those first frenzied and uncertain days of Alexander’s pontificate, the pope quickly 
turned his gaze north of the Alps to France and England, but particularly to France. On October 
5, 1159, the papal chancery sent copies of Alexander’s election encyclical, Aeterna et 
incommutabilis, to the French royal abbey of St. Denis; and to Peter, bishop of Paris, and the 
clergy of his diocese.77 One month later, Alexander initiated a series of more personal 
communications to reach out to key allies and prominent men and women in France. At the heart 
of this outreach was a concerted effort to exert influence on Louis VII.78 Contemporaries, 
Alexander chief among them, understood that Europe’s secular princes would play a 
disproportionate role in the settlement of the schism. In the early months of 1160, Archbishop 
Theobald of Canterbury acknowledged as much to his king, Henry II of England. “Some of us,” 
Theobald wrote of the English clergy, “indeed are preparing to approach or visit Alexander, 
while others are for Victor, but we are as yet uncertain which has the better cause, nor can we 
check or hold back by our authority those who fly off to one or the other with such reckless 
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levity.”79 With the situation in flux, Theobald concluded, “we think that it is unlawful in your 
realm to accept either of them, save with your approval.”80 Across the Channel in France, Louis 
VII’s bishops seemed perhaps more willing than their ecclesiastical brothers in England to 
declare for one candidate or the other, but they exhibited similar caution in acting too stridently 
while Louis contemplated the issue. As such, Alexander’s diplomatic offensive must be seen as a 
consistent attempt to win over the French king and to secure the loyalty of the French Church, 
nobility and people in the process. 
 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that on November 8, 1159 Alexander addressed the 
first personal letter of his pontificate to Henry, bishop of Beauvais and brother of Louis VII.81 
Here, the new pope set out an abbreviated version of his cause and beseeched Henry for aid. 
“Because now,” Alexander wrote, 
more than at any preceding time the Church of God has needed to be helped by the 
work and counsel of religious men, we ask, advise and exhort you through our 
letters…to stand fast with steadfast strength, and that when the simoniacal depravity 
of that apostolic and schismatic man [i.e. Victor] has been condemned in every 
way…you should strive to push all those subject to you into [union with the Church] 
with continual warning.82 
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Alexander expressed a desire for Henry to work on members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in 
France, but the pope’s closing reveals much about his ultimate goal. “Mindful of certain past 
friendships,” he confided, “we wish to single out you and your most dear brother for sincere 
charity among the offspring of Christ, and we, along with God, can hear your petitions 
willingly.”83 The pope offered up a little flattery and the useful opportunity to deal with problems 
that Henry needed to be resolved. The bishop of Beauvais and his brother, the king of France, 
had served the papacy in times past. Now Alexander hoped they would do so again. 
 The genius of Alexander’s communication strategy was that he, like Calixtus II before 
him, cultivated multiple ways to get his message across. Only five days after writing to Henry, 
the pope continued his charm offensive by reaching out to another individual close to Louis: his 
wife. Using much the same language as when he had written to the bishop of Beauvais, 
Alexander implored Adele, “to influence our most dear son and your husband, Louis, the 
illustrious king of the French.”84 In less than a week’s time, Alexander reached out to perhaps the 
two individuals closest to Louis, indicating a strong effort to influence a ruler through those 
around him. This, of course, was the same basic strategy that Alexander employed in Germany, 
where Eberhard acted as the pope’s crucial link to Frederick Barbarossa. But unlike Germany, 
where political realities on the ground precluded the possibility of taking a more activist posture, 
in France Alexander quickly upped the ante. Early in December, expressing continued concern 
that news of his election had not reached every part of France, he announced in a letter to Henry 
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that he was sending two papal legates to France, “so that this matter might shine forth more 
clearly.”85 According to Cardinal Boso, this was only one of several legations that Alexander 
sent to France, the Latin Patriarchate of the East, Hungary, and the Emperor of Constantinople.86 
Only through the zeal and labor of these men, Boso concluded, would “the revelation of the facts 
of the election to the Apostolic See occur, and, with the truth known, the whole community of 
the faithful be strengthened in the faith of catholic unity.”87 
 Boso’s trust in the power of Alexander’s legates knew few limits. Writing his account of 
the schism some years later, the cardinal drew a direct causal link between the widespread 
announcement of the election and the decisions of Henry II of England and Louis VII of France 
to recognize Alexander as the one, true pope in 1160.88 Arnulf, bishop of the prominent Angevin 
bishopric of Lisieux, similarly praised the pope’s legates in France. “They were men,” Arnulf 
wrote glowingly to the College of Cardinals in late 1160, “whose holiness the people revere, 
whose wisdom the clergy praise wholly, and at whose strength of severity the princes become 
frightened…so that strictness of teaching does not pass away and in every part of the Holy 
Roman Church grace gains strength.”89 The cardinal legates who ventured over the Alps to 
France in the winter of 1159-60 undoubtedly merited the praise lavished on them by Boso and 
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Arnulf. Legates, as we have seen before, were prominent tools in any pope’s diplomatic and 
communicative arsenal.90 Alexander had already worked hard to disseminate copies of Aeterna 
et incommutabilis. He had used Eberhard of Salzburg and Henry of Reims to disseminate 
information on his behalf and influence key figures. Now, clearly cognizant of how important it 
was to control and shape the flow of news, Alexander turned to direct papal representatives. Yet, 
in spite of this development, Boso’s formulation of the events of 1159-60 never captures the 
central role that non-legatine officials played in securing Alexander’s recognition in France and 
England. Yes, the pope took steps to communicate directly with those whose support he needed. 
But behind the scenes, perhaps even unbeknownst to the legates themselves, Alexander used 
other men and women to influence Louis VII and Henry II. The pope diversified his overarching 
strategy by employing direct and back channel communication. And in the end, this multifaceted 
communicative strategy paid off. 
 In July 1160, in a grand ceremony wreathed in symbolism, Louis VII and Henry II 
formally recognized Alexander as the legitimate pope. Although both kings appear to have been 
strongly predisposed towards Alexander from the moment of his election, for months neither 
man was willing to make known his views until after a protracted series of negotiations. 
Multiple—and at times contradictory—contemporary reports of these events cloud much crucial 
detail, but a painstaking reconstruction by Mary Cheney provides a basic outline of what 
occurred.91 After Frederick Barbarossa’s Council of Pavia officially declared for Victor IV in 
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February 1160, Louis and Henry discussed the schism at length and determined that they would 
postpone a final decision until after extensive deliberations. Henry, in particular, consulted the 
English clergy. Finally, late in July the two kings attended a council, almost certainly at 
Beauvais, in which both England and France formally recognized Alexander as the legitimate 
pope. According to Frank Barlow, Louis, an “incurably simple” man, delegated the decision to 
Henry, but the intensity with which Alexander courted the French king and his closest associates 
flies in the face of this.92 And while we know little about the planning of the council, it is surely 
no coincidence that it was held at Beauvais, the episcopal seat of Alexander’s chief advocate in 
France. “We attribute our reception,” Alexander gushed to Henry in 1161, “which was made 
solemnly in the council held in France, to you more than any other living person, through whose 
zeal, vigilance and labor the souls of the undecided were called back to the path of truth and, 
remaining in devotion to the Church, reinforced firmly in that path.”93 
 In the wake of this tremendous victory for his cause, circumstances surely tempted 
Alexander to rest on his laurels for a while. Yet as an astute politician, Alexander recognized that 
Fortune’s wheel was ever in motion. Although France and England had acknowledged him as the 
legitimate pope, dangers remained. It was always possible that one or both monarchs would 
succumb to Frederick Barbarossa’s charms and renege on their promise of allegiance. And as it 
turned out, Alexander’s fears proved sound. 
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 In 1162 a series of events revealed just how tenuous Alexander’s grip on power remained 
nearly three years after the double election. At the beginning of the year, Louis VII suddenly—
almost bizarrely—decided to enter into negotiations with Frederick Barbarossa, threatening all of 
Alexander’s hard-earned diplomatic work over the preceding years.94 The precise reasons for 
Louis’s sudden about-face remain unclear.95 Boso claims that Henry, count of Troyes and an ally 
of Frederick Barbarossa, approached the trusting French monarch “like the Tempter his Lord” 
and “with cunning he deceitfully suggested to him, on behalf of the Emperor, an allegedly 
desirable plan for restoring the peace of the Roman Church.”96 It seems, however, that Louis was 
the one who initiated the dialogue after a series of frustrating exchanges with Alexander.97 The 
French monarch clearly sent nuncios to Frederick before May 1162, perhaps because his views 
of Alexander were souring.98 In spite of his strengthening position, Alexander could do nothing 
to prevent this communication between Louis and the emperor. But he had been kept apprised of 
events. At some point in 1162 (precisely when remains unknown), Alexander received disturbing 
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news that the situation in France was more in flux than he would have liked.99 Faced with the 
very real possibility that his situation would again deteriorate, Alexander went on the offensive. 
The proposed meeting between Louis VII and Frederick I at St.-Jean-sur-Laône would prove a 
pivotal test of both his political acumen and also the communicative structures that underpinned 
all of his efforts. 
 The backdrop to the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône was Alexander’s decision in the 
spring of 1162 to abandon Italy in favor of France.100 By April 15, after almost three years of 
diplomatic and physical maneuvering that ultimately left him with a poor power base in Italy, the 
pope arrived at Marseilles, where he reported a near rapturous reception by the local nobility.101 
Almost immediately, on April 20, the pope wrote a short note to Louis VII, precisely the kind of 
missive that was never an option when dealing with Frederick Barbarossa. Geography and the 
political landscape both facilitated the ease with which the pope now contacted the French 
monarch. Alexander noted his arrival in France and announced his decision to “send some or 
other of our brother cardinals who are now with us, close to your region, so that the status of the 
Church might be fully known to your serenity.”102 Ten days later, however, came another salvo. 
On April 30, Alexander addressed four letters to King Louis; Queen Adele; Henry of France, 
who had recently been elected to the archiepiscopal see of Reims; and Hugh, bishop of Soissons 
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and Louis’s chancellor.103 These letters, which contained many duplicate phrases, worked in 
concert with the single aim of shoring up Alexander’s relationship with the French monarch. 
Alexander targeted the key individuals around Louis and then pursued them with almost 
relentless vigor. He congratulated Henry of France on his election as archbishop of Reims, and 
then urged him to approach his brother, the king.104 He informed Hugh of Soissons of his 
decision to send three prominently placed clerics—Henry of France, the bishop of Langres, and 
the bishop of Senlis—to meet with Louis in the hope that they, along with Hugh, might be able 
to negotiate successfully with their monarch on behalf of the papacy.105 He implored Louis to 
work for the unity of the Church and to receive the envoys he had written about in his letter to 
Hugh.106 And, finally, he urged Adele, Louis’s queen, “to strive and labor to confirm anxiously 
our most dear son in Christ, Louis, the illustrious king of the French, your husband and lord, in 
his devotion to Saint Peter and to us,” adding the same laundry list of requests that he had 
already asked of Henry, Hugh and the king himself.107 Here, as in times past, Alexander’s 
strategy was to communicate through others, cultivating as many links to the French king as he 
could muster. The hope, of course, was that at least one—and perhaps several or even all—of the 
men and women in this network would get through to the French king, influencing him and 
thereby bringing about the result that Alexander craved. The pope knew his relationship with 
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Louis had deteriorated. Over time he had built up a network of allies in France, and now he 
expected that network to pay dividends. 
 During the summer of 1162, Alexander probably remained unaware of the exact details 
of Louis’s proposed meeting with the German emperor at St.-Jean-sur-Laône.108 But he 
obviously knew something was afoot. The pope and the French king remained in contact through 
June and July, and it seems likely that it was Louis’s legate, Theobald, abbot of St. Germain-des-
Prés and the king’s former chancellor, who provided hints as to the political rumblings on the 
horizon.109 Whatever Theobald told the pope, it was enough to prompt him to send two 
additional legates to the French king.110 Alexander once again employed direct communication. 
Still, Theobald also apparently encouraged Alexander to reach out again to those closest to 
Louis. Four days after Alexander responded to the king’s legation, the pope sent north a special 
agent, Peter, canon of St. Aniane, to confer with both Henry of Reims and Hugh of Soissons, the 
two most important clerics in his network of allies. The identical letters of introduction that 
Alexander addressed to Henry and Hugh say nothing about the purpose of Peter’s visit, but it is 
hard to imagine that the situation with Louis VII was not on the agenda.111 Peter of St. Aniane 
had already informed Alexander of the deteriorating situation in France in an undated letter from 
the first half of 1162.112 Now he acted as the crucial link between the papal court and 
Alexander’s allies in the French king’s inner circle. This crucial information underpinned the 
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pope’s action to stem the tide rising against him. With his position suddenly under fire, 
Alexander needed both information and agents who could communicate his will to Louis and 
those around him. Once again, through direct and indirect communication, the pope pursued his 
ends. 
 The extent to which Alexander relied on this communication network became even more 
apparent as the summer went on. By August 1, 1162 (if not before), Alexander knew that Louis 
and Frederick were set to meet, and he was spurred on to action.113 As he journeyed north, 
presumably to deal with the situation in person, he wrote feverishly to Henry of Reims, begging 
his friend to “strive in every way for the disruption of the conversation that the king [Louis] 
proposed to have with Frederick, called emperor.”114 And since information—genuine 
information—was as good as gold in a tense political quandary such as this, the pope ordered 
Henry “to inform us as quickly as possible with your letters about the state of the aforementioned 
kingdom and your counsel for what should be done with the Church.”115 
 In many cases where popes requested help from others, the lack of documentary evidence 
makes it impossible for us to know whether the request was ever met. But in this case, it is 
abundantly clear that Henry acted decisively and with haste.116 In a masterful reprimand to his 
brother, the archbishop of Reims copied the entire text of Frederick Barbarossa’s letter endorsing 
Victor IV, which stated matter-of-factly that the king of France was about to endorse 
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Alexander’s rival. Then, at the end came the rebuke. “Therefore,” Henry wrote succinctly, “your 
discernment should be alerted in this critical moment of such necessity, lest through the sons of 
darkness your innocence permit the wretched shipwreck of both your soul and your body. 
Farewell.”117 The message was clear enough: the king of France, a man noted for his piety, 
risked his eternal salvation if he were to choose the wrong side in the schism. Henry undoubtedly 
felt that this rebuke would bring his brother back to the fold. But on the off chance that it did not, 
the archbishop of Reims planned further action. Under the shroud of secrecy, Henry contacted 
the archbishops of Tours and Sens to strategize. “Indeed, the conversation between our lord, the 
king of French, and the emperor of the Romans is set,” Henry wrote, his panic almost dripping 
from the page, “whereby we have no doubt that the faith of Jesus Christ, the liberty of the 
Church, and the fidelity of the lord Pope Alexander is to be gravely damaged and wounded.”118 
Something needed to be done. But what? Henry did not have an immediate answer, but he 
proposed an urgent meeting to discuss the matter before Louis and Frederick had a chance to 
confer at the end of August. “In His name and for love of Him,” Henry begged, “we beseech you 
on your soul that you should hasten to meet with us and our suffragan bishops at Paris on the 
vigil of St. Peter in Chains [July 31] so that we might strive as much as possible to liberate the 
Church of God from the distress and pain of the wicked.”119 
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Unfortunately, we do not know whether Henry of Reims’ conference at Paris ever took 
place, or, if it did, what further action the assembled clerics chose to pursue.120 The documentary 
trail ceases abruptly with Henry’s letter to the archbishops of Tours and Sens. But regardless, 
this remarkable chain of events is instructive. For a moment—as with the Admont collection that 
chronicled Eberhard of Salzburg’s communicative efforts on behalf of Alexander III—we see 
evidence of how an embattled pope sought to shore up his increasingly dangerous political 
situation. Here, as in Germany, Alexander communicated through non-curial subordinates with 
close access to the secular rulers he needed to influence. In Germany, the pope had worked 
through Eberhard of Salzburg when his own communications with Emperor Frederick 
Barbarossa ceased. In France, Alexander maintained active communications with Louis VII, but 
he also relied on the king’s closest associates when the situation appeared most dire. It is telling 
that Alexander seems never to have broached the subject of St.-Jean-sur-Laône with the French 
king. His letter of July 10 did not explicitly mention the meeting, even though the pope 
commended to Louis several legates who may have borne a more personal message about any 
potential contact with Frederick.121 Ultimately, it was Henry of Reims and his own ecclesiastical 
network upon which Alexander relied in his broader efforts to communicate with Louis VII. As 
with Eberhard, Alexander had cultivated Henry’s friendship from the very beginning of his 
embattled pontificate. He cajoled, flattered, and even begged the French cleric for help. And in 
the end his efforts paid off. The meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône came to naught, and in the wake 
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of the failed negotiation Louis’s commitment to Alexander became stronger with each passing 
day.122 
If Henry of Reims proved vital to Alexander’s larger efforts to communicate with Louis 
VII and the kingdom of France, Arnulf, bishop of Lisieux, played a similar role in the pope’s 
dealings with the Anglo-Norman realm of Henry II.123 Alexander’s relationship with Arnulf 
appears less frequently in the documentary record than Henry’s, but where it does, once again we 
see the pope targeting a specific individual who was particularly well placed to communicate his 
wishes to another party, in this case, the English king. On April 1, 1160, while still moving about 
southern Italy, Alexander wrote to Arnulf. “We hear,” the pope wrote, citing one or more letters 
that he had received from the bishop, “that the magnificent and most serene prince of the earth, 
Henry, king of the English, remains firm and steadfast in the unity of the Catholic faith, and that 
through your effort he strengthened his noble spirit in holy command.”124 Given that Arnulf had 
already helped to strengthen the papacy’s ties to the English monarchy, Alexander now asked 
that the bishop of Lisieux do more. “We ask,” the pope wrote, 
that you, concerned, continue a constant vigil around [Henry], lest through the 
frequent upheavals of the emperor and his nuncios he desires (God forbid!) to turn 
away from devotion to the Church and to us. Indeed we want you to put to the test 
the same king, bishops, and nearby persons, as if you were the apostle and nuncio of 
truth in those parts. With all diligence and effective eagerness you should exhort 
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nearby and surrounding bishops, ecclesiastical as well as secular persons, especially 
the nobles and powerful, to the same end.125 
 
In many ways, Alexander’s letter to Arnulf reveals how the papacy was beginning to internalize 
the importance of communication in making its will felt throughout Europe. Indeed, the pope’s 
words brim with the language of communication. The bishop of Lisieux was a “nuncio of truth” 
tasked with disrupting communications between Alexander’s ally, Henry II, and his enemy, 
Frederick I. He was to exhort clerics and laymen—particularly those in a position to exert further 
influence on the rest of Christian society—to support the pope’s cause, bringing Alexander’s 
message of unity to regions far from the papal court. And, in praising Arnulf’s efforts to keep 
him informed of the situation in Henry’s realm, Alexander invited his episcopal brother to 
continue doing so. 
 Ultimately, we possess only one letter in which Alexander explicitly directed Arnulf to 
serve as a link to the Anglo-Norman realm. But the extant corpus of Arnulf’s correspondence 
shows that the pope was not flying blind in selecting the bishop of Lisieux—like Eberhard and 
Henry of Reims before him—as a key communicative agent. Arnulf was a well-connected 
member of the episcopate, who routinely corresponded with important figures in France, at the 
papal court, and across the continent. Shortly after the news of the schismatic election reached 
his ears, Arnulf wrote in the fall of 1159 to four cardinals: John of Naples, William of Pavia, 
Henry of Pisa, and Hyacinth Orsini.126 He enthusiastically endorsed the election of Alexander III 
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and informed his contacts at the papal court that he would do his utmost to convince Henry II of 
Alexander’s cause.127 In the late spring or early summer of 1160, he used a lengthy and highly 
detailed letter to the archbishops and bishops of England to praise Alexander; excoriate Victor 
IV and Frederick Barbarossa; describe the emperor’s Council of Pavia; and communicate the 
general sympathy of the French Church to Alexander’s cause.128 Later the same year, he 
provided the papal court with a wide-ranging report that Alexander and his advisors must have 
received with great pleasure. Arnulf documented his efforts to influence Henry II, he described 
the general sentiment of the Anglo-Norman clergy, and he detailed how members of both the 
Alexandrian and Victorine parties were dealing with the schism.129 And in the period 1159 to 
1164 he consistently maintained personal lines of communication with the pope himself.130 As 
with Eberhard of Salzburg and Henry of Reims, Alexander clearly believed that a figure like 
Arnulf was well placed to aid the papacy’s broader communicative agenda. Once again, his faith 
was well placed. 
Alexander III’s communication strategy in France and England was both similar to, and 
yet also strikingly different from, that which he had employed in Germany. As with Eberhard of 
Salzburg in the imperial lands, the pope found a key ally in each kingdom—Henry of Reims and 
Arnulf of Lisieux—upon whom he relied more than any other. In each case—again, as with 
Eberhard—that ally was a well-connected individual who could be counted on to spread the 
pope’s word and implement his will. But the different contours of the political situation in France 
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and England also provided Alexander with more options. In Germany, Eberhard had been the 
only prominent supporter of the Alexandrian party; in France and England, Henry and Arnulf 
were key—but not solitary—figures who supported the pope’s cause. The aim of papal 
communication in each kingdom also played a key role in shaping Alexander’s strategy. From 
the beginning, the pope’s overarching mission in Germany was to win over Frederick and 
(through him) the ecclesiastical hierarchy that supported Victor IV. To that end, he employed 
Eberhard to spread Alexander’s case and to engage with the most important secular and 
ecclesiastical officials in the empire. The situation with Louis VII and Henry II, however, was 
different. In the kingdoms of France and England, where the majority of the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy already supported his cause, Alexander employed a network of many prominent 
individuals to influence the rulers of each realm. Both situations required the pope to cultivate 
and then use communication networks to further his aims. And behind the scenes, an army of 
messengers and other delegated agents helped to make these networks function. 
Making Networks Work—The Role of Papal Messengers: 
 Even as he sought to expand his communicative reach by tapping into networks in 
England, France, and Germany, Alexander III continued to rely on the traditional tools of 
communication available to him at the time. Messages, as we have seen on many occasions, 
could be delivered orally (whether by a single person or a larger body, such as a council) or by 
means of a written document.131 In fact, the two categories often overlapped. A written 
message—a letter, privilege, memorandum, or piece of conciliar legislation—required a person 
to carry it to its intended destination, where its addressee then read it privately or had it read 
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aloud. So impressed was Alexander by Arnulf of Lisieux’s integrity and steadfastness in 
influencing Henry II of England that the pope read the bishop’s letters and then “had them 
recited out loud in a public audience of our brothers.”132 Today, thousands of papal letters that 
have survived from the twelfth century attest to Alexander’s reliance on written communication, 
just as they reveal the contours of the communication networks that he employed. But the 
messengers who bore these letters and privileges to the far corners of Europe remain far more 
elusive. Some of course were the great officeholders of the Church, the legates, nuncios, and 
bishops who carried letters and oral messages even as they crisscrossed the continent serving the 
pope in a wide variety of capacities.133 Others were of decidedly lesser stature, holding no 
Church office of substance. Many remain nameless altogether, the details of their lives never 
recorded in the documents they carried and thus lost to the ages. Who were these individuals? 
What duties did they have? And what role did they play in Alexander’s broader efforts to 
communicate with the Church and with European society at large? 
 Papal messengers appear infrequently and all too briefly in Alexander’s letters, but even 
passing references to their activities reveal their crucial role in both the collection and 
dissemination of information on behalf of the papal court. Some messengers undoubtedly did 
little more than physically carry a written letter to its designated addressee. When in January 
1161 Alexander wrote almost gleefully to Eberhard, archbishop of Salzburg, to announce that the 
rulers and most prominent ecclesiastics of France, England, Spain, and the Latin Kingdom of 
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Jerusalem had denounced Victor IV and “magnificently received us as spiritual father and 
supreme pontiff, humbly offering to us all obedience and reference in word and deed,” he noted 
that Eberhard “should know this through transcripts of letters which we send to you by means of 
the bearer of the present letter.”134 Here a single messenger carried both a personal message from 
Alexander to Eberhard and also supporting materials that allowed the German archbishop to gain 
a fuller picture of the shifting political situation. But ultimately, the nameless messenger who 
bore these written letters seems to have had no other task. His charge ended when he reached 
Salzburg. 
 In other cases, however, messengers played more active or at least continuing roles in 
disseminating information on behalf of the papal court. Only a few weeks after he wrote to 
Eberhard, Alexander penned a letter to Hugh of Soissons in France. Predictably, the letter 
condemns Frederick Barbarossa’s persecution of the Church and exhorts Hugh to support the 
pope’s cause. But in closing, Alexander pressed Hugh to spread this information throughout his 
diocese. “You should exhort with all diligence,” he wrote, “the abbots and other prelates of the 
Church located in your diocese regarding this same matter. And whenever you assist us, we wish 
that you would assign that matter to our dear son, the bearer of the present letter, and that you 
should indicate this fact to us in your letters.”135 This is a curious passage. Alexander implies that 
the nameless “bearer of the present letter” was to remain on site—presumably in Soissons—as a 
papal agent-in-residence. His precise mandate remains uncertain, but obviously he was to help 
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Hugh in his efforts to solidify support for Alexander’s papacy. Such activity was apparently 
reasonably common. When Henry of Reims traveled to Cluny to depose its abbot, a prominent 
supporter of Victor IV, Alexander reminded him “to bring with you to that monastery our dear 
sons, R(ichard?), the bearer of the present message, and his friends who remain faithful to the 
Roman Church.” Henry, the pope wrote, “should quietly and peacefully cause [these men] to 
remain in that position.”136 For the second time in a matter of weeks, Alexander deliberately 
attached his own messengers to key allies in his ongoing dispute with Victor IV. 
 Why did the pope do this? One of the hallmarks of Alexander’s early letters is the pope’s 
almost palpable thirst for information. Allegiances shifted faster than sand, and in the early years 
of the schism it was often unclear whether Alexander’s position was improving or fast 
deteriorating. In such a tense political climate, where verifiable information was nearly priceless, 
Alexander sought information from every possible source. Naturally, prominent churchmen—
especially bishops—were well positioned to provide the pope with the best possible information. 
“Your devotion,” Alexander wrote to Eberhard of Salzburg at the beginning of 1161, “should not 
delay you in informing us through your own letters the position of your church and of the 
German kingdom, as well as the souls and wishes of the men of the same kingdom.”137 But 
Alexander clearly relied a great deal on a growing number of traveling legates. Cardinals Henry 
and Otto, who served as papal legates in France in the early 1160s, returned with the welcome 
news of how Henry of Beauvais “effectively silenced schismatics and heretics, and strengthened 
with many persuasions the soul of our most dear son, Louis, the illustrious king of France…and 
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the souls of others, secular princes and ecclesiastics, in the unity of the Catholic Church.”138 
Later, these same men, along with the abbot of Clairvaux, informed the pope that Henry had 
been elected to the all-important archiepiscopal see of Reims, which gave a key papal ally 
greater prestige and, in effect, a more prominent bully pulpit.139 Alexander’s letters exude 
references to various delegated agents providing the papal court with crucial information.140 
Given the importance of these messengers and other agents in providing Alexander with 
news of crucial political developments, it should come as no surprise that the pope consistently 
expressed concern for their wellbeing. He went out of his way to announce their presence, and he 
often exhorted local ecclesiastical officials to support their efforts. When in March 1161 the pope 
asked a certain Master Nicholas to keep up his efforts to strengthen the Church and solidify the 
support of various ecclesiastical and secular officials in France, he concluded with an offer to 
“send letters of introduction for you to our venerable brothers, Hugh, archbishop of Sens, and 
Samson, archbishop of Reims.”141 And in September 1162, after the failed meeting at St.-Jean-
sur-Laône, Alexander commended to Louis VII R[ichard] of Sancto Valerico “and other valued 
nuncios”, requesting that the king “receive [them] with kindness as befits a diligent and sensible 
king, and strive to respect them in every way.”142 These were the men who were responsible for 
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carrying the pope’s letters, collecting crucial information, and connecting the various members 
of his information network. Without them, the carefully constructed edifice of Alexander’s 
communication strategy would have come crashing to the ground. 
Curiously, however, letters concerning these messengers and delegated officials rarely 
detail the precise nature of their mission. It is unclear whether the pope gave them their 
instructions by word of mouth, or, in the event that they were written, that they simply have not 
survived. It seems likely, however, that Alexander had to rely to a considerable degree on the 
individual initiative of these men. Indeed, as William Miller observes, the very nature of a 
messenger’s task gave him (or in some rare cases, her) incredible leeway to make decisions and 
shape the way a message—be it in written or oral form—was delivered.143 In some cases, a 
messenger even became a double agent of sorts when he returned from his destination with an 
answer to the letter he originally bore.144 For many a messenger who crisscrossed Europe on 
behalf of the embattled Alexander III, there exists (as in the cases of Eberhard of Salzburg and 
Henry of Reims) no detailed biography, no praise from a grateful employer, and—in most 
cases—no detailed description of how they were to fulfill their appointed task. But it is 
abundantly clear that these messengers were vital cogs in the delicate machinery of the pope’s 
communication network. 
Conclusion: 
 The story of Alexander III’s efforts to unite the Church during the papal schism of 1159 
simultaneously reveals crucial information about one man’s efforts to control European affairs 
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and the ultimate fragility of his power to do so. The schism, a thorny problem of continental 
scale, challenged the pope to utilize many of the communicative tools available to him, and in 
the preceding pages we have seen many of these tools in action. He prodded and coaxed, begged 
and, at times, chastised some of the most powerful ecclesiastical and secular officials of the era, 
hoping that his efforts would succeed in destroying Victor IV’s power base while building up his 
own. Central to this effort were a series of networks that allowed Alexander to disseminate and 
collect information, build alliances, seek aid, and influence those who would determine his fate. 
Three members of the episcopacy—Eberhard of Salzburg, Henry of Reims, and Arnulf of 
Lisieux—were the central figures who stood at the center of these networks in their respective 
realms. Networks, as communication scholars have observed, often revolve around central 
“hubs”, crucial connectors that link many individuals or places together.145 In a sense, Eberhard, 
Henry, and Arnulf served as hubs in Alexander’s larger communications network. They were 
vital players who were absolutely instrumental in the pope’s larger efforts to communicate his 
will and implement policy during the schism. But as important as these three men were, it is also 
crucial to note that other men and women, down to the nameless messengers who often bore 
letters back and forth, were in many ways just as important. The networks on which Alexander 
relied were centered on certain key figures. But without the messengers who made those 
networks function, the papacy’s communication strategy would have stood in tatters. 
 The dominant storyline of papal history in the twelfth century is that of administrative 
and institutional centralization, and it is tempting to see in Alexander’s communication strategy a 
reaffirmation of this historiographical vision. Alexander, the politician, the puppet master, 
initiated communication with key allies and tapped into their burgeoning local networks so that 
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he could achieve his own ends. That was undoubtedly true. And it is important to note the pope’s 
efforts to expand on the communicative tools available to his predecessors—tools, as we have 
seen in the preceding chapter, that did not always work effectively if used in an unsystematic 
way. But the pope’s reliance on networks also reveals the striking fragility of papal power, a 
fragility in part brought on by the nature of the schism, but also by the very communicative 
structures and technologies of the era. Even among his allies, the pope relied heavily on back-
channel communication orchestrated by subordinates in whom he had to place his fate. If 
Eberhard of Salzburg or Henry of Reims or Arnulf of Lisieux had not supported the pope as 
actively as they did, or if they had not engaged with other members of their networks, 
Alexander’s faith in these men would have been for naught. Similarly, the nameless army of 
messengers who carried letters across Europe held tremendous responsibility for the success or 
failure of the papacy’s communication strategy. Some papal efforts, such as Alexander’s 
decision to send multiple letters (sometimes the same letter) to crucial allies, or to exert influence 
on a monarch such as Louis VII through many independent people, helped to mitigate the 
problems inherent in the communication technologies of the time. But even here, there was only 
so much the pope could do. The schism of 1159 challenged Alexander III’s right to rule the 
Church in a specific moment in the history of the papacy, but perhaps more importantly it 
offered a crucial test of the extent—and limits—of papal power in the pre-modern era. The 
papacy had made progress since the days of the dispute between Canterbury and York. And yet, 





A SHATTERED IDEAL: 
The Fourth Lateran Council and the Reform of Christendom, 1215-1227 
 
“Since it is worthless that sacred statutes be promulgated unless transgressors are to be 
compelled by the authority of a superior to observe them, in fact the authority of the legislator is 
made even more worthless, because it stands in scandal and ruin.”1 
 
-Honorius III to Thibaut, archbishop of Rouen (December 9, 1223) 
 
The Problem of Reform: 
 
 As dawn’s grey light spread over the city of Rome on the morning of November 11, 
1215, the basilica of St. John Lateran already buzzed with activity.2 A great crowd of primates, 
archbishops and bishops—four hundred eighty-three in number—packed into the ancient church 
to hear mass with Innocent III at the start of the pope’s great council. When the time came, a 
throng of other clerics and laymen joined the bishops inside, swelling the ranks of attendees to 
perhaps twelve hundred strong. It was the largest, most representative, and most impressive 
assembly of the Christian faithful since the Council of Chalcedon in 451.3 Finally, with almost 
no space left vacant, the pope reentered the church with his cardinals and ministers, took his 
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place at the head of those assembled, and intoned the hymn Veni Creator Spiritus. Shortly 
thereafter, the crowd undoubtedly restless, Innocent walked to the dais and began to preach. 
“With desire,” he began, quoting Luke 22:15, “I have wished to eat this Paschal meal with you 
before I suffer, that is,” he added prophetically, “before I die.”4 Then, his voice echoing dimly 
through the church built nine centuries earlier by the Emperor Constantine, the pope explained 
his reasons for calling them there. “Not for the sake of earthly convenience or for temporal 
glory,” he continued, “but for the reformation of the universal Church and especially the 
liberation of the Holy Land—I convened this council chiefly and especially for these two 
reasons.”5 Of course, the sea of assembled clerics and laymen already knew this. Two years 
earlier, the papal chancery had sent hundreds of copies of a summons, Vineam Domini, to the 
bishops of Christendom, and that summons laid down the date of the council and the matters 
Innocent intended to address.6 Now, with the representatives of Christendom before him, the 
pope reiterated his intentions and opened what was to become the crowning event of his 
pontificate. 
Over the next three weeks, the Fourth Lateran Council unquestionably proved Innocent’s 
masterful grasp of political and spiritual affairs. The pope controlled the council’s agenda by 
chairing the three plenary sessions and supervising meetings that took place at other times. He 
used the prestige of his office and that of the city of Rome to encourage, cajole, and even 
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manipulate those in attendance.7 And in the end, he got what he wanted. Although disruptions 
and arguments among the clergy marred the second plenary session on November 20, Innocent’s 
careful preparations for the third and final session proceeded flawlessly. On November 30, the 
Feast of St. Andrew, the pope celebrated an early mass with his cardinals and ministers before 
entering the Lateran basilica to supervise the day’s program. After the council dealt with several 
important political disputes, a representative of the Curia proceeded to read out seventy-one 
constitutions proposed and almost certainly written by Innocent himself.8 If there was any 
dissent, contemporary accounts make no mention of it. The measures quickly became law.9 
Surprisingly, the adoption of Innocent’s constitutions seems almost an afterthought in the 
two extant eyewitness accounts of the council. Richard of San Germano, who wrote about the 
council in his Chronica Priora, observed matter-of-factly that “the holy synod promulgated 
seventy canons,” while the remarkable account of an anonymous German cleric mentions only 
that “the constitutions of the lord pope were read” before the council’s concluding ceremony.10 
And yet, the implications of Innocent’s concilar program were profound. Among the seventy-one 
canons were decrees that defined orthodox Christian belief and the doctrine of transubstantiation; 
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promoted clerical discipline and the efficient administration of Church properties and offices; 
banned clerical participation in ordeals; instituted important changes in pastoral care; clarified 
Jewish-Christian relations; and called for a new crusade to the Holy Land.11 The Fourth Lateran 
Council dazzled attendees and contemporary commentators for its pomp and pageantry, but it is 
this stunningly broad reform program that has continued to fascinate historians of the Middle 
Ages. Innocent’s council has traditionally been seen by scholars as a watershed moment in the 
history of European society, a moment when the religious trajectory of the continent began to 
shift.12 Robert Brentano characterized the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council as “the secular 
church’s official announcement of a general change in the way that educated or enthusiastic 
ecclesiastics looked at their world and more specifically at their jobs.”13 Not one to eschew his 
role in history, Innocent III perhaps believed something similar when he closed the council by 
displaying a relic of the True Cross and then blessing the great assembly.14 In the days and weeks 
and months that followed, those who had attended the council ventured back to their 
ecclesiastical provinces with a forceful reform program in hand. But what happened next? How 
would this conciliar program promulgated in the splendor of St. John Lateran actually come to 
fruition? 
                                                
11 The definitive critical edition of the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council remains Constitutiones Concilii quarti 
Lateranensis una cum Commentariis glossatum, 2 vols., ed. Antonio García y García (Vatican City: Biblioteca 
apostolica vaticana, 1981); for brief commentary and an English translation of the canons with the Latin text, see 
Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 1: Nicaea I to Lateran V, ed. Norman P. Tanner (Washington: Georgetown 
University Press, 1990), pp. 227-271. I have chosen to use Tanner’s edition in this chapter, because it matches 
almost exactly the critical text edited by García y García. I also quote Tanner’s excellent English translation of the 
canons, where appropriate, providing the Latin in the notes. See, for clarification, Decrees, p. 229, n. 13. 
 
12 See the extensive bibliography on councils in Chapter 1. 
 
13 Robert Brentano, Two Churches: England and Italy in the Thirteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988), p. 106. 
 
14 Kuttner and García y García, “New Eyewitness Account,” pp. 128-129. 
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The spectacular success of the Fourth Lateran Council as an event could not overshadow 
a stark reality: law only has full meaning when both those it binds and those who enforce it 
know, understand, and accept its precepts. The process of implementing Innocent III’s reform 
program, then, was at heart a process of communicating a new set of ideas to the broader Church 
community and, where appropriate, to secular officials and the Christian laity. This proved a 
complex logistical problem. Although the papacy convened the Fourth Lateran Council with a 
concrete plan for the implementation of the conciliar program, that plan quickly unraveled at the 
local level, forcing Innocent’s successor, Honorius III, to inject himself and the papal Curia more 
forcefully into the process. Even this effort, however, bore mixed results. The papacy used the 
communicative tools available to it with greater consistency and in a more integrated fashion—
certainly more so than it had done when arbitrating the primacy dispute between Canterbury and 
York, or when attempting to end the schism of 1159. But although Innocent III clearly 
understood the necessity—and challenges—of effective communication, the plan that he and his 
successors put into motion for communicating the conciliar reform program to Christendom was 
still fraught with problems. As an institution, the papacy had acquired more power and more 
prestige over the previous century and a half, but the decade following the close of Innocent’s 
great council reveals how the papacy of the early thirteenth century—a period that supposedly 
represented the apogee of papal power—remained a remarkably decentralized institution in 
many ways. As the papacy sought to communicate its will to the far corners of the European 
continent, local ecclesiastical and secular officials still bore the heavy burden of implementing 
papal policy. In that sense, the communicative challenge for Innocent III and Honorius III was 
similar to that which Alexander III had faced fifty years earlier. The difference, however, was 
that the communication and implementation of the Lateran IV decrees required a more thorough 
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and widespread two-way flow of information in order to ensure the enforcement of the conciliar 
program. Bishops were a mercurial lot. Their independent will, their varying levels of 
competence, and, on occasion, their refusal to bend a knee to Rome, had the potential to wreak 
havoc on the papacy’s efforts to make its will felt throughout Europe. But if the papacy did not 
know that its bishops were shirking their duties, it could not act or follow up. 
A Papal Plan Unravels: 
 The papacy’s initial plan for implementing the reform canons of the Fourth Lateran 
Council proceeded on three levels. First, of course, Innocent III and the papal Curia recognized 
that the council itself was an important communicative tool. Since the advent of the resurgent 
papacy in the middle of the eleventh century, bishops, archbishops and, on occasion, other 
Church and secular officials frequently attended papal councils in force.15 But the scale of the 
Fourth Lateran Council was simply beyond that of any council since the early centuries of the 
Church. Innocent III did his utmost to ensure that as many prelates attended his council as 
possible, because, historically, high attendance lent credibility to the deliberations and decisions 
of a council.16 At the same time, however, it also ensured that those who had journeyed to Rome 
(or wherever a particular council was held) would return to their individual provinces and 
dioceses with direct knowledge of what had occurred at the gathering. From there, they could 
                                                
15 Calculating attendance at papal councils is a longstanding historiographical problem hindered by poor records. 
See, for example, Robert Somerville, Pope Alexander III and the Council of Tours (1163): A Study in Ecclesiastical 
Politics and Institutions in the Twelfth Century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 19-20. 
Estimates for the attendance of the First (1123), Second (1139), and Third (1179) Lateran Councils vary, but 
Norman Tanner has synthesized the relevant information in his edition of the decrees of these councils. Perhaps 300 
bishops, abbots and other religious attended in 1123; about 500 in 1139; and about 300 in 1179. See Decrees, pp. 
187, 195, and 205. Of course, there were many other papal councils in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The First, 
Second, and Third Lateran Councils are generally taken to be ecumenical, while the others are not, but this 
distinction is often fraught with problems. For a general discussion of what constitutes a general council, see Horst 
Fuhrmann, “Das Ökumenische Konzil und seine historischen Grundlagen,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und 
Unterricht 12 (1961), pp. 672-695. 
 




disseminate what they had learned to the lower clergy and, where necessary, to the laity. This 
system of person-to-person communication had obvious benefits in an era before advanced 
communications technology, when the production of many copies of a written text proved 
laborious and expensive.17 Word of mouth was something to be harnessed wherever possible. 
But person-to-person communication remained a double-edged sword. What if the bishops 
attending the Fourth Lateran Council failed to record accurately what had occurred? What if their 
memories proved faulty? The canons of the Fourth Lateran Council were not short, pithy 
statements that committed themselves easily to memory. Many were lengthy, incredibly detailed 
legal texts. Inaccurate copies of the canons would have led to confusion and contradictory 
practices. Innocent was far too shrewd an observer of human behavior to overlook this danger. 
So how to overcome it? 
 Once the papacy had the bishops of Christendom at the Lateran, next it had to ensure that 
they left the council with an accurate, authoritative copy of the conciliar canons. Several 
prominent scholars, chief among them Paul Pixton, Stephan Kuttner, and Antonio García y 
García, have argued that the papal Curia provided copies of the decrees to the attendees of the 
council, or at least to the bishops.18 Stefanie Unger, who discusses the issue at length in her study 
of Innocent’s constitutions, disputes this claim. Her reading of the extant source material—
                                                
17 The production of letters at the papal chancery in the thirteenth century was a complex process that involved 
drafting, copying, correcting, and sealing. The best systematic, if nonlinear, overview of this process and the 
officials involved can be found in Jane E. Sayers, Papal Government and England during the Pontificate of 
Honorius III, 1226-1227 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 15-129. This process was, to some 
extent, a result of important reforms put into place at the chancery under Innocent III. For a useful overview of 
Innocent’s reforms, see Patrick Zutshi, “Innocent III and the Reform of the Papal Chancery,” in Innocenzo III, Urbs 
et Orbis: Atti del Congresso Internazionale Roma, 9-15 settembre 1998, ed. Andrea Sommerlechner, vol. 1 (Rome: 
Presso la società alla biblioteca vallicelliana, 2003), pp. 84-101. 
 
18 Paul B. Pixton, The German Episcopacy and the Implementation of the Decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council, 
1216-1245: Watchmen on the Tower (Leiden: Brill, 1995), p. 193; Kuttner and García y García, “A New Eyewitness 




narrative accounts, the papal registers, and provincial and diocesan legislation—suggests that the 
Curia made a strong, but less systematic, effort to disseminate the text, only providing exemplars 
which archbishops and bishops then had to copy in order to procure versions for themselves.19 
This dovetails nicely with the older theory of Jane Lang, who argued that, for England at least, 
“the bishops and abbots who were present at the Council were the sole agents for the 
introduction of its decrees.”20 The papal Curia clearly provided exemplars of Innocent III’s 
sermon from the opening day of the council, because the anonymous German cleric who 
attended the council noted that he “obtained a copy and committed it to writing.”21 Richard of 
San Germano must also have gotten his hands on the text, which appears almost verbatim in his 
chronicle.22 It seems highly likely, then, that the Curia also circulated copies of Innocent’s 
reform constitutions, which clerical scribes could copy for the archbishops and bishops they 
served.23 Sadly, neither the anonymous cleric nor Richard of San Germano records anything 
about these copies, but this comes as no surprise given their focus on the pomp and pageantry of 
the event. The two men barely mention the decrees at all. Why should we expect them to 
comment on the papacy’s preferred method of disseminating and implementing the reform 
program? 
                                                
19 Stefanie Unger, Generali concilio inhaerentes statuimus: Die Rezeption des Vierten Lateranum (1215) und des 
Zweiten Lugdunense (1274) in den Statuten der Erzbischöfe von Köln und Mainz bis zum Jahr 1310 (Mainz: 
Sebstverlag der Gesellschaft für mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte, 2004), pp. 44-45, 47. 
 
20 Marion Gibbs and Jane Lang, Bishops and Reform, 1215-1272: With Special Reference to the Lateran Council of 
1215 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 113. 
 
21 Ibid., p. 124. 
 
22 Ryccardi de Sancto Germano Chronica Priora, pp. 90-93. 
 
23 As we will see later, there is significant textual evidence to support this claim. Provincial and diocesan legislation 
from various parts of Christendom in the years following the Fourth Lateran Council clearly show the textual 




 To this point, the papacy’s strategy for implementing the Lateran reform program rested 
on oral and written communication. The Fourth Lateran Council itself served as an information 
hub that gathered together the men who would be responsible for implementing the decrees at 
the local level. And written copies of the text—probably copied from exemplars at the Lateran—
ensured that those men had accurate information when they ventured back to their provinces and 
dioceses. The final level of Innocent’s plan, however, called for the creation of a new 
ecclesiastical institution: the yearly provincial and diocesan synod. The reform program of the 
Fourth Lateran Council appears to have been unique among western conciliar legislation from 
the Middle Ages in that it contained a specific mechanism intended to facilitate the 
communication and implementation of the rest of the reforms. C. 6 called on all metropolitans 
“to hold provincial councils each year with their suffragans,” so that they might see to “the 
correction of excesses and the reform of morals, especially among the clergy.” These councils 
would provide metropolitans with the opportunity to “recite the canonical rules, especially those 
which have been laid down by this general council, so as to secure their observance, inflicting on 
transgressors the punishment due.”24 Strictly speaking, Innocent III was not innovating here. The 
First Council of Nicaea (325), the Council of Chalcedon (451), and the Second Council of 
Nicaea (787) had all ordered metropolitans to hold semiannual synods.25 But c. 6 of the Fourth 
Lateran Council was the first to frame this rule both as a communicative tool and also a specific 
                                                
24 Decrees, p. 236: “metropolitani singulis annis cum suis suffraganeis provincialia non omittant concilia celebrare, 
in quibus de corrigendis excessibus et moribus reformandis, praesertim in clero, diligentem habeant cum Dei timore 
tractatum, canonicas regulas et maxime quae statuta sunt in hoc generali concilio relegentes, ut eas faciant observari, 
debitam poenam transgressoribus infligendo.” 
 




vehicle for the implementation of the rest of the conciliar canons.26 Bishops who attended the 
provincial synod were to “see to the observance of the things that [the metropolitans] decree, 
publishing them in episcopal synods which are to be held annually in each diocese.”27 To 
monitor the process, metropolitans should then  
appoint for each diocese suitable persons, that is to say prudent and honest persons, 
who will simply and summarily, without any jurisdiction, throughout the whole year, 
carefully investigate what needs correction or reform and will then faithfully report 
these matters to the metropolitan and suffragans and others at the next council, so 
that they may proceed with careful deliberation against these and other matters.28 
 
Innocent III’s vision of the provincial and diocesan synod, then, was that of a multifaceted 
communicative tool that would disseminate the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council, collect 
information about the implementation of those canons, and then publish new measures to correct 
any problems when and where they might occur. The architecture of this communication strategy 
was clear: like a pyramid, the canons promulgated at the Fourth Lateran Council would make 
their way down to the great ecclesiastical provinces, to individual dioceses, and finally to the 
level of the parish or individual monastic house. 
 The logic behind this three-tiered communication strategy appeared sound, but there were 
cracks in its façade. The system ultimately placed an enormous burden on one group in 
                                                
26 The First Council of Nicaea specifically decreed that semiannual provincial synods would allow bishops to 
inquire into the standing of those clergy or laymen who had been excommunicated. The Council of Chalcedon 
ordered metropolitans to hold similar synods to put to right various matters in the province. And the Second Council 
of Nicaea reiterated the decree of the Council of Chalcedon, adding that such synods should discuss canonical and 
evangelical matters. In all three cases, the provincial synods were framed as a forum for discussion among bishops, 
not as a means of communicating ideas to a broader audience. For the text of the relevant canons from all three 
councils, see ibid., pp. 8, 96, and 143-144. 
 
27 Ibid., p. 236: “et quae statuerint, faciant observari, publicantes ea in episcopalibus synodis, annuatim per singulas 
dioeceses celebrandis.” 
 
28 Ibid.: “per singulas dioeceses statuant idoneas personas, providas videlicet et honestas, quae per totum annum 
simpliciter et de plano, absque ulla iurisdictione sollicite investigent, quae correctione vel reformatione sint digna, et 
ea fideliter perferant ad metropolitanum et suffraganeos et alios in concilio subsequenti, ut super his et aliis, prout 




particular: archbishops and bishops. Throughout the Middle Ages (as today), members of the 
episcopal elite served as the Church’s traditional shock troops, crucial officials who often 
possessed enough local knowledge, independent authority, and prestige to deal with important 
problems in the many corners of Christendom.29 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the 
papacy turned to this group of ecclesiastical officials to enact reforms on the scale articulated by 
the Fourth Lateran Council. This, as it turns out, may have been an error on the part of the 
papacy. Regional case studies for England and Germany reveal that members of the episcopal 
elite had a decidedly mixed record when it came to implementing the decrees. Jane Lang and 
Paul Pixton have shown in particular that Innocent’s vision for regular synodal activity broke 
down at the provincial and diocesan level.30 The statistics for Germany are particularly bleak. 
During the decade following the Fourth Lateran Council, the six ecclesiastical provinces that 
made up most of Germany held a combined total of eighteen (and perhaps nineteen) provincial 
synods.31 On the face of it, this is not a small number. But it still pales in comparison to what c. 6 
actually called for. Assuming for the moment that in the wake of the Fourth Lateran Council 
metropolitans would have needed some lead time to set up the infrastructure for regular 
provincial synods, it seems reasonable to say that such synods would only have begun in earnest 
                                                
29 See, for example, Richard W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages (London: Penguin 
Books, 1990), pp. 170-213. 
 
30 For a summary of their conclusions, see Gibbs and Lang, Bishops and Reform, pp. 174-179; Pixton, German 
Episcopacy, pp. 436-476. 
 
31 Bremen failed to hold any provincial synods until 1238; Cologne held two (one sometime before August 1220, 
the other in 1224); Magdeburg held two (August 1220, September 1225); Mainz held three (1218, one sometime 
before August 1221, and 1225); Salzburg held five or six (1216, 1219, 1220, 1222, 1224, and perhaps 1225); Trier 




starting in 1218 or 1219.32 If yearly provincial synods had begun in 1219 (the most conservative 
estimate), then a total of forty-two should have taken place in Germany by the end of 1225, ten 
years after the Fourth Lateran Council. And yet the actual number fell short by more than half. 
Those that met did so irregularly. Most problematic of all, there appears to have been no 
correlation between the meeting of provincial synods and diocesan synods. 
 This last point is crucial, because Innocent III’s vision of rejuvenated synodal activity 
clearly revolved around the top down flow of information from the Fourth Lateran Council to 
provincial synods, to dioceses, and finally to parishes. In such a system, a series of diocesan 
synods would take place within one year of the most recent provincial synod. Pixton’s archival 
mining produced a list of these provincial and diocesan synods in Germany, but renewed 
manipulation of his data in fact paints an even bleaker picture than he may have realized. The 
extant information for the archdiocese of Cologne proves instructive. Sometime before August 1, 
1220, Archbishop Engelbert of Cologne held a provincial synod in his home diocese.33 If his 
suffragan bishops—the bishops of Liège, Utrecht, Minden, Münster, and Osnabrück—had 
followed c. 6 of the Fourth Lateran Council, they would then have proceeded to hold diocesan 
synods of their own in that year or the following year. But they only succeeded in part.34 
Engelbert held a diocesan synod for his own diocese of Cologne in 1221, and with the exception 
                                                
32 This, I think, is a generous assumption. While it took some metropolitans and bishops months—and, in some 
cases, years—to return home from the Fourth Lateran Council, the work of assembling bishops at a provincial synod 
could not have been too onerous. 
 






of the bishop of Utrecht, every one of Engelbert’s suffragans held one diocesan synod—but 
spread out over the next four years [See Table 1].35  
 
Table 1: The Provincial Synod of Cologne (1220) and the Resulting Diocesan Synods 
It is admirable, perhaps, that each of Engelbert’s suffragans followed through with their 
canonical duty, but the resulting scenario was far from what Innocent III had envisioned. No 
provincial synod followed in 1221, or in 1222, or even in 1223. Engelbert once again assembled 
his suffragan bishops at Cologne in 1224, but there is no record that any of the bishops held 
diocesan synods before the next provincial council met in September 1226 under the leadership 
of a new archbishop.36 While this 1226 council clearly instigated diocesan synods in the years 
that followed, the diocesan gatherings happened infrequently, inconsistently, and normally not 
more than once per diocese in the twelve years that followed [See Table 2].37 Perhaps Engelbert 




















and his successor felt no need to call more frequent provincial synods. Perhaps, too, for similar 
reasons they did not press their suffragan bishops to hold their own diocesan synods with greater 
frequency and diligence. It is clear, however, that the architecture of Innocent III’s 
communication strategy crumbled to dust in the archdiocese of Cologne, just as it did in the other 
provinces of Germany and, in all likelihood, other regions of Europe.38 
 
Table 2: The Provincial Synod of Cologne (1226) and the Resulting Diocesan Synods 
 The infrequency of provincial and diocesan synods in the years following the Fourth 
Lateran Council posed perhaps the most potent challenge to the communication and 
implementation of Innocent’s reform program. But it was not the only one. Even if and when 
synods met at the provincial and diocesan level, the possibility remained that the lengthy and 
                                                
38 To my knowledge, Pixton has produced the only systematic data on provincial and diocesan synods for a large 
region of Europe. But Jane Lang noted a similar—if slightly less quantified—trend in England. See Appendix B in 








Liège	  (June	  1230)	  







intricate reform canons would become garbled in transmission or, perhaps worse still, that 
bishops or other clerics would alter their content in a way that diluted their potency or meaning. 
A brief look at synodal legislation from France and England in the wake of the Fourth Lateran 
Council reveals that, indeed, this problem plagued the transmission of the reform program to the 
local level. 
 Sometime between 1216 and 1219, clerics in the western French city of Angers put 
together a collection of recent legislation promulgated in provincial and diocesan synods in 
France and Anglo-Norman England.39 The exact circumstances of its production remain 
shrouded in mystery, but during the thirteenth century this collection had a long life as a popular 
exemplar for many later statute collections.40 Named the Synodal of the West by Odette Pontal, 
the compilation of statutes is in itself a remarkable example of the intertextuality of legal works 
in the Middle Ages. The compilers brought together a large number of statutes from a wide 
variety of French and Anglo-Norman sources from the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, 
all of which exuded the kind of reform spirit that had taken root at Paris and served as a guiding 
                                                
39 Les Statuts synodaux français du XIIIe siècle: Précédés de l'historique du synode diocésain depuis ses origins, 
vol. 1, ed. and trans. Odette Pontal (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, 1971), p. 107. 
 
40 For a discussion of the Synodal of the West and its production, see ibid., pp. 107-108. For details of the extant 
manuscripts of this collection, see ibid., pp. 109-111. Records of synodal statutes from the thirteenth century are 
fairly numerous, and we have examples from many regions of Europe, including France, England, Germany, 
Hungary, Portugal, Spain, and parts of Scandinavia. Many examples, however, come from the later thirteenth 
century, a period beyond the scope of the present chapter. Additionally, as Odette Pontal notes, there is a reason that 
the Angers collection is so important: many of these other statute collections bear the marked textual imprint of the 
Angers collection or the sources that were used to compile it. The statutes of Odo de Sully of Paris seem to have 
been particularly important, and there is substantial information that they proliferated widely in France and to 
regions such as Portugal and even Greece. The Angers collection, therefore, is a highly representative example of 
the type of legislation that was being promulgated at the local level. For a very useful discussion of the diffusion of 
synodal statutes in the thirteenth century, see Odette Pontal, Les statuts synodaux, Typologie des sources du Moyen 




light for Innocent III at the Fourth Lateran Council.41 Crucially, those sources also included the 
canons of the Fourth Lateran Council. Although it is impossible to know whether the Angers 
collection was compiled for the purpose of transmitting the decrees of councils such as Lateran 
IV, it undoubtedly provides a useful snapshot of the type of information that was making its way 
down to the local level. Among the one hundred thirty-four statutes contained in the Angers 
collection, seventeen bear the marked textual imprint of the Lateran IV canons.42 Rubrics in most 
of the extant manuscripts denote canons “from the council of the Lateran,” but in a few cases 
Innocent III’s constitutions are merely woven into the fabric of the provincial or diocesan 
legislation that formed the basis of much of the Angers collection.43 In both cases, however, the 
dissemination of the Lateran IV texts went hand in hand with their abridgement. Two brief 
examples reveal the result of this process. 
One of many reforms articulated in the Angers collection concerned the exhibition, 
veneration, and sale of relics. According to s. 40, “ancient relics shall never be displayed outside 
a reliquary or put up for sale.”44 Furthermore, “no one should presume to venerate newly 
discovered relics publicly unless they have first been approved by the authority of the Roman 
                                                
41 Ibid., pp. 105-106. The best account of the intellectual movement that underpinned reform efforts at Paris (and 
beyond) around the year 1200 remains John W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes and Merchants: The Social Views of 
Peter the Chanter and His Circle, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). For a more explicit 
discussion of the connection between this movement and Innocent III’s reform program, see Baldwin, “Paris et 
Rome en 1215,” pp. 99-124. 
 




44 Ibid., p. 164 [no. 40]: “Item in concilio est stautum quod antique reliquie amodo extra capsam nullatenus <non> 




pontiff.”45 The prohibitions contained in this statute stem word for word from c. 62 of Innocent 
III’s reform constitutions.46 But—crucially—the Angers text distilled the Lateran IV canon. In its 
original form, c. 62 went much further. It required local prelates “not to allow those who come to 
their churches, in order to venerate, to be deceived by lying stories or false documents.”47 It 
“forbid the recognition of alms-collectors, some of whom deceive other people by proposing 
various errors in their preaching, unless they show authentic letters from the apostolic see or 
from the diocesan bishop.”48 It provided—rather oddly—a lengthy example of the form letter 
that the papacy usually granted to alms collectors, again to reduce dishonest practices at the local 
level.49 And, finally, it laid out a series of guidelines to protect legitimate alms-collectors and to 
manage the extent of indulgences granted to patrons and alms-collectors who visited local 
churches.50 In short, the clerics who compiled the Angers collection omitted a large amount of 
material that was relevant to both bishops and local parish priests alike. 
The problems stemming from this brand of textual abbreviation become even clearer 
from a second example. The Angers collection also contained a version of c. 21, the Fourth 
Lateran Council’s famous decree on yearly confession and the receipt of the Eucharist. Here, as 
in the previous example, the Angers text bore the marked textual imprint of Innocent III’s reform 
                                                
45 Ibid.: “inventas [autem] de novo nemo publice venerari presumat, nisi prius auctoritate romani pontificis fuerint 
approbate.” 
 
46 Decrees, p. 263. 
 
47 Ibid.: “Praelati vero decaetero non permittant illos, qui ad eorum ecclesias causa venerationis accedunt, vanis 
figmentis aut falsis decipi documentis.” 
 
48 Ibid.: “Eleemosynarum quoque quaestores, quorum quidam se alios mentiendo abusiones nonnullas in sua 
praedicatione proponunt, admitti, nisi apostolicas vel diocesani episcopi literas versa exhibeant, prohibemus.” 
 
49 Ibid. Usually, a form letter such as this would appear in a formulary rather than a statute collection. 
 




constitution. S. 75 and s. 76 enjoined the Christian laity to confess their sins once a year to their 
parish priest, as Innocent had decreed.51 But these statutes make no mention of the second most 
important part of the Lateran IV constitution: that, having confessed their sins, all Christians who 
“have reached the age of discernment,” should “reverently receive the sacrament of the Eucharist 
at least at Easter unless they think, for a good reason and on the advice of their own priest, that 
they should abstain from receiving it for a time.”52 Any Christian who failed to receive the 
Eucharist once a year would “be barred from entering a church during their lifetime,” and also 
“denied a Christian burial at death.”53 The Angers collection included clauses from c. 21 that 
established rules for confessing to a priest other than one’s own. And it reiterated almost 
verbatim Innocent’s remarkable, almost moving, instructions on the way that priests should hear 
confessions.54 But by omitting the section on receiving the Eucharist, the compilers of the 
Angers collection fundamentally altered the meaning of the Lateran IV constitution. In the wake 
of Innocent’s great council, Miri Rubin observes, “Everything that had formed the Christian 
person from baptism, through instruction, confirmation and in the exchanges prompted by 
confession, should have prepared for the reception of communion.”55 At some level, then, to 
exclude the requirement of receiving the Eucharist was antithetical to the new sacramental 
                                                
51 Statuts synodaux français, pp. 190, 192. 
 
52 Decrees, p. 245: “omnis utriusque sexus fidelis, postquam ad annos discretionis pervenerit...suscipiens reverenter 
ad minus in pascha eucharistiae sacramentum, nisi forte de consilio proprii sacerdotis ob aliquam rationabilem 
causam ad tempus ab eius perceptione duxerit abstinendum.” 
 
53 Ibid.: “alioquin et vivens ab ingressu ecclesiae arceatur et moriens Christiana careat sepultura.” 
 
54 Ibid.; Statuts synodaux français, pp. 190, 192. 
 
55 Miri Rubin, “Sacramental Life,” in The Cambridge History of Christianity: Christianity in Western Europe, c. 




theology proposed by the Fourth Lateran Council, which bound together penance and 
communion “into a solemn and meaningful annual event.”56 
The Angers collection reveals in striking fashion how information that was contained in 
Innocent III’s canons was not communicated to the local level. However, the Synodal of the 
West, while an extremely important collection, was ultimately a statute collection compiled by a 
series of editors. What of diocesan legislation promulgated by members of the episcopacy? 
While little diocesan legislation has survived from the period directly following the Fourth 
Lateran Council, we see a similar process of emendation, abbreviation, and omission in those 
statutes that we have.57 Between 1217 and 1219, the great reforming English bishop, Richard 
Poore, published a collection of statutes for his diocese of Salisbury.58 As an attendee of the 
Fourth Lateran Council, Poore possessed firsthand knowledge of Innocent’s aims and the 
legislative program intended to further them. Although Innocent had died prematurely in 1216, 
he surely would have approved of Poore’s efforts to promote the Lateran IV legislation through a 
diocesan council. Anne Duggan’s careful analysis of Poore’s synodal program shows that the 
canons of the Fourth Lateran Council directly influenced twenty-six out of one hundred and 
fourteen statutes (23%).59 In most cases, the text that Poore published remained remarkably close 
                                                
56 Ibid., p. 225. 
 
57 Pontal, Les statuts synodaux, pp. 82-84. The examples of diocesan statutes presented below, of Richard Poore (c. 
1217-1219) and Thibaut of Rouen (c. 1224), are some of the best-known examples of such legislation from this 
early period following the promulgation of the reforms of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. For Thibaut’s 
statutes, see the discussion below, pp. 157-166. 
 
58 Gibbs and Lang, Bishops and Reform, pp. 108, 110-129. For a recent survey of the life and career of Richard 
Poore, who served variously as bishop of the sees of Chichester (1215-1217), Salisbury (1217-1228), and Durham 
(1228-1237), see Brian Kemp, “God’s and the King’s Good Servant: Richard Poore, Bishop of Salisbury, 1217-28 
(Denis Bethell Memorial Lecture, 1997),” Peritia 12 (1998), pp. 359-378. The Latin text of Richard Poore’s 
diocesan statutes for the see of Salisbury can be found in Councils and Synods with Other Documents Relating to the 
English Church, ed. F.M. Powicke and C.R. Cheney, vol. 2, part 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 57-96. 
 
59 Duggan, “Conciliar Law 1123-1215,” p. 355, n. 190. 
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to both the letter and spirit of Innocent III’s constitutions. His statute on the care of the sick, for 
example, borrowed heavily from the original language of c. 22 of the Lateran program while also 
preserving the general spirit of Innocent’s decree.60 Meanwhile, s. 4 and s. 55 preserved the 
essence (and, indeed, the crucial language) of c. 1, the Fourth Lateran Council’s famous decree 
on the Trinity and the doctrine of transubstantiation, albeit in truncated and rearranged form.61  
Yet other statutes from Poore’s collection puzzlingly warped the Lateran IV decrees by 
omitting important language. S. 8, which prohibited clerical fornication, reiterates verbatim some 
passages from Innocent’s c. 14 on clerical incontinence.62 Both texts prohibited clerics from 
marrying and engaging in sexual activity of any kind, and laid out canonical punishments for 
those who fell victim to, or supported, such sin. But Innocent’s language was much stronger, his 
punishments more severe. “Anyone,” the pope had written, “who has been suspended for 
[incontinent behavior] and presumes to celebrate divine services, shall not only be deprived of 
his ecclesiastical benefices but shall also, on account of his twofold fault, be deposed in 
perpetuity.”63 Poore omitted this language altogether. He also ignored Innocent’s innovative 
attempt to prevent married clerics from using their sinful behavior for their own advantage. 
“Those clerics who have not renounced the marriage bond according to the custom of their 
region,” Innocent had declared at the Fourth Lateran Council, “shall be punished even more 
                                                
 
60 Cf. Lateran IV c. 22 in Decrees, pp. 245-246; Salisbury s. 98 in Councils and Synods, p. 92. 
 
61 Cf. Lateran IV c. 1 in Decrees, pp. 230-231; Salisbury s. 4 and s. 55 in Councils and Synods, pp. 61, 77-78. 
 
62 Cf. Lateran IV c. 14 in Decrees, p. 242; Salisbury s. 8 in Councils and Synods, p. 62. 
 





severely if they fall into sin, since for them it is possible to make lawful use of matrimony.”64 
Apparently, Poore felt no need to include this clause in the statutes for his diocese. Elsewhere, he 
prohibited clerics from marrying, but the language—and, it seems, intent—was a far cry from 
what Innocent had envisioned.65 
Richard Poore was precisely the type of energetic, reforming bishop that Innocent III 
surely wanted on the front lines of his battle to reshape Christian society. The Salisbury statute 
collection remains a remarkable exposition of reform ideals, one that drew on the legislative 
programs of the Third and Fourth Lateran Councils, the 1208 diocesan synod of Odo de Sully of 
Paris, and the 1213/1214 provincial synod of Stephen Langton of Canterbury, all of which 
influenced the Angers collection as well.66 But even Poore’s impressive collection did not take 
up many of the issues that Innocent III had wanted his bishops to tackle after the Fourth Lateran 
Council. Indeed, while the Salisbury collection proves that large sections of Innocent’s 
constitutions could reach the level of the diocese and parish intact, it also reveals how bishops 
remained unpredictable, even shifty, allies in the effort to implement reform. The Salisbury 
collection bears the textual imprint of twenty-three of Innocent’s decrees, covering issues from 
transubstantiation, the appointment of preachers and schoolmasters, clerical incontinence, care of 
the sick, and benefices, to procurations during episcopal visits, violence against clerics, 
excommunication, clandestine marriages, and avarice among the clergy.67 But just as telling are 
                                                
64 Ibid.: “qui autem secundum regionis suae morem non abdicarunt copulam coniugalem, si lapsi fuerint, gravius 
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65 See Salisbury s. 79 in Councils and Synods, pp. 85-86. 
 
66 Ibid., p. 57. 
 
67 The canons of the Fourth Lateran Council that appear—in one form or another—in the Salisbury statute 




the Lateran IV canons that make no appearance. These included decrees on heresy, the 
celebration of religious rites in other languages, ordeals, clerical resignations, the suitability of 
clerics instituted to churches, appeals, tithes, relics, simony, and Jewish-Christian relations. 
Perhaps Poore felt that other statutes in his collection sufficiently covered some of these topics.68 
Perhaps, too, he felt that some of the Lateran IV canons did not apply to his diocese. It is 
impossible to know what Poore thought as he put together the statute collection for his diocese, 
just as it is impossible to know why German metropolitans and bishops failed in their canonical 
duty to hold provincial and diocesan synods with greater frequency, or why the compilers of the 
Angers collection altered the meaning of the Lateran IV canons by omitting crucial pieces of 
text. It is clear, however, that hiccups in the communicative process envisioned by Innocent III in 
c. 6 threatened to undercut the reform process at various points. In the decade that followed the 
close of the Fourth Lateran Council, the papacy—first, briefly, under Innocent III and then under 
his successor, Honorius III—had to confront and then deal with these obstacles to reform. The 
papal response to these challenges reveals much about the contours of papal power in the early 
thirteenth century and, in many ways, the striking limits of that power. 
Sources, Problems, and Parameters: 
 Even as the Lateran basilica fell back into its normal routine, and the metropolitans, 
bishops, and abbots of Christendom journeyed home, the memory of Innocent’s great council 
fresh in their minds, the papal Curia quickly turned to the process of implementing the council’s 
decrees. Foremost on Innocent’s mind was the crusade, which had been one of the chief reasons 
for the council in the first place. After the debacle of the Fourth Crusade earlier in Innocent’s 
                                                
68 Poore’s statutes, for example, included two decrees on tithes (s. 48 and 49), which the Fourth Lateran Council 
also addressed in four lengthy canons (c. 53-56). However, Poore’s statutes do not cover the same issues, nor do 
they address the question of tithes in as much depth as Innocent III’s constitutions. Cf. Decrees, pp. 259-261; 
Councils and Synods, pp. 75-76. 
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pontificate, the pope eagerly micromanaged the logistics of organizing, recruiting, and 
fundraising for what was to become the Fifth Crusade to the Holy Land. But when Innocent died 
suddenly at Perugia in July 1216, the task of organizing Christendom’s massive undertaking fell 
to his successor, Honorius III, a longtime member of the papal Curia whose deep experience in 
ecclesiastical administration to some extent made up for his lack of Innocent’s forceful 
personality. The story of the crusade—of its organization, realization and ultimate failure—has 
been told elsewhere with remarkable attention to detail.69 But what of the rest of the Lateran IV 
program? Historians have overlooked the role of Innocent’s successor in shaping the 
implementation of the Lateran IV constitutions, even though Honorius III’s pontificate was 
significant in many ways.70 Honorius’ registers, which cover the full period from his election in 
1216 until his death in 1227, provide an unparalleled window into the Curia’s efforts to shape the 
communication and implementation of Innocent III’s constitutions, even as synodal activity 
evidently faltered throughout Europe. Papal registers are a remarkable but difficult source for 
students of the Middle Ages. On the one hand, they provide us with perhaps the fullest picture of 
the inner workings of any single medieval institution. Yet, on the other, that picture is sadly 
incomplete. 
 Honorius’ registers, like all papal registers in the medieval period, are problematic 
historical sources for three reasons: 1) they are incomplete records of papal correspondence, 2) 
they usually reveal only one side of a particular issue, and 3) the letters are not as clear as we 
                                                
69 See James M. Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986). 
 
70 In addition to what follows, Honorius III played an instrumental role in the growth of the Dominican and 




might hope.71 The process of recording outgoing papal letters in registers began as early as the 
fifth century, perhaps mimicking the practice of the Roman Imperial Chancery.72 Yet while 
fragmentary evidence suggests that the practice continued in the centuries that followed, the 
dynamics of recording the pope’s outgoing correspondence fundamentally changed as the 
amount of that correspondence increased drastically beginning in the eleventh century. The late-
eleventh-century register of Gregory VII—the earliest original papal register—perhaps contained 
as much as two-thirds of the pope’s written output, a remarkable amount that gives us a full, if 
not altogether complete, picture of papal government in action during the reform period.73 By the 
early thirteenth century, however, the volume of papal correspondence had become too great.74 
Eventually, the chancery chose to take shortcuts, in part because registration was a time-
consuming (and expensive) process, but also because some letters were deemed of lesser 
importance. While it is impossible to know exactly what percentage of outgoing papal letters 
made it into Honorius III’s registers, estimates suggest somewhere in the range of 18-29%.75 
This seems a small number, and yet the amount of registered papal correspondence for Honorius’ 
pontificate remains voluminous. Pietro Pressutti calendared 6,288 papal letters for Honorius’ 
                                                
71 The best historiographical account of papal registration in the early thirteenth century can be found in Edward 
Andrew Reno III, “The Authoritative Text: Raymond of Penyafort’s Editing of the Decretals of Gregory IX (1234),” 
unpublished doctoral dissertation (Columbia University, 2011), pp. 320-327. Cf. Sayers, Papal Government and 
England, pp. 65-93. 
 
72 Ibid., p. 65. 
 
73 Gregory VII’s register is the earlier original register, that is, the earliest register that does not exist in copied form. 
Fragments of earlier registers survive, including a largely complete register for John VIII (872-82). See Registrum 
Johannis VIII papae, ed. Erich Caspar, MGH ES, vol. 7 (Berlin: Weidmannos, 1928), pp. 1-272. 
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and 1300. He observed a steady rise in the number of letters issued by the papacy, from an average of 35 a year 
during the pontificate of Leo IX (1049-54), to 72 under Innocent II (1130-43), to 179 under Alexander III (1159-81), 
to 280 under Innocent III (1198-1216). See Southern, Western Society and the Church, pp. 108-109. 
 




pontificate, a figure that admittedly incorporates some letters that exist in other forms but do not 
appear in the registers themselves.76 Which letters made it into the registers has been the subject 
of longstanding historical debate.77 But if the “purpose of the register was to act as an official 
memory, official, that is, to the department [of the Curia] it served,” as Jane Sayers has argued, 
then by nature it needed “to harbour and record ‘important’ letters, primarily those issued on the 
pope’s own volition or at the instigation of curial officers of or political leaders.”78 As such, even 
while the registers of Honorius III provide us with an incomplete picture of the pope’s 
correspondence, it is reasonable to assume that these official compilations contain letters that 
were both a) particularly important and b) largely representative of matters that the pope wished 
to address during his decade-long pontificate. 
 A more problematic issue with the registers—and, indeed, with most letters and letter 
collections from the medieval period—is that too often they reveal only one side of the spiritual, 
administrative, and judicial issues contained therein. Honorius III’s letters frequently provide a 
summary of the problem at hand (e.g. the background of a sentence of excommunication, a case 
of heresy, the collection of the crusade subsidy, etc.), and they invariably close with some form 
of decision or directive to the recipient. But the documentary record often dies there. We seldom 
know what, if anything, happened next. This unfortunate fact complicates our efforts to 
                                                
76 Regesta Honorii Papae III, 2 vols., ed. Pietro Pressutti (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1978). Pressutti’s work 
is a calendar of papal letters in the vein of earlier compilations by Philipp Jaffé and August Potthast. Cf. Regesta 
pontificum romanorum, 2 vols, ed. Philipp Jaffé (Graz: Akademische Druck-U. Verlagsanstalt, 1956) and Regesta 
pontificum romanorum, 2 vols., ed. August Potthast (Graz : Akademische Druck-U. Verlagsanstalt, 1957). 
Pressutti’s work, however, is not an edition, and contains only a reconstructed chronology of Honorius III’s letters, 
with brief descriptions of each letter’s subject. The full text of Honorius’ registered letters can only be found in 
manuscript form. See ASV Reg. 9-13. 
 
77 For a useful overview of this issue, see Reno, “The Authoritative Text,” pp. 324-327. Cf. Sayers, Papal 
Government and England, pp. 67-93, which highlights this and other historiographical problems arising from the 
compilation of the papal registers in the thirteenth century. 
 
78 Ibid., p. 72. 
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understand the implementation of the Lateran IV reforms, but it does not doom them. Instead, the 
nature of the available source material simply forces us to examine not just the outcomes of papal 
attempts to implement the conciliar program, but—crucially—the process by which the pope and 
the papal Curia sought to do so. The following pages, therefore, examine the way that the papacy 
as an institution sought to implement the conciliar decrees with the larger aim of reforming 
Christian society. 
 This goal of understanding how the papacy attempted to implement the Lateran IV 
program during Honorius III’s pontificate faces one more hurdle: the contents of the letters 
themselves. A close analysis of Honorius’ registers reveal at least 425 letters that address the 
Fourth Lateran Council or issues stemming from it in some way, shape or form.79 Of those, 187 
explicitly name the council or its decrees.80 Putting aside the 41 letters that address only the 
crusade and the collection of the crusade subsidy, we are left with 146 letters that explicitly name 
the council and address one or more of the conciliar canons. However, it is also necessary to take 
into account an additional 22 letters that clearly reference the conciliar canons, even if the 
council itself is not named. On August 8, 1218, for example, Honorius wrote to Otto, the bishop 
of Würzburg, regarding his attendance at a provincial council called by his immediate superior, 
                                                
79 This figure was derived through a thorough analysis of the contents of Honorius III’s registers using both 
Pressutti’s calendar and the manuscripts of the registers themselves. Of the 425 letters that touch on issues relating 
to the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, 187 explicitly mention the council. However, in almost every case where a 
letter does not explicitly name the council, the contents clearly bear the imprint of the conciliar decrees. For 
example, of the 173 letters that address c. 71, which called for the Fifth Crusade to the Holy Land, only 45 cite the 
council. Yet the remaining 128 letters clearly remain relevant. The same is true of letters addressing other canons. 
 
80 123 of the remaining 239 letters (51%) deal with the crusade, while the rest cover a broad range of topics that 
relate in some way to issues raised by the council (e.g. pastoral care, clerical reform, the fight against heresy, or even 
preaching) but are formulated in too general a way to pinpoint a precise connection with one of the Lateran IV 
decrees. Where letters explicitly reference the council, the exact terminology varies. However, the most common 
forms reference something done “contrary to the statute of the general council” (contra constitutionem concilii 
generalis); a decision made “in the general council” (in generali concilio); or even something that should be done 




Siegfried, archbishop of Mainz.81 Here, Honorius clearly had in mind the new requirement that 
archbishops hold yearly provincial councils with their suffragan bishops, but he did not name the 
council or the specific decree (c. 6) that laid down that requirement. Similarly, on December 15, 
1223, the pope exhorted Peter, bishop of Meaux, to “correct and reform nearby prelates and even 
members of religious orders and others of the diocese subject to [him] by law.”82 This particular 
letter unquestionably exudes the spirit of several of the Lateran IV canons, including c. 12 
(general chapters and the reform of monasteries), and cc. 14-16 (prohibitions on a variety of 
clerical behavior), but there is no concrete reference to the conciliar reform program.83 Still, both 
of these letters clearly relate to the implementation of the reform program, regardless of the fact 
that they do not mention the council by name. 
 Letters such as those to the bishops of Würzburg and Meaux expand the source base for 
the analysis that follows, but they also reveal a final problem with the contents of Honorius’ 
registers: none of the letters that address the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council detail specific 
decrees. Instead, it is necessary to figure out the decree(s) from context. In many cases, this 
process poses no significant interpretive challenge, because the context is so obvious. Letters, for 
example, that address benefices and pastoral care clearly relate to c. 29, which, in its most 
succinct form, states that “whoever receives any benefice with the cure of souls attached, if he 
was already in possession of such a benefice, shall be deprived by the law itself of the 
                                                
81 ASV Reg. 10, f. 6v [Press. 1570]. 
 
82 ASV Reg. 12, f. 130r [Press. 4622]: “ut non obstante frivole appellationis obiectu corrigere et reformare valeas 
tam circa praelatos quam subditos necnon religiosos et alios diocesana tibi lege subiectos.” 
 




benefice.”84 Even the letter to the bishop of Würzburg, which does not name the council 
explicitly, clearly dovetails with a specific decree, c. 6. Yet other letters are more opaque. 
In January 1224, Honorius gave permission to the prior and chapter of the Augustinian 
house of St. Gertrude to “have, according to the statute of the general council, a schoolmaster in 
[their] church, who should attempt to educate both his canons and other clerics who wish to 
attend his school.”85 Traditionally, canons regular had an intense interest in education and in 
using that education to instruct others, so it comes as no surprise that the Augustinians of St. 
Gertrude had, apparently, asked for permission to have a schoolmaster in house.86 Here, the 
pope’s decision to grant this request seems to reference c. 11 of the Lateran IV decrees.87 “In 
every cathedral church,” the council had declared, “but also in other churches with sufficient 
resources, a suitable master, elected by the chapter or by the greater and sounder part of it, shall 
be appointed by the prelate to teach grammar and other branches of study, as far as is possible, to 
the clerics of those and other churches.”88 The overlap between c. 11 and Honorius’ letter to the 
house of St. Gertrude appears unmistakable. But, curiously, it is possible that c. 27 on the 
instruction of ordinands also applied in this case. That decree enjoined bishops “to prepare those 
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85 ASV Reg. 12, f. 142r [Press. 4693]: “Supplicastis nobis ut habendi iuxta statutum concilii generalis magistrum 
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86 Caroline Walker Bynum, “The Spirituality of Regular Canons in the Twelfth Century,” in Jesus as Mother: 
Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages, ed. Caroline Walker Bynum (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1982), pp. 22-58. 
 
87 Cf. ibid; Decrees, p. 240. 
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who are to be promoted to the priesthood and to instruct them either by themselves or through 
other suitable persons, in the divine services and the sacraments of the church, so that they may 
be able to celebrate them correctly.”89 In fact, c. 11 contained a very similar clause, ordering 
metropolitans to arrange for a theologian “to teach scripture to priests and others and especially 
to instruct them in matters which are recognized as pertaining to the care of souls.”90 So which 
canon does Honorius III’s letter reference? Logically, c. 11 is a better fit, in part because of the 
specific language, but also because the pope sent his letter to the prior and chapter of St. 
Gertrude rather than the local archbishop. But Honorius’ letter never specified who the “other 
clerics who wish to attend [the schoolmaster’s] school” might be. If some of them were local 
parish priests subject to the overarching authority of the local bishop and, by extension, his 
superior, the archbishop, suddenly a potential problem arises. In the event that the Augustinian 
house had trouble instituting (or paying for) a schoolmaster, who, then, was ultimately 
responsible for dealing with the problem? If Honorius’ letter had referenced c. 11, it seems the 
prior of St. Gertrude would have held ultimate responsibility for the matter. However, if 
Honorius in fact referenced c. 27, it might have been necessary for the local metropolitan to get 
involved. 
The case of the Augustinian house of St. Gertrude remains largely academic, because 
there is no evidence that the canons had trouble instituting a schoolmaster. Still, the ambiguity in 
Honorius III’s letter to the house—a letter clearly intended to facilitate the enforcement of part of 
the Lateran IV program—unveils potential problems in interpretation, most obviously for us as 
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historians of the Middle Ages, but of course also for those who received and acted on papal 
directives in centuries past. At times, the fog of eight centuries of history clouds the fact that the 
Middle Ages were just as litigious as our own era, and that the process of reform—whether of 
morals, of government, of the economy, or of religion—has never been easy. Innocent III and 
Honorius III surely understood this, but it is puzzling, then, why papal letters of the period left so 
much to the interpretation of the recipient. The pages that follow now turn to the content of those 
letters in an effort to understand how the papacy injected itself into the implementation process, 
and the pitfalls it inevitably faced as it attempted to do so. 
The Program of Papal Implementation—The Case of Rouen: 
 What is perhaps most remarkable about Honorius III’s letters to ecclesiastical and (on 
occasion) secular officials regarding the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 is not always what they 
contain, but rather what they fail to say. As discussed above, between 1216 and 1227, the papal 
Curia issued at least 168 letters that directly referenced the council and attempted to implement 
one or more of its decrees, but, surprisingly, only one of these letters made an explicit 
exhortation to implement the conciliar program in its entirety.91 This letter came not in the form 
of a general encyclical to the episcopacy or the Christian faithful, which Honorius issued on 
occasion to deal with matters such as the crusade.92 Instead, it came as a targeted letter to a single 
individual: Thibaut, the archbishop of Rouen. This letter provides a unique window into the 
process by which a papal command translated into action at the local level. But it also reveals 
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how the limits of papal communication strategy failed to overcome significant problems of 
transmission and enforcement. 
On December 9, 1223, eight years after Innocent III’s great council, Honorius pointedly 
cautioned the newly minted archbishop of Rouen against the dangers of inaction. “It is worthless 
that sacred statutes be promulgated,” the pope explained, “unless transgressors are to be 
compelled by the authority of a superior to observe them.” At issue was not just the statutes 
themselves, but also the reputation and credibility of the institution that had issued them. When 
laws are ignored, Honorius argued, “the authority of the legislator is made even more worthless, 
because it stands in scandal and ruin.” Therefore, the pope continued, “having heard that the 
statutes of the general council are weakened in your diocese, we, having full faith through the 
Lord in your discretion, order through our apostolic letters that you cause the aforementioned 
statutes to be observed steadfastly in your diocese.” Honorius did not elaborate about how the 
archbishop of Rouen should implement his command. But he did issue a warning. “By no 
means,” he reminded Thibaut, “should you make another’s fault your own while you neglect to 
correct it.” Then, in the vein of a stern parent dressing down a disobedient child, Honorius 
concluded with language that was firm and clear: “Let us not be compelled to proceed against 
you as if you are negligent and weak.”93 
 Curiously, Honorius revealed nothing of the situation in Rouen that had prompted the 
letter in the first place, although earlier papal efforts to initiate reform in and around Rouen had 
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met with resistance in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.94 But several things are clear enough. 
First, Honorius was not blind to the challenges of implementing the conciliar reform program at 
the local level. He had heard that something was amiss in Rouen, perhaps from local prelates or 
from papal agents in or near the French province. Half a century earlier, Alexander III had 
instructed papal messengers to remain on site in various parts of Europe to collect local 
information and report it back to the papal Curia.95 Although Honorius’ letter is silent on the 
matter, perhaps a similar network of informants was at work for the pope in the early decades of 
the thirteenth century. Even though Thibaut was an “active and energetic prelate,” to quote one 
scholar, it is highly unlikely that the archbishop of Rouen would have reported failings in his 
own province.96 If he had done so, surely he would have requested specific advice from the pope 
about how to proceed with the implementation of the conciliar canons. And of course Honorius’ 
reply contains no such counsel. 
 As he crafted his letter to Thibaut of Rouen, Honorius III reinforced two critical 
assumptions about the process of implementing the conciliar reform program: 1) that the 
archbishop had in his possession the text of the conciliar canons, and 2) that Thibaut, as a 
prominent member of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, would do his utmost to publish and enforce 
the reforms. The strength of Honorius’ language—particularly his threat to proceed against 
Thibaut if the archbishop proved negligent in his duties—suggests the seriousness of the matter, 
and the evident concern that the papacy had about the potential failure of Innocent’s reforms. But 
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it is equally important to note that the pope’s letter provided no specific advice about how 
Thibaut should proceed and no insight into how the papacy would monitor the implementation 
process. Yes, Honorius had made his will known, but how—if at all—would Thibaut respond? 
 In this particular case, the archbishop of Rouen acted on the papal mandate. In March 
1224, Thibaut convened a provincial council at Rouen, where in the presence of nearly all of his 
suffragan bishops and a good number of abbots and other prelates he promulgated nineteen 
canons based on the reform decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council.97 In doing so, the archbishop 
adhered to Innocent III’s original model for the implementation of the conciliar program: 
provincial and—presumably—diocesan synods would serve as the key communicative tool by 
which the decrees filtered down to the local level. And in some ways this process proved a 
success. Thibaut’s decrees, which cover twenty-one of the seventy-one Lateran IV canons, 
remain remarkably true to the letter and spirit of Innocent’s reforms.98 But, as was the case in 
other provincial legislation from the period, the Rouen canons did not cover anywhere near the 
full scope of the Lateran IV reform program. Given this fact, it seems a remarkable 
overstatement to argue, as Nadine-Josette Chaline has done, that “the legislation of [Innocent 
III’s] council was promulgated in the diocese by Thibaut d’Amiens in 1224 when holding a 
                                                
97 A record of the Council of Rouen (1224) and its nineteen canons exists in only one manuscript, which dates the 
event to March 27, 1223 instead of 1224. However, because Easter Style dating was in use in Normandy during the 
early thirteenth century, the transcription of the date, MCCXXIII, needs to be read as 1224 rather than 1223. Bessin 
(who transcribed the manuscript), Mansi, and Hefele all dated the council incorrectly to 1223, but Vincent Tabbagh 
corrected the date in his brief biography of Thibaut, archbishop of Rouen, in the Fasti ecclesiae Gallicanae. See 
Richard Kay, “Mansi and Rouen: A Critique of Conciliar Collections,” The Catholic Historical Review 52 (1966), p. 
171; Arthur Giry, Manuel de diplomatique (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1972), p. 112-114; Guillaume Bessin, 
Concilia Rotomagensis provinciae (Rouen: Franciscum Vaultier, 1717), pp. 130-132; Giovanni Domenico Mansi, 
Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, vol. 22 (Florence, 1778), p. 1198; Hefele, Histoire des conciles, 
p. 1438; Tabbagh, Fasti ecclesiae Gallicanae, vol. 2, p. 81. 
 
98 Thibaut’s decrees cover the following Lateran IV canons: 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 27, 30, 31, 32, 
47, 51, 53, 54, 55, and 59. Cf. Bessin, Concilia Rotomagensis provinciae, pp. 130-132; Decrees, pp. 236-237, 239-




provincial council.”99 The Council of Rouen’s decrees also remained heavily abbreviated 
versions of their Lateran IV counterparts.100 No doubt Thibaut—and other metropolitans and 
bishops like him—felt the need to distill the complex Innocentian decrees to their most essential 
meaning. This process, however, inevitably made Thibaut’s decrees less nuanced and more open 
to interpretation by those who would enforce them at the local level, specifically his suffragan 
bishops, abbots in his province, and even parish priests. 
Why would Thibaut have lacked specificity in his own provincial decrees? Perhaps the 
archbishop assumed that his sugffragan bishops possessed copies of the Lateran IV canons 
already. The Rouen decrees certainly imply that Thibaut’s subordinates had access to the text of 
the Lateran IV reforms. The decree on excommunication, for example, explicitly orders that 
“that constitution [c. 47] be observed with all diligence” before quoting an excerpt of the Lateran 
IV canon.101 Similarly, the Rouen decree on confession (s. 9) provides a laundry list of issues 
(albeit in summary form) that come directly out of Innocent III’s famous c. 21, including 
“confession made to one’s own priest or to another by license of the same man,” and “the 
punishment of those who break the seal of confession.”102 The decree concludes with the cryptic 
line that these matters are “to be implemented as legislated,” suggesting that those who attended 
the Council of Rouen could look up the details elsewhere.103 If Thibaut assumed, however, that 
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his bishops had access to the full text of the decrees, he may have made an error. Five of 
Thibaut’s six suffragan bishops—the bishops of Avranches, Bayeux, Evreux, Lisieux, and 
Seéz—were all present at the provincial council (the bishop of Coutances was absent).104 But 
only one of those men, Robert de Albeiges, bishop of Bayeux, had attended the Fourth Lateran 
Council, the other four sees having experienced a turnover of leadership between 1215 and the 
Council of Rouen in 1224.105 The institutional memory of the other four dioceses may have been 
strong, but unless Thibaut knew for a fact that all of his bishops possessed authoritative copies of 
the Lateran IV decrees, he should not have assumed that they would be able to reference the text 
at will. Even Thibaut himself had no first-hand knowledge of Innocent’s great council. Much had 
changed in the years since 1215, and with that change came the increasing likelihood of a 
communication breakdown and a failure of institutional memory. 
 The abridgement of the Lateran IV canons at the local level should come as no surprise, 
given trends in the transmission of the canons throughout Europe.106 But, curiously, Thibaut also 
tweaked their content to provide even more powers to the bishops who were entrusted with the 
enforcement of the conciliar program. Playing off Innocent’s decree on the correction of offences 
(c. 7), Thibaut chose to highlight the role of episcopal power in the process. “The offences of 
canons of a cathedral church,” Innocent had written, “are to be corrected by the chapter in those 
churches which until now have had this custom, at the instance and on the orders of the bishop 
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and within a suitable time-limit which the bishop will decide.”107 In distilling the language of the 
Lateran IV canon, Thibaut fronted the role of the bishop at the expense of the cathedral chapter. 
“Individual bishops,” the archbishop declared in his brief decree, “should correct the excesses of 
the canons of the cathedral church if the chapter ought to correct the same excesses and will have 
ignored the warning.”108 This subtle shift towards more pronounced episcopal power also 
appears s. 4 and s. 7 of the Rouen decrees. S. 4 draws on the Lateran IV decree about general 
chapters of monks (c. 12), an institution intended to facilitate the orderly reform of monastic 
communities throughout Europe.109 The driving thrust of the Lateran IV decree was the need for 
monastic orders to hold a general chapter once every three years in every kingdom or 
ecclesiastical province.110 To that end, more than three-quarters of the lengthy text elaborated on 
who should attend such general chapters, how monks and nuns should resolve disputes, and how 
they should go about the reform of their communities. When crafting his provincial statutes, 
however, Thibaut set aside all of this material and focused instead on the last section of Innocent 
III’s decree, which emphasized the role that bishops were to play in such general chapters. “All 
of our suffragan bishops,” Thibaut wrote, “should strive to reform monasteries subject to them, 
and through ecclesiastical censure should restrain advocates, patrons, knights, and any others 
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from offending monasteries with regard to their persons or goods.”111 A decree that the papal 
Curia had crafted to allow monastic orders a greater degree of centralized self-government 
suddenly transformed into a potent expression of episcopal authority over those same orders.  
 Thibaut made a similar rhetorical move when crafting s. 7, which sought to reform 
clerical behavior. This statute had at its heart c. 15 and c. 16 of the Lateran IV decrees, which 
addressed the issues of clerical drunkenness and attire.112 Here, the archbishop of Rouen 
explicitly referenced the Innocentian canons. “Therefore,” he ordered, albeit in language quite 
different from Innocent’s own, “the constitutions against drunkenness, inebriation, clerics who 
conduct business, the unordained promoting themselves to perform the divine office, and also the 
constitution regarding respectability and attire of the same clerics, should be observed 
steadfastly.”113 Thibaut’s statute failed to detail the particular types of clerical behavior (specific 
colors and styles of clothing, certain games, etc.) that the Fourth Lateran Council sought to ban, 
perhaps further evidence that he expected his subordinates to have access to the text of the 
decrees. But he added a section on enforcement that had no textual basis in the original Lateran 
IV canons. Thibaut suggested that the dean and chapter of the local cathedral church play a role 
in enforcing these decrees in the chapter, but “bishops,” he concluded, “should not neglect to 
force the observation of all these decrees.”114 It was a fitting punch line to what had become a 
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running theme of Thibaut’s provincial decrees: bishops were to be the key players in the 
implementation and enforcement of reform. 
 With the abridgement of some canons, and the emendation of others came Thibaut’s 
decision to exclude entirely some of Innocent III’s decrees. Some of the Lateran IV decrees, such 
as c. 4 on the relationship between the Greek and Latin Churches or c. 71 on the crusade, 
undoubtedly had little relevance in the province of Rouen, or, in the case of the latter, had simply 
outlived their usefulness by 1224. But what of the other decrees that Thibaut excluded? Why, for 
example, did he not include versions of Innocent’s decrees on heresy (c. 3), election procedure 
(c. 24-26), care of the sick (c. 22), violence against clerics (c. 45), or Jewish-Christian relations 
(c. 67-70), among others? It is easy to imagine how many of these decrees would have been 
relevant in the province of Rouen, but the decrees clarifying Jewish-Christian relations usefully 
highlight how the overlapping interests of the papacy, the episcopacy, and the French monarchy 
complicated papal efforts to enforce the Lateran IV program at the local level.115 
In the late twelfth century, Rouen had been home to a thriving Jewish community, one 
that surely still existed in some form in the 1220s.116 Jewish migration from Normandy’s cities to 
its villages in the years around 1200 failed to stem persistent violence against Jewish 
communities, whose dispersion throughout the ecclesiastical province put the issue of Jewish-
Christian relations not just in the hands of the archbishop of Rouen, but also his suffragan 
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bishops and local clergy.117 The Fourth Lateran Council explicitly prohibited Jews from exacting 
“oppressive or excessive interest from Christians” (c. 67); forced Jews “of either sex, in every 
Christian province and at all times…to be distinguished in public from other people by the 
character of their dress” (c. 68); forbade Jews from being “appointed to public offices, since 
under cover of them they are very hostile to Christians” (c. 69); and prevented converts from 
Judaism to Christianity “from observing their old rite, so that those who freely offered 
themselves to the Christian religion may be kept to its observance by a salutary and necessary 
coercion.”118 Innocent III’s decrees constituted a clear-cut set of directives, but the Church was 
not the only power concerned with the place of Jews in Christian society. Secular rulers were as 
well. Only months before, at the end of 1223, Louis VIII of France had enacted a new series of 
laws governing the place of Jews in French society.119 Some of French royal policy overlapped 
with Innocent’s decrees; some did not.120 On the issue of the usury of the Jews, Innocent’s decree 
simply reinforced an idea that the French monarchy had already embraced by the early thirteenth 
century. So there was little need for Thibaut to push this issue with any special force. Similarly, 
                                                
117 William Chester Jordan, The French Monarchy and the Jews from Philip Augustus to the Last Capetians 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), pp. 51-55. 
 
118 Decrees, pp. 265-267: “synodali decreto statuimus ut si de caetero quocumque praetextu Iudaei a christianis 
graves et immoderatas usuras extorserint”; “statuimus ut tales utriusque sexus in omni christianorum provincia et 
omni tempore, qualitate habitus publice ab aliis populis distinguantur”; “prohibentes ne Iudaei officiis publicis 
praeferantur, quoniam sub tali praetextu christianis plurimum sunt infesti”; “statuimus, ut tales per praelatos 
ecclesiarum ab observantia veteris ritus omnimodo compescantur, ut quos christianae religioni liberae voluntatis 
arbitrium obtulit, salutiferae coactionis necessitas in eius observatione conservet.” 
 
119 Jordan, French Monarchy and the Jews, pp. 93-104; the text of Louis VIII’s stabilimentum can be found in 
Layettes du Trésor des chartes, vol. 2, ed. Alexandre Teulet (Paris: H. Plon, 1866), no. 1610. 
 
120 I am grateful to William Chester Jordan for helping me to understand the intricacies of French royal policy 
towards the Jews in the 1220s, specifically which of the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council would have been 
applicable in Normandy at that time. While the immediate information that follows comes out of a conversation with 
Prof. Jordan, much of the same information can be found in Jordan, French Monarchy and the Jews, pp. 77-79, 93-




there would have been no need for Thibaut to promulgate c. 69 on Jews holding offices, since 
such a situation was virtually inconceivable in Northern France at this time. But it is difficult to 
understand why the archbishop of Rouen did not include c. 68 on Jewish dress or c. 70 on 
converts, because in both cases the Fourth Lateran Council was well ahead of the French 
monarchy, whose own policy on such issues would not crystallize until late in the reign of Louis 
IX. Perhaps Thibaut felt it wise to tread softly on issues relating to Jewish-Christian relations, 
given that the French monarchy’s policy was in a state of evolution.121 Or, perhaps, the 
archbishop of Rouen simply felt that other matters were more important. The available source 
material does not allow us to see into the mind of this particular thirteenth-century cleric, but the 
simple fact that Thibaut did not reiterate some of Innocent’s canons proves instructive. Here 
again, as on many other occasions, the independent will of a member of the episcopal elite 
subverted—whether intentionally or not—the reform program that Innocent III and his advisors 
had crafted so carefully. 
 The decrees of Thibaut’s Council of Rouen in 1224 ultimately tell an interesting story 
about the way Innocent III’s reform program trickled down to the local level. On the one hand, 
they provide rare direct evidence of a member of the episcopacy acting directly on a papal 
mandate, in this case, Honorius III’s letter from December 1223. In one sense, Honorius’ letter 
clearly worked. Thibaut, who had only just taken over the archdiocese of Rouen the year before, 
called a provincial council to promulgate the Lateran IV decrees. And the statutes that emerged 
from this council did address many issues that Innocent and his successor, Honorius, wanted to 
disseminate throughout Christendom. But, as we have seen before, this council—such a crucial 
part of the communicative process—raised just as many problems as it solved. In spite of 
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Honorius’ command to promulgate the entire conciliar program, Thibaut’s provincial statutes 
abridged Innocent III’s reform decrees, altered others, and excluded many altogether. In the one 
instance where the papacy ordered a subordinate to implement the conciliar program in its 
entirety, that subordinate only partially fulfilled his charge. And despite Honorius’ threat of 
future action against the archbishop, the documentary record provides no record of any papal 
follow up. The papacy’s most forceful attempt to exercise its will through written 
communication had succeeded only in part. Local authority, not the centralized power of Rome, 
still reigned supreme. 
The Program of Papal Implementation—Piecemeal Implementation and the Use of Letters: 
 Honorius III’s letter from December 1223 represents the only known written attempt on 
the part of the papacy to implement the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council en masse. Far more 
common was a piecemeal approach to implementing the reform program. According to this 
model, the papacy communicated with specific ecclesiastical officials and institutions to enact 
one or more of the Lateran IV decrees. Excluding the letter to Thibaut, archbishop of Rouen, the 
papal registers contain 167 letters that reference the Fourth Lateran Council—whether explicitly 
in the text or implicitly based on the content therein—and address the implementation of one or 
more of its canons. Although these letters vary widely in length and form, their content and the 
patterns of their dissemination further underscore the notion that the papacy’s communication 
strategy for the implementation of the Lateran IV reform program remained remarkably 
decentralized and largely unstructured by a guiding organizational principle. 
 During the course of his decade-long pontificate, Honorius III issued letters that sought to 
implement a wide array of the Lateran IV decrees. Of the 71 canons that made up Innocent III’s 
great reform program, at least 34 make an appearance in Honorius’ registers, albeit with varying 
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degrees of frequency [See Table 3].122 The overwhelming majority of these letters address 
administrative issues, such as benefices (c. 29—71 letters), the crusade (c. 71—45 letters), tithes 
(c. 53-56—17 letters), general chapters (c. 12—12 letters), and procurations and episcopal 
visitation (c. 33—10 letters).123 Honorius also turned his gaze to the issue of provincial councils 
(c. 6—6 letters), that thorny topic that influenced so much else in the implementation of the 
Lateran IV program. And, at times, he even addressed more obscure administrative matters, such 
as when he wrote to the bishop and archdeacon of Osma to enforce c. 37, the Innocentian decree 
that prohibited someone from being “summoned by apostolic letters to a trial that is more than 
two days’ journey outside his diocese.”124 But it is telling that Honorius rarely addressed many of 
the decrees that have so impressed historians of the Middle Ages. References to heresy (c. 3), the 
appointment of schoolmasters (c. 11), the instruction of priests (c. 27), and aspects of Jewish-
Christian relations (c. 67-68) are few and far between.125 And I have been unable to locate a 
single mention of the famous decrees on doctrine (c. 1), preaching (c. 10), the establishing of 
new religious orders (c. 13), ordeals (c. 18), mandatory confession (c. 21), care of the sick (c. 
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22), or relics (c. 62).126 Historians often argue that these canons (many of which address pastoral 
care) indicate a fundamental shift in the way that the institutional Church saw its responsibilities 
towards the Christian laity.127 But what if the institutional Church—headed by the papacy—did 
not, in fact, prioritize these reforms? What if our reading of the authoritative texts of these 
canons fails to take into proper consideration how much (or how little!) of those texts was 
actually communicated to the local level?128 Given the large number of times that the papacy 
injected itself into the process of implementing the Lateran IV reforms, how do we explain the 
lack of references to what have since become the hallmarks of Innocent III’s famous council? 
 
Table 3: Number of Honorius III’s Letters Dealing with Specific Lateran IV Canons 
                                                
126 This conclusion is based on having gone through every one of Honorius III’s registered letters. 
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Abulafia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 182-203. 
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 Part of the answer undoubtedly has to do with the theoretical position of the pope as 
leader of the Church. By the late twelfth century, the bishops of Rome had rearticulated their 
theoretical position vis-à-vis the rest of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Henceforth, the pope was the 
universal ordinary, not just the bishop of Rome but also the bishop of all of Christendom.129 The 
principal role of the bishop, of course, was to be a pastor, a leader of his flock. And in the canons 
of the Fourth Lateran Council, it is easy to see the papacy—as the author of the reform 
program—honing this vision of the pope as the pastor of every Christian, everywhere. Yet this 
vision of papal leadership necessarily clashed with the traditional rights of the archbishops and 
bishops who remained the Church’s principal agents in the many corners of Christendom. To 
what extent could the pope co-opt responsibilities and privileges that had been the preserve of 
the epsicopate? This was a question that twelfth- and thirteenth-century canon lawyers wrestled 
with at length.130 But the consensus that emerged—if there was one—was neither coherent nor 
static. “The theory of papal monarchy we find in the writings of the canonists,” Kenneth 
Pennington concludes, “is as likely to perplex us with its contradictions as to enlighten us with 
its intricacies.”131 Some popes, such as Innocent III, Gregory IX, and Innocent IV, pressed their 
authority over the bishops in more profound ways; others were quicker to respect episcopal 
privilege. 
                                                
129 On the development of the idea of the universal ordinary, see Robert L. Benson, “Plenitudo potestatis: Evolution 
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The raging intellectual debate about the role of the pope in Christian society likely 
explains, at least in part, why Honorius III only reluctantly injected himself into the process of 
implementing certain of the Lateran IV reforms. But the limitations of available communication 
structures also undoubtedly played a profoundly important role. At the most basic level, some 
issues were easier for the pope to address than others. The administrative reforms that Honorius 
III most frequently took up in his letters ultimately lent themselves to papal involvement and 
oversight, because they were the precisely the type of matters that local officials would bring to 
the attention of the papal Curia. A cleric—however insignificant in stature—who had been 
denied a benefice, a crucial part of his livelihood, would have had a vested interest in appealing 
the decision to Rome. Similarly, a monastery that had been forced to pay an unjust procuration to 
a visiting bishop would have had cause to report the matter to the pope, in part because money 
was on the line and in part because that same bishop would surely come again. But imagine for a 
moment a man in Germany reporting to Honorius that he had not been called upon to make 
confession once a year, as c. 21 explicitly decreed. Issues of pastoral care were, of course, 
traditionally the realm of the local bishop. More importantly, though, it is almost impossible to 
imagine such an issue coming before the pope in the first place.132 
The content of Honorius III’s registers firmly supports the argument that certain matters 
were more likely than others to come before the papal Curia. Patterns in the dissemination of 
these letters further underscore this notion. The recipients of Honorius’ letters about Lateran IV 
fall into one of four categories: members of the episcopate (primates, archbishops, and bishops); 
legates; institutions (such as a monastery or the members of a particular religious order); and 
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sec. XIII,” in Pievi e parrocchie in Italia nel basso Medioevo (sec. XIII-XV): atti del VI Convegno di storia della 
Chiesa in Italia: Firenze, 21-25 sett., 1981 (Rome: Herder, 1984), pp. 81-195. 
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individuals who fell outside the ranks of the episcopal elite. Of the 167 letters that Honorius and 
his advisors issued to implement the reforms of the Fourth Lateran Council, 78 (47%) went to 
bishops; 7 (4%) went to legates; 31 (18%) went to institutions; and 52 (31%) went to other 
individuals [See Table 4].133 These numbers are in themselves revealing. In one sense, it is 
unsurprising that Honorius addressed such a large percentage of his letters to members of the 
episcopate. The communication strategy that the papacy laid out at the Fourth Lateran Council 
specifically targeted bishops—the conveners of provincial councils and diocesan synods—as the 
primary enforcers of the new reform program. And in spite of the canonists’ newfound 
subjugation of bishops to the will of the pope, the archbishops and bishops of Christendom were 
still the members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy who were best placed to tackle local issues in a 
systematic way. So it should come as no surprise that the pope and the Curia would continue to 
work through the episcopal hierarchy when tackling the process of reform in a piecemeal way. 
But at the same time, it is also telling that Honorius addressed so many letters to individuals who 
were not members of the Church’s most elite group. 
                                                
133 These figures are based on a database that I have compiled of all the letters from Honorius III’s pontificate that 




Table 4: The Breakdown of Recipients of Honorius III’s Letters Concerning the Fourth 
Lateran Council of 1215 
 Who were these less prominent members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy? Some were men 
and women who held specific institutional positions, such as Werner, a canon in Basel; Raynald 
de Puzalia, subdeacon and prior of the monastic house of St. Severus in the diocese of Mainz; the 
nameless prioress of the Cistercian convent of Stikiswald; and William, the treasurer of York.134 
Others, such as John de Muceio, scholastic of Metz, and Master Martin de Pateshill, a cleric, had 
titles that suggested a career in teaching, or at least formal university training.135 Still others, 
however, seem to have had little standing at all. We see registered papal letters to Gerald de 
Burgh, Ralph de Novilla, Stephen Eketon, and Reginald de Radeno, among others, all 
mysteriously titled with the generic descriptor of cleric.136 The positions that all of these men and 
women held did not necessarily make them obvious recipients of special papal attention, but in 
                                                
134 Press. 1494, 3143, 4652, 5882. 
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most cases, they shared a common interest: the pursuit of a benefice.137 Of the 52 letters that 
Honorius and the papal Curia addressed to individual clerics who were not bishops, a remarkable 
46 of them (88%) concerned c. 29 of the Lateran IV decrees, which had laid down that no cleric 
should hold more than one benefice with the care of souls attached to it.138 C. 29, as noted above, 
was a remarkably popular topic of discussion in all of Honorius’ letters concerning the Fourth 
Lateran Council, more popular even than the crusade that ate up so much of the papacy’s energy. 
Nearly 43% of his letters implementing the reform program concerned the administration of 
benefices according to the Innocentian decree. Why was this so? And what does it tell us about 
the papacy’s larger ability to communicate and implement the Lateran IV reform program? 
 On one level, the Fourth Lateran Council’s decree concerning benefices was part of a 
larger—and longstanding—effort on the part of the papacy to control appointments to Church 
offices, an effort that began, with mixed results, in the twelfth century.139 But Innocent III’s 
decree was not actually responsible for increased papal intervention into this area of 
ecclesiastical administration. The text of c. 29 barely mentions the Roman pontiff at all. On the 
contrary, the decree stipulated that the papacy was only to involve itself in the administration of 
benefices in exceptional circumstances. “Concerning exalted and lettered persons, however,” the 
Fourth Lateran Council had decreed, “who should be honored with greater benefices, it is 
                                                
137 Women, of course, could not hold benefices. 
 
138 This calculation, as in various places above, has been made by manipulating a database of Honorius III’s letters 
concerning the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. 
 
139 The scholarly literature on the administration of benefices is, sadly, remarkably out of date. The most thorough 
study of the papacy’s attempts to control benefices in the period under discussion remains Geoffrey Barraclough, 
Papal Provisions: Aspects of Church History Constitutional, Legal and Administrative in the Later Middle Ages 




possible for them to be dispensed by the Apostolic See when reason requires it.”140 It was not 
until 1265 that Clement IV, in his bull Licet ecclesiarum, would inject the papacy into the 
administration of benefices in a more forceful way.141 And yet, the evidence from Honorius III’s 
registers seems to suggest that the papacy was pushing itself into this process much more 
forcefully than c. 29 had intended. Or does it? 
 “Papal provisions,” Geoffrey Barraclough once argued, “belong to the age of 
ecclesiastical centralization, and are one of the most obvious examples of the way in which that 
centralization worked.”142 This theory is a tempting enunciation of the larger historiographical 
argument about the ever-centralizing tendencies of the papacy in the High Middle Ages. And at 
face value, Honorius’ letters concerning the administration of benefices—71 in number—seem 
to reinforce Barraclough’s claim. But here, once again, the papacy’s ability to act in a substantive 
way at the local level depended almost entirely upon the upward flow of critical information, in 
this case through an appeals process. Honorius almost certainly did not know who Gerald de 
Burgh, Ralph de Novilla, Stephen Eketon, and Reginald de Radeno were, any more than he knew 
who occupied the subdeaconry of Metz or the position of treasurer of York. No, here, as in many 
other areas, Honorius and his advisors relied on the transmission of information from the 
periphery to the center. Only then could the pope evaluate the case and decide how to proceed. 
 There were, of course, times when the papacy took a more proactive stance towards the 
reform process. This was accomplished through delegated agents, who traveled on behalf of the 
                                                
140 Decrees, p. 249: “Circa sublimes tamen et litteratas personas, quae maioribus sunt beneficiis honorandae, cum 
ratio postulaverit, per sedem apostolicam poterit dispensari.” 
 
141 Barraclough, Papal Provisions, p. 9. For the text of Licet ecclesiarum, see ASV Reg. 12, f. 54. 
 




papacy and carried a mandate to enact the pope’s will throughout Christendom. Given the 
increasingly large role that legates, nuncios, and judges-delegate played in the execution of papal 
power, it should come as no surprise that Honorius III also used legates to implement the decrees 
of the Fourth Lateran Council.143Among the corpus of Honorius’ letters are seven that the pope 
addressed to legatine representatives of the papal Curia: three went to Bertrand, cardinal priest of 
SS. John and Paul; two to John of Columna, cardinal priest of S. Praxedes; one to Guala, cardinal 
priest of S. Martin; and one to Romano Bonaventua, cardinal deacon of S. Angelo.144 Because 
canon law defined specific geographical and, occasionally, temporal limits to a legate’s mission, 
the mandates that these four men received from the pope were hardly open ended.145 But these 
legates nonetheless would have possessed significant powers to implement papal policy in 
regions far from Rome. Did they? 
 What is perhaps most interesting about each of the seven letters that Honorius sent to 
cardinal legates is the fact that they address very specific issues. They offer no broad mandate to 
implement the Lateran IV reforms, but instead zoom in on a single measure. On February 23, 
1217, less than a year after he ascended to the Chair of St. Peter, Honorius wrote to Bertrand, 
cardinal priest of SS. John and Paul, who one month earlier had taken up a position as legate to 
Southern France.146 The topic of the letter was procurations owed by various institutions to 
visiting bishops, a subject that grew out of c. 33 of the Lateran IV reforms. But, remarkably, 
                                                
143 For the massage bibliography papal legates, see Chapter 1, n. 26. 
 
144 Press. 365, 836, 922, 1586, 1658, 1955, and 5737. For an overview of the legations of these four men, see 
Zimmermann, Die päpstliche Legation, pp. 44-45, 72-74, and 81-82. 
 
145 See Robert C. Figueira, “The Medieval Papal Legate and His Province: Geographical Limits of His 
Jurisdiction,” in Plenitude of Power: The Doctrines and Exercise of Authority in the Middle Ages: Essays in 
Memory of Robert Louis Benson, ed. Robert C. Figueira (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 73-105. 
 




Honorius did not direct Bertrand to implement the decree on his behalf. Instead, he reminded the 
cardinal that he, too, was subject to the same rule! Either the pope felt compelled to remind his 
agent of the important new regulation governing his legation, or Honorius had received word that 
Bertrand was abusing his office.147 Either way, the pope now prodded his legate to adhere to the 
letter of the law. 
 Honorius’ reprimand to Bertrand is to some extent an aberration, but even the remaining 
legatine letters do not reveal an activist papacy strongly tackling the issue of reform through 
delegated officials. Twice, in October and December 1217, the pope wrote to two legates—
Bertrand and Guala—regarding benefices.148 The following year, he ordered John of Columna, 
who was then serving as papal legate to the Latin Empire of Constantinople, to implement c. 4 
and c. 5, both of which dealt with the relationship between the Eastern and Western Church and 
were thus highly relevant to John’s mission.149 In 1218, he wrote to Bertrand once more, this 
time on the matter of excommunication (c. 47 and c. 49).150 And, finally, in 1225 Honorius 
ordered Romanus Bonaventura, legate to the kingdom of France, to reform monastic houses 
according to the decrees of the recent general council (c. 12, 24-26).151 In each case, the pope 
referenced Innocent’s great council but did not specify the relevant decree, did not quote the 
original text, and did not offer specific advice on how each legate should proceed. It was as 
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148 Press. 836 and 932. 
 
149 Ibid., nos. 1586 and 1658; Zimmermann, Die päpstliche Legation, p. 74. 
 
150 Ibid., no. 1955. 
 




though the papacy wanted to micromanage each situation, but could not bring itself to pull the 
trigger. 
 A brief survey of all of the legations that took place under Honorius III offers a similarly 
bleak picture. In the early twentieth century, Heinrich Zimmermann combed the papal registers 
and relevant narrative and documentary sources to produce a list of all of the papal legations 
from the first half of the thirteenth century. His admirable work has uncovered 55 legations from 
the pontificate of Honorius III.152 Sixteen of these men were cardinals, whose missions at various 
points covered Southern France, Germany, Lombardy and Tuscany, the Latin Empire of 
Constantinople, Provence, Perugia, and much of Scandinavia.153 Twenty-nine were other 
ecclesiastical officials, many of whom held permanent positions at the papal Curia.154 A further 
ten were patriarchs, archbishops, and bishops, who held legatine authority on top of their 
position as a member of the episcopate.155 In each case, Honorius wrote a letter of introduction 
for the legate in question, a letter that specified the geographic region in which he would operate, 
the powers he would possess, and, in many cases, the issues he was to address. The chancery 
often addressed these letters to a large number of ecclesiastical officials in the region of the 
legate’s mission, a clear indication that the papacy wished its agents to be received with dignity 
and, ultimately, obedience.156 But out of at least sixty-nine papal letters that institute legations, 
                                                
152 Zimmermann, Die päpstliche Legation, pp. 72-103. 
 
153 Ibid., pp. 72-84. 
 
154 Ibid., pp. 87-100. 
 
155 Ibid., pp. 100-103. 
 
156 See, for example, Press. 265, the papal letter of introduction for Bertrand, cardinal priest of SS. John and Paul, 
for his legation to France in 1217. The letter addressed the archbishops of Embrun, Aix, Arles, Vienne, Narbonne, 
and Auch; the bishops of Mende, Clermont, Le Puy-en-Velay, Limousin, Rodez, Albi, Chorges, Périgueux, and 
Agen; abbots, priors, deacons, archdeacons, archpriests, and all clerics in the provinces of the aforementioned 
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only six make even the slightest reference to the Fourth Lateran Council, and only one—a letter 
to Vitalis, archbishop of Pisa—calls upon the legate to invite other prelates to a provincial 
council.157 We know that papal legates presided over provincial councils with some regularity, 
but evidence for Honorius’ legates performing this function is slight. James, papal chaplain and 
penitentiary, who arrived in Scotland as a representative of the papacy in November 1220, 
definitely held a council at Perth in February 1221.158 And in July of 1223 Conrad de Urach, then 
serving as papal legate to France, invited the bishops of the province of Rouen to attend a synod 
on the Albigensian heresy, which was to be held at Sens in the following year.159 But, as 
Zimmermann notes, Conrad was an unpopular representative of the papacy, and he was 
subsequently recalled shortly thereafter. The fate of the council is uncertain. Honorius charged 
his legates with many important tasks, including the establishment and maintenance of peace, the 
crusade, negotiations with Europe’s many princes, and even the establishment of new churches 
in fringe regions of the continent. But if the pope intended these men to push for the full 
implementation of the Lateran IV reform program, the documentary record has left no trace of 
his request or his legates’ compliance with it.160 
                                                
archbishops and bishops. These officials had jurisdiction over the swath of territory in which Bertrand was to 
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157 ASV Reg. 9, f. 214v. 
 
158 Zimmermann, Die päpstliche Legation, pp. 93-94; Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives, p. 86. 
 
159 Zimmermann, Die päpstliche Legation, p. 77. 
 
160 To be clear, I am limiting my discussion to the pontificate of Honorius III. There are examples of legates under 
Gregory IX (1227-1241) pushing the Lateran IV reforms with greater urgency. The most prominent example was 
John of Abbeville, cardinal bishop of Sabina, whom Gregory IX sent as legate to Spain in 1228. Although 
remarkably unpopular, John’s energetic approach to the reform process left a lasting mark on the Spanish Church. 
And yet there is little doubt that John’s legation was the exception to the rule. For an overview of John’s legation 
and its impact, see Peter Linehan, The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 20-34. As Linehan himself admits on p. 35, “After the legate’s departure the 




 How does one change the fabric of a society? This was the question that the institutional 
Church sought to answer at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. In the splendor of St. John 
Lateran, Innocent III, perhaps the greatest pope of the Middle Ages, laid down a forceful 
program of institutional and spiritual reform intended to change not only the way that the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy governed the Church, but also—crucially—the way Christians 
experienced their faith. The ideas were bold, the reforms broad in scope. But the process of 
change would not come easily. Innocent, ever the realist, clearly recognized that the 
implementation of the council’s reforms depended upon their orderly communication from Rome 
to the local level. Perhaps if he had lived longer, he would have thrown himself into this process 
with zeal. But, as we have seen in the preceding pages, under his successor, Honorius III, the 
process of communicating and implementing the reforms was anything but orderly. The papacy’s 
hierarchical model of communication, one based primarily on the transmission of ideas through a 
newly reinvigorated communicative tool—the provincial and diocesan council—broke down as 
archbishops and bishops failed to hold synods with any regularity, as they altered (and debased) 
the Lateran IV canons, and as they failed to follow up with proper oversight. 
 Honorius III, of course, was no fool. Like Innocent before him, he and his advisors 
recognized clearly the challenges of communicating new ideas and instituting complex new legal 
practices. The sheer number of papal letters addressing the Lateran IV reforms is testament 
enough to that fact. Yet in spite of the pope’s many attempts to inject himself into the 
implementation process, the papacy’s overarching response to the challenge of reform was both 
largely decentralized and even disorganized. Honorius’ sole attempt to implement the reforms en 
masse met with mixed results. His piecemeal approach was hardly better, governed as it was by 
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the need for local information, which was rarely forthcoming and, when it was, only addressed 
certain of the Innocentian reforms. And his use of legates was both unsystematic and, it seems, 
rarely focused on the process of communicating or implementing the conciliar canons. 
 Ultimately, then, the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 highlights in dramatic fashion the 
papacy’s continued struggles to make its will felt throughout Europe. And yet, despite the 
inadequacies of the communicative tools available to the bishops of Rome, the story was not one 
of complete failure. Even while the papacy’s communication strategy failed to produce the 
results that Innocent III and Honorius III surely wanted, the institution still displayed a keen 
ability to innovate when grappling with a large-scale communicative challenge. In the first 
quarter of the twelfth century, Calixtus II had begun to employ a more unified communication 
strategy as he struggled to end the primacy dispute between Canterbury and York. Fifty years 
later, Alexander III had augmented the traditional tools of papal communication by tapping into 
networks that helped him to navigate the papal schism of 1159. Now, in the first quarter of the 
thirteenth century, the papacy was experimenting with a new mechanism—the provincial and 
diocesan synod—to realize its lofty policy goals. This tool may not have been the game-changer 
that Innocent hoped it would be, but, in an odd twist of fate, the type of communication failure 
that resulted from papal efforts to reform Christian society may have done more to increase the 
communicative reach of the papacy than regular diocesan synods ever could. 
In 1234, Gregory IX, the subject of the following chapter, built upon the foundations laid 
by Innocent III and Honorius III when he issued the Liber extra, a text that was to become the 
definitive collection of decretal law until the beginning of the twentieth century.161 Historians of 
                                                
161 Innocent III had issued the first papally-sanctioned decretal collection, Compilatio tertia, in 1209/1210. This 
text, however, included only decretals that had been written by Innocent III. Several years later, Innocent, in a rather 
curious move, refused to approve a new decretal collection, Compilatio quarta, which included the canons of the 
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canon law frequently point to the advent of papal decretal collections in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries as an attempt on the part of the bishops of Rome to define what was, and was 
not, the law.162 Contemporary evidence supports this notion. In Rex pacificus, the bull of 
promulgation that Gregory attached to the Liber extra, the pope lamented how “various 
constitutions and decretal letters of our predecessors, dispersed in diverse volumes, have seemed 
to induce confusion, some because of excessive similarity, some because of contradiction, some 
even because of prolixity.”163 Gregory’s words take on new meaning in light of the breakdown of 
communications that plagued the implementation of the Fourth Lateran Council. If the papacy 
could not rely on its bishops, and if it could not even rely on its own institutions, perhaps it 
needed a new tool altogether. The Liber extra, which contained every canon of the Fourth 
Lateran Council of 1215, went on to become one of the most copied, studied, and widely 
disseminated texts of the Middle Ages.164 Innocent III surely would have found some satisfaction 
in that fact. 
                                                
Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. Honorius III issued a new compilation, Compilatio quinta, in 1226, but this 
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discussion of decretal collections in this era, see Kenneth Pennington, “Decretal Collections 1190-1234,” in The 




163 Corpus iuris canonici, vol. 2, ed. Aemelius Friedberg (Graz: Akademische Druck- U. Verlagsanstalt, 1959), pp. 
1-2: “Sane diversas constituitones et decretales epistolas preaedecessorum nostrorum, in diversa dispersas volumina, 
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Latin Christianity: Selected Translations, 500-1245, ed. and trans. Robert Somerville and Bruce C. Brasington (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 235-236. 
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A WAR OF WORDS AND WILLS: 
Gregory IX, the Council of Rome, and the Campaign Against Frederick II, 1239-1241 
 
“So great was the strife between these two that the Ship of St. Peter under the pontificate of 
Gregory was almost sunk into the abyss. And this is what Abbot Joachim had predicted for the 
Roman pontiffs: ‘Some shall contend against princes, while others shall live their days in 
peace.’”1 
 
-Salimbene de Adam, Chronicle 
 
 
 The small Italian commune of Grottaferrata, situated roughly twelve miles southeast of 
Rome, is a relatively sleepy place. Its one great landmark—the Basilian monastery of St. Mary, 
founded by St. Nilus the Younger in 1004—stands at the edge of town, surrounded even now by 
its imposing fifteenth-century walls.2 The winding streets of the commune remain relatively 
quiet, exuding a feeling of timelessness typical of Italian towns—a sense of a place that 
remembers much and has witnessed still more. But in the early days of August 1240, this same 
town must have been a busy hive of activity. Pope Gregory IX, then in the midst of a titanic 
struggle with Emperor Frederick II, had made Grottaferrata his temporary place of residence.3 
                                                
1 Chronica fratris Salimbene de Adam ordinis minorum, ed. Oswald Holder-Egger, MGH SS, vol. 32 (Hanover: 
Hahn, 1963), p. 36: “Iste etiam longo tempore fuit in discordia et pugnavit cum imperatore Friderico secundo, qui 
multa mala fecit ecclesie Dei, que eum nutrivit et coronavit, ita quod pene navis Petri sub predicto papa cecidit in 
profundum. Hoc est quod abbas Ioachym de Romanis pontificibus dixit, videlicet quod aliqui conabuntur in 
principes, aliqui ducent pacificos suos dies.” I have modified slightly the English translation found in The Chronicle 
of Salimbene de Adam, trans. Joseph L. Baird, Giuseppe Baglivi, and John Robert Kane (Binghamton, NY: 
Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1986), p. 10. 
 
2 For the history of the monastery, see Stefano Parenti, Il monastero di Grottaferrata nel Medioevo, 1004-1062: 
segni e percorsi di una identità (Rome: Pontificio istituto orientale, 2005). 
 
3 It seems that Gregory traveled to Grottaferrata sometime between July 21 and August 1, and he remained there 
until at least September 29 before journeying back to Rome. Pott. 10,920-10,938. There are many overviews of 
Gregory’s battle with Frederick II, which occurred in fits and spasms between 1229 and 1241. Useful accounts of 
the contours of this struggle can be found in David Abulafia, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor (London: Allen 
Lane, 1988), chapters 5, 9, and 11; Joseph Felten, Papst Gregor IX (Freiburg im Breisgan: Herder, 1886), chapters 
6, 10-11, 13, 17-18, 23-27; Ernst Kantorowicz, Frederick II: 1194-1240, trans. E. O. Lorimer (New York: Frederick 
Ungar Publishing, 1957), parts 4, 7-8; Thomas Curtis Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen: 
Immutator Mundi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), parts 4 and 9. 
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And it was here that the pope and his advisors put into motion a new plan to thwart Frederick 
and turn the political situation to the pope’s advantage. Gregory was calling a general council of 
the Church, the first since Innocent III’s Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. There, the pope hoped 
to build support for his cause, use the trappings of his office to impress those in attendance, and, 
if necessary, formally depose the emperor. The council was to meet the following spring in 
Rome, but for that to happen, Gregory first had to communicate his plan and summon the 
representatives of Christendom to the Eternal City. Suddenly, the task of implementing the 
pope’s grand strategy fell not to kings, bishops, or princes, but instead a handful of papal scribes. 
 The papal chancery sprang into action. On August 9, 1240 the register of Gregory IX 
records 212 copies of three outgoing papal letters: 153 copies of Eterna providentia; 10 copies of 
Super bases; and 49 copies of Cum graves.4 All three letters contained the same basic message, 
exhorting their recipients to obey the Apostolic See by attending the council the following 
spring.5 “We ask and exhort you diligently,” Gregory wrote to recipients of Eterna providentia, 
“mandating that it be instructed to you through apostolic letters, that you manage personally to 
come to our presence immediately preceding the feast of the resurrection of the Lord, so that 
your mother, the Church, might have in her son the desired comfort in your visit and the most 
welcome support of the counsel you provide.”6 Even the formality of thirteenth-century chancery 
language could not quite hide the pope’s sense of urgency. His situation was more precarious 
than he let on. For the better part of the preceding decade, the relationship between the papacy 
                                                
4 Les Registres de Grégoire IX, vol. 3, ed. Lucien Auvray (Paris: Libraire des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de 
Rome, 1902), nos. 5420-5633 [pp. 389-402]. 
 
5 The differences between these letters are discussed below. See pp. 188-191. 
 
6 Ibid., no. 5420 [p. 389-390]: “fraternitatem tuam rogamus et hortamur attente, per apostolica tibi scripta 
precipiendo mandantes quatenus usque ad proximum festum Resurrectionis Dominice ad nostram presentiam 
personaliter venire procures, omni occasione cessante, ut habeat Ecclesia mater in filio speratum in tua visitatione 
solacium et gratum providi consilii fulcimentum.” 
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and the empire had alternated between periods of peace—even cooperation—and periods of 
conflict. But beginning in 1236, Frederick and Gregory gradually came to loggerheads over the 
emperor’s efforts to assert control over Lombardy, the region of northern Italy that was 
frequently at the heart of papal and imperial efforts to control the Italian peninsula.7 Frederick 
pushed, and Gregory pushed back. In a solemn ceremony on Palm Sunday 1239, the pope 
excommunicated the emperor for the second time since 1227.8 That tactical political move, 
however, was not the end of the conflict but rather the beginning. By early 1240 Frederick was 
marching through Italy, capturing the city of Ravenna and laying siege to Faenza. The papacy 
was on the defensive. Something, Gregory knew, had to be done. 
For the next two years, Gregory IX played an elaborate game of political chess with 
Frederick II, a game that would only end for the papacy with the emperor’s sudden demise from 
an attack of dysentery in December 1250. The task confronting the papacy in this conflict was, in 
some ways, similar to that which Alexander III had faced eighty years earlier during the papal 
schism. As in 1159, the situation in the second and third decades of the thirteenth century 
required the papacy to mobilize political support for its cause while undercutting the position of 
its foe. And, again as in 1159, papacy and empire found themselves at odds with one another. 
However, there were also crucial differences between these two political situations. Alexander 
III had needed to appeal to secular and ecclesiastical leaders even to establish his own legitimacy 
as leader of the Western Church.9 Gregory IX had to convince similar parties of his cause—but 
                                                
7 See the summaries in n. 3. 
 
8 For the text of Gregory’s bull of excommunication see Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi, vol. 5, part 1, ed. 
J. L. Huillard-Bréholles (Paris: Henry Plon, 1857), pp. 286-289. Gregory had first excommunicated Frederick in 
1227 over the emperor’s failure to leave on crusade according to the pope’s timetable. 
 
9 The fact that the schismatic papal election of 1159 had produced two popes, each elected by a group of cardinals, 
complicated matters significantly. See Chapter 3. 
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not, crucially, of his legitimate authority. By 1239, Gregory had been sitting on the Chair of St. 
Peter for over a decade, and Frederick had worked with him on many occasions. The conflict 
between empire and papacy during Gregory’s pontificate would see both pope and emperor 
contemplate the removal of the other from his respective position, but implicit in those tactical 
political moves was the assumption that both leaders held their power legitimately.10 As a result, 
the papacy’s line of attack was much more about undercutting Frederick’s support than 
bolstering its own. This was to play a key role in how Gregory IX approached the conflict. 
The political situation in 1239 also differed markedly from the one Alexander III had 
faced in 1159, because the foundations of papal power had shifted somewhat during the eighty 
years separating the two events. Innocent III had expanded the theory of papal monarchy in new 
and important ways during his pontificate, breathing new life into the claims to power that 
Gregory VII had made in the late eleventh century.11 At the same time, the papacy had also 
become much more of a landed political power. By the end of his pontificate in 1216, Innocent 
had hammered lands donated to the papacy as far back as the eighth century into a formal 
political entity.12 The Papal State—the terra sancti Petri—came to encompass a wide swath of 
territory that spanned the central regions of the Italian peninsula. Divided into provinces, this 
                                                
 
10 In some ways, the papacy was in a particularly awkward position vis-à-vis Frederick, because papal actions had 
been largely responsible for creating the problem that Gregory and Innocent eventually faced. As a child, Frederick 
had been the ward of Innocent III, whose support had been decisive in boy king’s eventual assumption of the 
imperial office. See Abulafia, Frederick II, chapter 3; Van Cleve, Emperor Frederick II, part 2. 
 
11 Pennington, Pope and Bishops: The Papal Monarchy in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), chapter 1. 
 
12 Daniel Waley, The Papal State in the Thirteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 1961), chapters 1 and 2. The 
foundations of what was to become the Papal State went back to a series of donations of land that had been made to 
the papacy by Pepin (754), Charlemagne (774), and Louis the Pious (817), with important additions made under the 
Ottonians (962 and 1001) and with the death of Countless Matilda of Tuscany in 1115. For the early history of the 
Papal State, see Thomas F.X. Noble, The Republic of St. Peter: The Birth of the Papal State, 680-825 (Philadelphia: 




territory was governed through legates and then rectors appointed by the popes.13 The creation of 
the Papal State eventually increased the financial stability of the papacy and undoubtedly added 
to the prestige of the institution, particularly in Italy.14 But with the territorialization of papal 
power came a series of risks. Now the papacy had to protect that territory, which was both a 
source and instrument of papal power. Frederick’s dual position as king of Germany (and, after 
1220, emperor) and king of Sicily put this newly created Papal State in an awkward—and 
dangerous—vise of political opposition. Bounded north and south by hostile forces, the papacy 
in the 1230s and 1240s had to consider its territorial position vis-à-vis the empire, which in turn 
shaped the way that Gregory IX worked against Frederick. 
The papacy’s approach to its conflict with Frederick II during the final years of Gregory 
IX’s pontificate reveals that the institution had grown in significant ways since it tried to tackle 
the primacy dispute between Canterbury and York around the year 1100. Even though the basic 
administrative and communicative tools available to the papacy—letters, legates, councils, and, 
on occasion face-to-face meetings—had not changed drastically, the institution had begun to use 
them in a more systematic way. Crucially, Gregory IX—like Innocent III and even Alexander III 
before him—realized that effective communication was vital to the implementation of papal 
policy. And yet, at the same time, that realization could still not overcome some hard truths 
about the limited effectiveness of the administrative apparatus that the bishops of Rome had at 
their disposal to put ideas and decisions in motion. The conflict between empire and papacy in 
the second quarter of the thirteenth century eventually ended in a stunning, if somewhat lucky, 
                                                
13Waley, The Papal State, chapter 4. At the time of the conflict between the papacy and Frederick II, the Papal State 
consisted of the provinces of Campagna and Sabina, the Patrimony of St. Peter in Tuscany, the Duchy of Spoleto, 
and the March of Ancona. 
 
14 Financial records show that the Papal State probably only started to pay for itself in the last years of the thirteenth 
century. Ibid., chapter 8. 
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victory for the successors of St. Peter: Frederick was dead, and the empire was in a state of 
chaos. But in spite of that favorable outcome, the papacy seemed unable to deviate from a path 
that would ultimately lead to Boniface VIII’s shaming at Anagni. Gregory IX’s communication 
strategy and his decision to call for a general council in 1240 ultimately laid bare the continued 
limits to the effective power of the papacy. 
Cultivating Hierarchy—Gregory IX’s War of Words: 
 It is impossible to know what Gregory IX thought as he proclaimed Frederick’s 
excommunication in a solemn ceremony on Palm Sunday 1239. Gregory was a confident, some 
might say stubborn, leader of the Western Church.15 And yet it is hard to imagine that he did not 
have at least a few misgivings. The decision to go up against one of the most powerful secular 
rulers in Europe, one particularly well placed to overwhelm the papacy’s base of support even in 
Italy, was no small matter. One thing, however, is abundantly clear: the pope’s plan for 
combatting the emperor relied chiefly on thorough and effective communication. In the 
thirteenth century—as in centuries past—the papacy’s ability to effect real political change on 
the ground was based in large part on influence (which could, of course, rely on coercion) rather 
than brute strength.16 Victory for Gregory, then, relied on the pope’s ability to build support for 
                                                
15 Steven Runciman, for example, once wrote that Gregory was a “stern and ascetic” man who possessed “a clear 
legalistic mind and a proud, unyielding faith in the divine authority of the papacy.” Steven Runciman, A History of 
the Crusades, vol. 3: The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
p. 178. 
 
16 In making this claim, I am not trying to set up a strict dichotomy between “influence” and “physical power”, but I 
do believe some distinction is important when thinking about how the papacy approached lay powers as opposed to 
members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Most of this study has dealt with the papacy’s ability to control 
ecclesiastical officials, and the papacy’s conflicts with lay rulers—where they have appeared—have been cold rather 
than hot wars. But the situation with Frederick II was fundamentally different, because the conflict quickly took on a 
military dimension, even though the papacy could not match Frederick’s military might. Until the Papal State 
became a more fully formed political entity in the pontificate of Innocent III (1198-1216), the bishops of Rome had 
limited military abilities. Eventually, this changed in the second half of the thirteenth century when the papacy 
began to use crusading not just against those who adhered to an unorthodox vision of the Christian faith or those 
who were not Christian at all, but also Christian lay powers. The papacy, in alliance with the Angevin monarchy of 
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his cause while—crucially—undercutting Frederick’s support. The pope hoped to accomplish 
this by publishing as widely as possible the news of Frederick’s excommunication, and 
eviscerating the emperor with damning propaganda. Initially, letters and delegated agents were to 
be the primary instruments of the papacy’s communication strategy. In each case, Gregory 
needed to disseminate information widely, effectively, and efficiently, particularly given the 
geographic constraints placed on the Papal State to the north and the south. The pope knew this, 
and his chancery got to work immediately, producing the text of three letters—Sedes apostolica, 
Cum nuper, and Ascendit de mari—that went out in four distinct waves over the next three 
months. These written salvos reveal how the papacy initially approached the problem posed by 
Frederick, as well as how the institution had begun to internalize the need for clear 
communication when implementing policy. But they also highlight various administrative 
pitfalls that accompanied that process of disseminating a series of ideas throughout Christendom. 
 On April 7, 1239, only a few days after Gregory formally excommunicated the emperor, 
the papal chancery sent out a host of letters announcing this solemn event to Europe’s 
ecclesiastical and secular leaders. The first copy of Sedes apostolica that appears in the registers 
was sent to Peter de Colmieu, archbishop of Rouen, and his suffragan bishops, with two more 
registered copies going to “all archbishops and bishops, exempt and otherwise,” and to “kings, 
dukes, counts, and other nobles.”17 The text laid out the case against Frederick in broad 
brushstrokes, and then urged these clerics to action. “We diligently remind and exhort all of 
you,” Gregory wrote, “that you should arrange to solemnly publish and announce the 
                                                
Sicily, was able to recruit sizeable armies and raise significant sums of money to fund those armies. But this 
development, which produced mixed results, occurred largely after 1254, four years after Frederick II’s death. See, 
generally, Norman Housley, The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades Against Christian 
Lay Powers, 1254-1343 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). 
 
17 Registres, vol. 3, nos. 5092-5094 [pp. 201-206]. 
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aforementioned sentence of excommunication and anathema on every Sunday and every feast 
day, with bells tolling and candles lit.” At the same time, the pope added, “you should similarly 
have [the sentence] published and even announced throughout your cities and dioceses.”18 The 
striking image of news traveling across the continent on a aural wave of tintinnabulation has a 
romantic feel to it, but it also surely reflects the rousing condemnation of the emperor’s actions 
that Gregory wished to elicit from Europe’s clerics, princes, and people. That he laid out 
reasonably specific instructions for the dissemination of Frederick’s excommunication is also 
striking. This news was to be read out—and read out often. Indeed, Gregory’s exhortation to 
have the excommunication “published and even announced” (et etiam nuntiari) suggests that the 
archbishops, bishops, and other members of the Church hierarchy who received the papal letter 
were to do extra duty by either traveling around announcing the emperor’s fate themselves or 
having delegated agents do so.19 
 Curiously, at the same time that the chancery issued Sedes apostolica, Gregory also wrote 
a shorter but similar letter, Cum nuper, to a more targeted list of recipients: the archbishop of 
Reims and his suffragan bishops; all of the archbishops and bishops of France; the archbishop of 
Salzburg and “certain others”; the bishops of the March in Italy; Otto Candidus, cardinal deacon 
of St. Nicholas and papal legate to England; and, finally, Baldwin II, the Latin emperor of 
Constantinple, and the nobility of his realm.20 The basic message of Cum nuper was identical to 
                                                
18 Ibid., no. 5092 [pp. 204-205]: “Quocirca universitatem vestram monemus et hortamus attente, per apostolica 
vobis scripta in virtute obedientie firmiter precipiendo mandantes quatenus, nullum sibi prestantes consilium, 
auxilium vel favorem, predictam excommunicationis et anathematis sententiam singulis diebus dominicis et festivis, 
pulsatis campanis et candelis, ac generaliter alia omnia quae presentibus continentur, solempniter publicare ac 
nuntiare curetis, et faciatis simili modo per vestras civitates et dioceses publicare et etiam nuntiari.” 
 
19 Ibid., p. 205: “publicare et etiam nuntiari.” The emphasis is my own. 
 




that of Sedes apostolica, reiterating the need to publish and announce the news of Frederick’s 
excommunication to a broader public.21 What was Gregory up to in addressing this particular 
mix of ecclesiastical office-holders and secular rulers? The logic behind the pope’s decision is 
not altogether clear, but having already sent Sedes apostolica, the purpose of Cum nuper seems 
to have been to target specific constituencies whose support would prove especially vital. France, 
a traditional ally of the papacy, was perhaps the most powerful kingdom in Europe at the time. 
The support of her bishops would have been a vital firewall of support in a protracted conflict 
with Frederick. The same was true of the bishops of the March, who led dioceses in the Papal 
State itself. And Salzburg had been a staunch ally of the papacy during the schism of 1159, 
although Eberhard II, who was then archbishop in 1239, had strong imperial sympathies.22 
Perhaps Gregory now sought to win over a man who could be a key ally—or a dangerously well-
placed enemy. Otto, the cardinal legate to England, who had served Gregory previously in his 
on-again, off-again disputes with the emperor, was an obvious candidate to take on additional 
responsibilities publishing the emperor’s excommunication.23 Finally, with the Latin emperor of 
Constantinople and his nobles, it seems likely that Gregory wanted to bolster his support in the 
“other” empire of the Latin West. In sending copies of Cum nuper to large groupings of 
individuals, such as the episcopate of France or the March, the papacy was honing its 
                                                
21 Ibid., no. 5095; For the full text, see ASV Reg. 19, f. 149v. [Note: I have used the scribal folio numbers for 
register 19 instead of the actual folio count, which is off by six folios.] 
 
22 For the history of the archdiocese of Salzburg during the schism of 1159, see Chapter 3, and Franz Gruber, 
Eberhard II. Erzbischof von Salzburg, 2 vols. (Burghausen: R. Speth, 1878-1880). 
 
23 Otto had been sent to Germany and Denmark in 1229 to publish the news of Frederick’s first excommunication; 
to Lombardy in 1232 to negotiate between Frederick and the Lombard League; and now to England, Scotland, and 
Wales in 1237 to reform the English Church and (after Gregory’s letter of 1239) work against Frederick in those 
realms. Heinrich Zimmermann, Die päpstliche Legation in der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts  vom 
Regierungsantritt Innocenz' III. bis zum Tode Gregors IX., 1198-1241 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1913), pp. 




communication strategy while hammering home its message by repeating it to key 
constituencies. In the fight against Frederick, news of the emperor’s excommunication needed to 
circulate widely. But just as Alexander had recognized eight decades earlier, Gregory now 
understood that certain individuals, office-holders, and regions would prove especially important 
in that broader conflict.24 
 The papacy’s effort to target specific individuals continued a month later, when, on May 
22, the chancery sent out a second wave of copies of Sedes apostolica. The first group of 
recipients included twelve prominent archbishops in England, France, and Italy: the archbishops 
of Canterbury, York, Embrun, Rouen, Lyon, Sens, Tours, Reims, Bordeaux, Berry, Besançon, 
and Genoa.25 Each letter was also addressed to the suffragan bishops of the relevant archdiocese, 
although they were not named individually.26 The second group of recipients included “all abbots 
and brothers” of the Cistercian, Cluniac, and Premonstratensian orders; the priors and brothers of 
the Dominicans; and the ministers and brothers of the Franciscans.27 The tactical decision to send 
out more copies of the letter detailing Frederick’s excommunication points to the papacy’s 
increasing emphasis on targeting certain individuals or groups whose influence and support 
                                                
24 It is unclear whether the recipients of Cum nuper also received copies of Sedes apostolica. If Sedes apostolica 
had been sent to “all archbishops and bishops”, as well as “kings, dukes, counts, and other nobles,” as the registers 
suggest, then this targeted list of individuals would have received that letter as well. However, as will be discussed 
below, there is reason to doubt that copies of Sedes apostolica were, in fact, sent to the entire episcopal hierarchy as 
well as every noble in Europe. 
 
25 Registres, vol. 3, nos. 5101-5112 [pp. 208-209]. 
 
26 Ibid. Adopting the form typical in papal letters throughout the Middle Ages, the letters were merely addressed, 
for example, to the archbishop of Reims “and his suffragans” (et suffrageneis eius). In addressing letters in this way, 
it is reasonable to assume that the named archbishop would hold responsibility for passing along the content of the 
papal letter to his suffragans. 
 
27 Ibid., nos. 5113-5117 [p. 209]. The term “order” (ordo) indicated a formal, institutionalized organization of 
religious who followed a rule. For a useful overview of the basic administrative institutions associated with orders in 
this period, see Gabriel Le Bras, Institutions ecclésiastiques de la chrétienté médiévale, 1.2-4 (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 




would prove vital to its larger cause. But the choice of recipients in this second wave of letters 
also shows that Gregory was thinking of additional ways to disseminate his message. By 
including the abbots, priors, and ministers of the major religious orders of the day, the pope and 
his advisors undoubtedly sought to tap into the expansive international communication networks 
that connected houses of these orders.28 These networks—both formal and informal—had 
become increasingly institutionalized after the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which required 
religious orders to hold general chapters every three years.29 In harnessing their communicative 
power, Gregory showed that the papacy was beginning to think of new ways to supplement the 
traditional institutional hierarchy of the Church. 
 Having published the news of Frederick’s excommunication, Gregory and his advisors 
now turned to the task of laying out a more forceful case against the emperor. This they did in 
Ascendit de mari, a text, Thomas Van Cleve argues, that “has few parallels in passionate 
                                                
28 Employing the term “international” is somewhat anachronistic to describe a society before the dawning of the 
nation state. My point, however, is that the religious orders had an institutional organization that spanned 
geographical borders and even the borders of the increasingly defined “national” churches of kingdoms, such as 
France, England, Hungary, etc. For monastic communication networks in the period under discussion, see the rich 
and varied collection of studies in Die Ordnung der Kommunikation und die Kommunikation der Ordnungen, vol. 1: 
Netzwerke: Klöster und Orden im Europa des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts, ed. Cristina Andenna, Klaus Herbers, and 
Gert Melville (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012). For one particularly interesting case study of the international 
connections between mendicant houses, see Jens Röhrkasten, “Local Ties and International Connections of the 
London Mendicants,” in Mendicants, Military Orders, and Regionalism in Medieval Europe, ed. Jürgen Sarnowsky 
(Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 145-183. 
 
29 Decrees, pp. 240-242. For a general overview of the administrative function of the general chapter, see Le Bras, 
Institutions ecclésiastiques, pp. 486-490. Useful case studies on the gradual institutionalization of the major 
religious orders include (for the Cluniacs) Dietrich W. Poeck, Cluniacensis Ecclesia: Der cluniacensische 
Klosterverband (10.-12. Jahrhundert) (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1998) and Gert Melville, “Action, Text, and 
Validity: On Re-Examining Cluny’s Consuetudines and Statutes,” in From Dead of Night to End of Day: The 
Medieval Customs of Cluny, ed. Susan Boynton and Isabelle Cochelin (Tunhout: Brepols, 2005), pp. 67-83; and (for 
the Cistercians) Constance Berman, The Cistercian Evolution: The Invention of a Religious Order in Twelfth-




propaganda in the Middle Ages.”30 The text is lengthy, detailed, and completely saturated with 
Gregory’s obvious disdain for the now-excommunicated emperor. “Out of the sea,” the pope 
raged in his opening description of Frederick, “rises a beast filled with the words of blasphemy, 
which, formed with a bear’s feet, the mouth of a raging lion and, in the rest of its body, shaped as 
a panther, opens its mouth in blasphemy of the divine name, nor does it fail to attack with similar 
javelins his tabernacle and the saints who live in heaven.”31 The strident language of Ascendit de 
mari has captured the attention of scholars like Van Cleve—and for good reason. But the length 
and elaborate imagery of the letter, while perhaps cathartic for Gregory and his advisors as they 
put the words to parchment, only mattered if they reached a broader audience. That, of course, 
was the point of propaganda. The record for Ascendit de mari that appears in Gregory’s register 
indicates that the text was sent initially to the archbishop of Reims and his suffragan bishops. But 
additional copies were sent “in the same way” to “all archbishops and bishops,” to “the 
illustrious king of France,” and to “all kings.”32 This was standard chancery practice, and indeed 
corresponding records for Sedes apostolica indicate that that letter was also sent out to “all 
archbishops and bishops, exempt and non-exempt,” and to “all kings, dukes, counts, and other 
                                                
30 Van Cleve, Emperor Frederick II, p. 431. For the text of Ascendit de mari, see Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis 
pontificum romanorum, vol. 1, ed. G.H. Pertz and C. Rodenberg, MGH (Munich: Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 
1883), no. 750 [pp. 645-654]. 
 
31 Ibid., p. 646: “Ascendit de mari bestia blasphemie plena nominibus, que pedibus ursi et leonis ore deseviens ac 
membris formata ceteris sicut pardus, os suum in blasphemias divini nominis aperit, tabernaculum eius et sanctos 
qui in celis habitant similibus impetere iaculis non omittit.” 
 
32 Registres, vol. 3, nos. 5118-5121 [pp. 209-210]: “in eundem modum universis archiepiscopis et episcopis”; “in 




nobles.”33 Gregory and his advisors clearly wished to blanket the continent with as many copies 
of these texts as they could. But how did this actually work in practice? 
A papal letter sent “in the same way” (in eundem modum) to parties other than the main 
recipient was akin to the modern method of “copying” someone on a memo or e-mail. But in an 
era when “copying” additional parties quite literally entailed the physical copying of more 
letters, it is difficult to know how seriously we should take these records in the registers. 
Hundreds—perhaps even thousands—of copies of Sedes apostolica and Ascendit de mari would 
have been required to reach every member of the episcopal hierarchy and every noble in 
Europe.34 The production of a single papal document on that grand a scale was a rarity in the 
Middle Ages, even though the papal chancery increased its output dramatically during the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries.35 By the time of Gregory’s pontificate, the chancery employed 
perhaps as many as 60-70 scribes, although some of those may only have worked in a part-time 
                                                
33 Ibid., nos. 5093 and 5094: “In eundem modum universis archiepiscopis et episcopis, tam exemptis quam aliis,” 
and “In eundem fere modum regibus, ducibus, comitibus et aliis nobilibus.” 
 
34 The phrase “and other nobles” (et aliis nobilibus) is particularly nebulous, because it did not correspond to a 
defined position, such as a kingship, a dukedom, or even a county. In addition to the episcopate, “Ascendit de mari” 
apparently went to a more targeted group of secular officials that included only kings instead of “all nobles.” 
 
35 For the increased output of letters over the course of this period, see Chapter 4, n. 74. It is also important to note a 
distinction between the number of letters and the number of copies of letters that the chancery produced. When 
Richard Southern calculated the increase in chancery output, his estimates were based on the former, but it is more 
difficult to calculate the latter. There were, of course, times in the thirteenth century when the chancery clearly 
produced a large number of copies of a single letter. The most prominent example is Innocent III’s summons to the 
Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, Vineam Domini. See Alberto Melloni, “Vineam Domini—10 April 1213: New 
Efforts and Traditional Topoi—Summoning Lateran IV,” in Pope Innocent III and His World, ed. John C. Moore 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 63-73. I have been unable to locate any concrete information about the production 
costs incurred by the papal chancery. However, Michael Clanchy has come up with similar estimates for the English 
royal chancery in the thirteenth century based on extant accounts. Parchment, it turns out, was relatively 
inexpensive, while ink, sealing wax, and, of course, the labor necessary to produce the documents, cost more. See 





capacity.36 If every chancery scribe was capable of producing three, four, or perhaps even five 
letters every day, as Jane Sayers suggests, it would have taken the chancery about three to four 
days to produce the 620 letters necessary to reach every archbishop and bishop in Christendom 
in the year 1239.37 Even if the number of scribes working at one time was half of Sayers’ 
estimate, the same amount of work could have been accomplished—in theory—in six or seven 
days. But is that what happened with Sedes apostolica and Ascendit de mari? 
 Even if the chancery was able to quickly churn out hundreds of copies of a letter like 
Sedes apostolica or Ascendit de mari, the logistical challenge of sending those copies was still 
great. At the most basic level, the chancery first had to know to whom it was sending these 
single-sheet documents. These letters were intended for “all archbishops and bishops.” It would 
be easy to assume that the papacy—as the head of the institutional Church—had ready access to 
a list of all the archbishops and bishops of Christendom, who, by the first half of the thirteenth 
century were more than 600 in number. However, there is no indication that the bishops of Rome 
possessed such a comprehensive list. In the late twelfth century, the papal chamberlain, Cencio 
(the future Honorius III), had assembled a new financial document—the Liber censuum—that 
                                                
36 The number of scribes who worked in the thirteenth-century papal chancery has been the subject of debate, in part 
because of incomplete information, and in part because the number also seems to have changed over the course of 
the century. According to Sayers, Honorius III (1216-1227) had between 64 and 73 scribes working his chancery. 
Bernard Barbiche, who spent considerable time and energy thinking about the composition of the papal chancery in 
this period, argued that by the pontificate of Boniface VIII (1294-1303) the number was perhaps a near-constant 50. 
The only point of consensus seems to be that the number changed over time. Sayers, Papal Government and 
England, p. 51; Bernard Barbiche, “Diplomatique et histoire sociale: les ‘scriptores’ de la chancellerie apostolique 
au XIIIe siècle,” Annali della scuola speciale per archivisti e bibliotecarii dell’Università di Roma 12 (1973), p.121. 
Both works build on—and, at times, challenge—broader conclusions in Peter Herde, Beiträge zum päpstlichen 
Kanzlei- und Urkundenwesen im dreizehnten Jahrhundert (Kallmünz: M. Lassleben, 1961). 
 
37 This calculation of the number of archiepiscopal and episcopal sees in existence in 1239 is based on a reading of 
Hierarchia Catholica medii aevi, vol. 1: 1198-1431, 2nd ed., ed. Conrad Eubel (Munich: Sumptibus et typis librariae 
Regensbergianae, 1898). I readily acknowledge that my count may be off by a few, but that does not affect the 
overarching point about the scale of the task facing the papal chancery. For the daily output of chancery scribes, see 
the excellent discussion in Sayers, Papal Government and England, pp. 50-52, which synthesizes a large amount of 




recorded similar information, albeit in a form that would not have been terribly helpful to the 
chancery. In an attempt to record census payments owed to the papacy by churches and 
monasteries throughout Europe, Cencio divided the Liber censuum into geographical units 
covering Rome, the suburbican dioceses, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Germany, Spain, Burgundy, 
France, Gascony, England, Dacia, Norway, Sweden, Scotland, Ireland, Sardinia, the Crusader 
states, and Antioch.38 Each section was further broken down into dioceses, but that information 
appears to have been neither comprehensive nor consistently updated. Cencio had left room in 
the manuscript for later additions, but there is almost no indication that this was done in the early 
thirteenth century. This is an important, if somewhat obvious, point, because the number of 
bishops was not static. Canon law (particularly c. 24 of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215) had 
largely standardized the election of bishops, who were, henceforth, almost universally elected by 
the canons of the cathedral chapter.39 But the creation of new dioceses was a more haphazard 
process. In Poland, for example, the king apparently had the power to create new bishoprics in 
pagan territories that came under Christian influence.40 Territories, such as those that were part 
of the Crusader states, were added and lost as time went on. Who was keeping track of which 
dioceses were extant at a particular moment in time? Cencio’s efforts in the Liber censuum, 
although apparently for a different reason, represented one attempt to do just this. But the 
manuscript was hardly the master list that the papal chancery would have needed to copy single-
sheet letters for every member of the episcopate. 
                                                
38 Le liber censuum de l'église romaine, ed. Paul Fabre and L. Duchesne, 5 vols. (Paris: Fontemoing, 1889-1905). 
For the history of the Liber censuum, see Paul Fabre, Étude sur le Liber censuum de l’Église romaine (Paris: E. 
Thorin, 1892); Reinhard Elze, “Der Liber Censuum des Cencius (Cod. Vat. Lat. 8486) von 1192 bis 1228,” Bulletino 
dell’ archivio paleografico Italiano n.s. 2 (1956), pp. 251-270. 
 
39 Colin Morris, The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
pp. 527-529; Decrees, p. 246. 
 
40 Morris, Papal Monarchy, pp. 271-272. 
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 The papacy’s problem of knowing to whom it should address certain letters becomes 
even more troublesome when we consider the institution’s interaction with lay powers. The 
registers indicate that Sedes apostolica, in particular, was also sent to “all kings, dukes, counts, 
and other nobles.” As stated above, the papal chancery may not even have had in its possession a 
firm list of every bishopric in Europe. If that is so, how can we reasonably expect that the pope, 
his advisors, and the members of the papal chancery would have had an authoritative list of 
Europe’s nobility? Reigning monarchs would have been easy enough to document. So too, 
perhaps, the holders of major dukedoms and counties, particularly in countries like England, 
where the number and composition of the earldoms shifted very little over the course of the 
Middle Ages. But the phrase used by Sedes apostolica—“and other nobles” (et aliis nobilibus)—
is remarkably undefined, and could be interpreted to mean a large number of major and minor 
nobles, who might vary in status and influence depending on the region in which they lived. 
 The broader point here is twofold. On the one hand, the effectiveness of letters like Sedes 
apostolica and Ascendit de mari depended entirely on their widespread diffusion. The process of 
communication did not end when the letter reached one of its many recipients. In fact, as 
Gregory made clear in the language of Sedes apostolica, the reception of that letter was then 
meant to initiate another phase of communication in which the original recipients of the letter 
would spread the pope’s message in their various localities. But given the questions raised above, 
was this model actually put into practice? An inherent danger in working with centralized 
administrative documents such as the papal registers is that we begin to believe too strongly in 
the administrative apparatus they seem to portray. Did the papacy truly send copies of Sedes 
apostolica to every archbishop and bishop in Christendom? To every count and noble? The fact 
that the papacy subsequently focused its communicative efforts on targeted individuals suggests 
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that this was probably not so, and that we are too quick to buy into the idea that these papal 
letters circulated universally. 
 The passage of time, and the inevitable loss of manuscript material from the Middle Ages 
makes it difficult to prove one way or the other that letters like Sedes apostolica circulated as 
widely as the papal registers suggest they did.41 At times, however, individual data points 
provide us with at least some way of digging into this thorny issue. Matthew Paris, for example, 
records the full text of Sedes apostolica that was sent to Otto, Gregory’s cardinal legate who was 
then operating in England.42 He also includes the full text of Ascendit de mari, no small feat 
given the length of that text.43 Matthew, of course, “understood the importance of supporting and 
amplifying his narrative with documentary material,” and, as such, surely went in search of such 
material as he composed his chronicle.44 It remains noteworthy that the Chronica majora 
contains a copy of Sedes apostolica, but we would do well not to read too much into this fact. 
Unlike the episcopate or the European nobility, Matthew did not wait for important papal letters 
to land on the doorstep of St. Albans. He looked for important material, and the results of his 
efforts must have been patchy.45 The papacy, like any administrative institution—medieval or 
                                                
41 Determining the circulation of papal letters in the Middle Ages is an incredible thorny task—one that, somewhat 
ironically, may be easier for the period before the pontificate of Innocent III. This fact is largely because of the 
various Papsturkunden and Pontificia projects, which have collected and edited papal documents from the centuries 
before a regular succession of surviving papal registers begins with Innocent III. Cartularies and literary sources 
supplement our source base for understanding the circulation of papal letters, but only inconsistently. In spite of the 
fact that the papacy may be the single most documented institution from the Middle Ages, studies of the papacy—
the present study included—continue to wrestle with this important issue. 
 
42 Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. H.R. Luard, vol. 3, Rolls Series (London: Longman, 1876), pp. 569-573. 
 
43 Ibid., pp. 590-608. 
 
44 Richard Vaughan, Matthew Paris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 126. 
 
45 For example, while Matthew records that Gregory IX’s decision to call a general council in 1240, he does not 
include the text of the summons, Eterna providentia, indicating that he may never have seen it. Matthew Paris, 
Chronica majora, vol. 4, p. 30. 
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modern—would never have accomplished anything if those who bore responsibility for 
implementing its commands had to look for its directives. Literary sources like Matthew Paris’s 
Chornica majora, then, must be treated with particular care. As noteworthy as it is that important 
papal letters made their way into such texts, it is equally noteworthy that Jane Sayers has 
recorded no extant original copies of Sedes apostolica in any repository of medieval manuscripts 
in England.46 
Sidestepping for a moment the question of whether Sedes apostolica and Ascendit de 
mari circulated as widely as the papal chancery recorded, it is important to make a few 
observations about Gregory’s general approach to disseminating ideas. The papacy’s reliance on 
the episcopate and Europe’s secular rulers meant that its communication strategy depended on 
the top-down flow of information. What is less commonly understood, however, is that 
geography played a key role in shaping how this model of communication worked in practice. 
The ecclesiastical province was, by and large, a geographically delineated space made up of 
smaller geographical administrative units: the dioceses under the jurisdiction of that province. By 
the thirteenth century, these units—as the papal registers show—had taken on a national 
character. So, for example, Gregory sent letters to the bishops of France or the bishops of 
England. This meant that the Church’s natural administrative hierarchy was being mapped onto 
geographical regions and even secular political units. Communicating through this hierarchical 
superstructure was a logical means of disseminating and, where necessary, collecting 
information. But in the preceding chapter of this study, we saw how a similar model of 
                                                
 
46 Jane Sayers, Original Papal Documents in England and Wales from the Accession of Pope Innocent III to the 
Death of Pope Benedict XI, 1198-1304 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Given the amount of material that 
has been lost from the Middle Ages, it might come as no surprise that no copy of Sedes apostolica has survived from 
England. But this evidence should at least raise questions about the circulation of such a letter to all members of the 




communication—built upon regular provincial and diocesan synods—could break down in 
various ways.47 Given this, it made sense for the papacy to make use of other tools when 
spreading its message. By 1239 the major monastic orders had been undergoing a gradual 
process of institutionalization for some time, and they had served the papacy in the past, 
particularly when preaching the Crusades in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.48 The 
mendicant orders, however, remained a relatively new phenomenon in Christendom.49 And yet 
only a few years after their establishment and organization, they were to take their place in the 
service of the papacy.50 This development was of particular importance to the papacy because 
the mendicants attempted (and were able) to create an institutional organization that was parallel 
to, but separate from, the traditional ecclesiastical hierarchy of the episcopate.51 In 1239 the 
burden of Gregory’s communication strategy still fell squarely on the shoulders of his bishops, 
                                                
47 See Chapter 4. 
 
48 The papacy’s use of the religious orders in the broader effort to preach the crusade and spread crusade 
propaganda is well documented in the historical literature. Useful overviews of this process include Jean Flori, 
Prêcher la croisade: XIe-XIIIe siècle: communication et propagande (Paris: Perrin, 2012); Norman Housley, 
Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), chapter 2; Jonathan 
Phillips, The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 
chapters 4 and 5. 
49 For the early history of the mendicant orders in the thirteenth century, including the clericalization and 
institutionalization of both orders, see C.H. Lawrence, The Friars: The Impact of the Mendicant Orders on Medieval 
Society (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), chapters 2-4; William A. Hinnebusch, The History of the Dominican Order: 
Origins and Growth to 1500, vol. 1 (Staten Island: Alba House, 1966), chapters 1-3, 6-10; John T. Moorman, A 
History of the Franciscan Order: From Its Origins to the Year 1517 (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1988), parts 
1 and 2, particularly chapters 6, 8, and 15; Neslihan Senocak, The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the 
Franciscan Order, 1209-1310 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). 
 
50 Lawrence, The Friars, pp. 185-188; Christoph T. Maier, Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the 
Cross in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For the mechanics of mendicant 
preaching in the thirteenth century, see Louis Jacques Bataillon, La Predication au XIIIe siècle en France et Italie: 
études et documents (Aldershot: Variorum, 1993); David L. d’Avray, The Preaching of the Friars: Sermons 
Diffused from Paris before 1300 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). 
 
51 Hans-Joachim Schmidt, “Establishing an Alternative Territorial Pattern: The Provinces of the Mendicant Orders,” 
in Franciscan Organization in the Mendicant Context: Formal and Informal Structures of the Friars’ Lives and 
Ministry in the Middle Ages, ed. Michael Robson and Jens Röhrkasten (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010), pp. 1-17. 
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but the networks of the monastic orders and the mendicants expanded his reach by a considerable 
margin. 
 In the first few months of his renewed conflict with Frederick II, Gregory IX’s attempt to 
undercut the emperor’s support depended almost entirely on communicative mechanisms 
traditionally available to the papacy. The pope used letters to convey the news of Frederick’s 
excommunication to the members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and to secular rulers and nobles, 
who in turn bore responsibility for spreading that news in the various corners of Christendom. 
Whether this strategy proved effective is harder to gauge. Given that Gregory sent out several 
waves of letters, eventually targeting certain individual and constituencies with greater urgency, 
it seems likely that the pope and his advisors had doubts about the effectiveness of their first 
salvo. One thing, however, is clear: in the months after Gregory excommunicated Frederick, the 
emperor’s political position waxed, while the papacy’s waned. “If Christendom was impressed” 
by the news of Frederick’s excommunication or the flowery language of Ascendit de mari, John 
Watt concludes, “it was not sufficiently moved to intervene decisively on one side or the 
other.”52 Imperial armies continued to push into papal territory. Propaganda, it seems, could not 
stem the tide of raw military power. 
The Council That Never Was—Gregory IX’s War of Action: 
 If Gregory and his advisors had any hope that the excommunication of Frederick would 
bring about a speedy end to the conflict between empire and papacy, the year that followed 
dashed those hopes on the rocks of political realism. Frederick proved every bit the tenacious 
political opponent that Gregory had thought when his chancery issued Sedes apostolica in April 
                                                
52 John A. Watt, “The Papacy,” in The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 5: c. 1198-1300, ed. David Abulafia 




1239. The political and military might of Frederick’s dual kingdoms of Germany and Sicily 
continued to press the Papal State from both sides, but particularly from the north. By the time 
the papal court settled in the small Italian commune of Grottaferrata, Gregory found himself 
under increasing pressure.53 Drastic action was needed, and the pope now decided to deploy one 
of the most potent political and communicative weapons in his arsenal: a general council. That 
Gregory decided on this course of action in an effort to undercut Frederick’s support should 
come as little surprise. Councils, as we have seen, were a traditional mechanism of papal 
authority that had proven effective for the papacy in past political disputes.54 A council brought 
together members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy (and sometimes others); it served as a means of 
collecting and processing information from distant lands; and, if properly implemented, it could 
be a tool for disseminating papal decisions, because those who attended could carry information 
back to their home regions. Even though a council was also an opportunity for 
miscommunication—as we saw in the previous chapter on the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215—
Gregory now hoped that such a communicative tool would breathe new life into his cause and 
encourage Europe’s ecclesiastical and secular rulers to work against the emperor with greater 
vigor.55 In this case, however, the papacy’s decision to call a council is in some ways less 
interesting than the way it went about doing so. The Council of Rome, as it was to become 
known, never actually met as Gregory hoped. But in its planning—and, indeed, its failure—the 
papacy showed that, as an institution, it had begun to think in new and creative ways about 
                                                
53 For a summary of the main political events between Frederick’s excommunication and Gregory’s decision to call 
a general council, see Van Cleve, Emperor Frederick II, pp. 432-448. 
 
54 See the discussions of the Council of Reims (1119) and the Council of Tours (1163) in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
55 The principal argument of Chapter 4, of course, is that this process was fraught with the potential for 
miscommunication. However, in spite of that fact, the council remained—in theory—an excellent means of 




communicating ideas to a broader public, even if the harsh realities of contemporary politics 
prevented those ideas from coming to fruition.  
 Reading entries in the papal registers from August 9, 1240, it is impossible to escape the 
conclusion that something had changed in the way that the papacy was approaching the task of 
communicating and implementing policy. These are the entries for the 212 letters that the 
chancery produced during Gregory IX’s stay at Grottaferrata: 153 copies of Eterna providentia; 
10 copies of Super bases; and 49 copies of Cum graves.56 All three letters exhorted their 
recipients—whether clerics, kings, or nobles—to attend the forthcoming Council of Rome in 
person or to send delegated agents or nuncios in their stead. Yet it is not the dry chancery prose 
of each of these letters that captures one’s attention, but rather the layout and organization of 
these letters in the register itself. Under the broad heading, “First Convocation of the Council,” 
two folios of parchment are divided into six geographical subunits: France and Provence; 
England and Scotland; Germany, Poland, and Dacia; Hungary; Spain; and Lombardy, the March 
of Treviso, and the Romagna.57 Within each subunit are the texts (or abbreviated texts) of the 
three papal letters listed above, along with a list of the recipients of each of those letters, 
classified by office or status. The section for France and Provence serves as a convenient 
example of this organization [See Figure 1]. Eterna providentia was sent to twelve French 
archbishops; fifteen bishops; seventeen cathedral chapters, including the general chapter of the 
Cistercians; the abbots of six major monasteries; and one Brother William of the Carthusian 
                                                
56 ASV Reg. 20, ff. 48r-49v; These entries are reproduced with a remarkably similar layout in Registres, vol. 3, nos. 






Order.58 Super bases was sent to Louis IX, the king of France.59 And Cum graves went to the 
counts of Flanders, Brittany, Provence, and Savoy.60 The five remaining geographical subunits 
display a similar distribution of the three letters, with minor variations here and there. Generally, 
Eterna providentia went to members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy; Super bases went to kings; 
and Cum graves went to other members of the nobility. 
 The register entries for Gregory IX’s summons to the Council of Rome display a subtle, 
but important, shift in the way that the papacy conceptualized the process of communicating 
ideas and, by extension, implementing policy. The process of sending the text of a single letter to 
a list of archbishops and bishops—or, indeed, to even to a broader audience, such as the “all 
clerics” or “the Christian faithful”—was neither new nor particularly uncommon for the papal 
chancery in the Middle Ages. Papal election encyclicals, crusade bulls, and even the summons to 
the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 seem to have circulated widely—as the papal chancery no 
doubt intended.61 But never before had the papal chancery laid out in such a systematic way how 
it intended to circulate one or more papal letters.62 Something was changing. For one, Gregory 
IX’s chancery had begun to think in terms of specific communicative units based on geography. 
                                                
58 Ibid., nos. 5420-5471 [pp. 389-39]. Eterna providentia went to the archbishops of Sens, Tours, Reims, Lyons, 
Bourdeaux, Vienne, Auch, Besançon, Embrun, Rouen, Berry, and Arles; the bishops of Paris, Chartres, Lisieux, Le 
Mans, Orléans, Beauvais, Cambrai, Clermont, Nîmes, Béziers, Le Puy-en-Velay, Agen, Poitiers, Carcassonne, and 
Toulouse; the chapters of Tours, Rouen, Reims, Lyons, Vienne, Besançon, Berry, Embrun, Auch, Paris, Chartres, 
Orléans, Le Mans, Lisieux, Le Puy-en-Velay, Clermont, and the general chapter of the Cistercians; the abbots of 
Prémontré, Cluny, Compiègne, Fécamp, Saint-Denis, and Brother William of the Carthusians. 
 
59 Ibid., no. 5472 [pp. 391-392]. 
 
60 Ibid., nos. 5473-5476 [p. 392]. 
 
61 See the discussion of Alexander III’s election encyclical, Aeterna et incommutabilis, in Chapter 3. 
 
62 To my knowledge, this statement is true based on an examination of the papal registers from the first half of the 
thirteenth century. Of course, we do not know exactly what papal registers looked like in earlier periods, particularly 
for the formative twelfth century, when the papal chancery expanded significantly. However, the papacy—like many 
medieval institutions—was deeply bound by tradition, and it is difficult to imagine that an organizational innovation 
such as that described above would have been adopted and then abandoned in the thirteenth century. 
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The rubrics in the margins of the register manuscript indicated specific regions of Europe defined 
by geography rather than political leadership (e.g. the kingdom of France) or even national 
character (e.g. French clerics). Within each of these geographical units, the chancery recorded 
addressees hierarchically, grouping together individuals with similar offices or of similar 
statuses. It is also worth noting that the chancery targeted different constituencies by crafting 
three similar, but ultimately different, letters: one for members of the Church hierarchy; one for 
ruling princes; and one for other nobles. The papacy was tailoring its summons to different 





Figure 1: The first entry in Gregory IX’s register for August 9, 1240. The rubricated heading for 
“France and Provence” is in the top left-hand corner of the folio. The text of Aeterna providentia 
appears at the top of the page, followed by the list of copied recipients in hierarchical order: 
archbishops, bishops, cathedral chapters, and monastic houses. Archivio Segreto Vaticano, 
Registra Vaticana 20, f. 48r. 
 
 Conceptualizing new communicative units was all well and good, but did the shift that 
we see in Gregory’s registers have a practical purpose? In fact, it seems that it did. Breaking 
from the tradition of sending letters to “to all archbishops and bishops” or “all kings, dukes, 
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counts, and other nobles”—which, as we have seen, may not have occurred uniformly in 
practice—the new method on display in Gregory’s register suggests that the chancery was, in 
fact, sending individual copies to each of the listed recipients. The list of archbishops, bishops, 
dukes, and counts is a targeted, not a comprehensive, list.63 It is difficult to know why papal 
records would list these specific individuals and office-holders if they had not been intended as 
recipients of Gregory’s letters. Additionally, there is strong evidence that someone at the papal 
court—whether the pope, his advisors, or the chancery scribes themselves—was using the 
register entries to determine with whom they were allowed to communicate. In the margins of 
the manuscript, next to the list of archiepiscopal and episcopal recipients in Germany, a papal 
scribe noted that several of the listed individuals had been excommunicated. These included the 
patriarch of Aquileia, the archbishops of Salzburg, Mainz, Trier, and Cologne, and the bishops of 
Passau and Freising [Figure 2].64 Dating this marginal note with precision is difficult, but it was 
certainly unplanned and probably done after the rest of the register entries for August 9, 1240 
had been laid out on the page. Regardless of the precise date, the mere fact that this note exists 
suggests an active engagement with the register manuscript. The papacy’s record of its outgoing 
correspondence had been updated to list those who were, quite literally, cut off from further 
communication. Clearly, someone at the papal court was using this information. 
                                                
63 A careful examination of the list of addressees in the registers shows that the chancery’s list was targeted, rather 
than a comprehensive. In 1240, for example, the archdiocese of Canterbury in England had seventeen suffragan 
bishops: Asaph, Bangor, Bath, Chichester, St. David’s, Ely, Exeter, Hereford, Lichfield, Lincoln, Llandaf, London, 
Norwich, Rochester, Salisbury, Winchester, and Worcester. However, the records in the papal registers indicate that 
only six of these suffragan bishops of Canterbury were slated to receive copies of Eterna providentia: Chichester, 
Ely, Exter, Lincoln, Norwich, and Worcester. 
 





Figure 2: The marginal notation next to the register entries for Germany on August 9, 1240. 
Here, the scribe has noted that the patriarch of Aquileia, the archbishops of Salzburg, Mainz, 
Trier, and Cologne, and the bishops of Passau and Freising have been excommunicated 
(excommunicati). Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Registra Vaticana 20, f. 48v. 
 
 Underpinning these technical details of papal manuscript production and recordkeeping 
was a new way of thinking about communication. For whatever reason—the need to organize the 
increasingly complex task of disseminating letters or the failure of past attempts to do so—the 
papal chancery, as implementer of the pope’s will, had mapped out a clear communication 
strategy right on the folios of Gregory’s parchment register. Various communication strategies 
that we have seen in the pages of the present study were coming together in a more coherent 
way. Even as he relied on the traditional mechanisms of communication available to him at the 
time, Gregory thought about geography; he used the episcopate; and he tapped into monastic 
networks and organizations of preachers that worked outside of the traditional Church hierarchy. 
Perhaps most striking of all, the pope and the chancery felt the need to record this information. 
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Gregory’s register presents a remarkable model of how papal communication was to work in 
theory. But did this model work in practice? 
 Most of the available evidence suggests that Gregory’s summons to the Council of Rome 
did, in fact, circulate widely. Yet we know this not from the survival of original copies of the 
letters but from documentary and chronicle evidence that describes the response to Gregory’s 
call. Only one month after the papal chancery issued copies of the summons, the emperor put 
into motion his own plan to stop clerics from attending the council. In a lengthy encyclical, sent 
to the princes of the empire and even the king of England, Frederick explained in strident 
language his objection to the forthcoming council. Then, undoubtedly sensing the threat that 
Gregory’s action could pose to his authority and political position within Europe, the emperor 
urged action. “To those called to the council,” he concluded, “we deny any kind of safety, for 
people or possessions, through territory subject to our authority.”65 Shortly thereafter, Frederick 
sent out another imperial encyclical with more explicit instructions. “We command,” the 
emperor wrote, “enjoining you under penalty of our favor and perpetual imperial ban, that you 
should obstruct, disrupt, and detain in every way all prelates, archbishops, bishops, abbots, 
priors, and deans and ministers of any order crossing through your land to travel to the Roman 
curia, or if they will have wished to cross by land or sea, privately or publicly, completely 
denying to them safe passage by land or sea.”66 Somewhere, the ghosts of William the 
Conqueror and Henry I of England were laughing. During papal efforts to arbitrate the primacy 
                                                
65 Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, vol. 2, ed. L. Weiland, MGH Constitutiones (Hanover: 
Hahn, 1896), no. 233 [p. 320]: “sed omnibus ad concilium evocatis per terram nostre dicioni subiectam in personis 
et rebus securitatem quamlibet denegamus.” 
 
66 Ibid., no. 234 [pp. 321-322]: “mandamus sub pena gratie nostre et perpetuo banno imperii firmiter iniungentes, 
quatinus omnes prelatos, archiepiscopos, episcopos, abbates atque priores et cuiuslibet ordinis prepositos ac 
ministros per vos ituros ad Romanam curiam transeuntes, sive mari vel terra, privatim vel publice transire voluerint, 
passagium tam per mare quam per terram eis penitus denegantes.” 
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dispute between Canterbury and York, both English monarchs had worked diligently to prevent 
the physical movement of clerics, which in turn impeded the papacy’s ability to bring about a 
resolution to the case. Now, more than a century later, Frederick II adopted a similar course of 
action. He could not prevent Gregory from calling a general council of the Church. But if he 
could prevent Europe’s clerics from attending that council and consulting with the pope in 
person, he could slow, perhaps even cripple, Gregory’s offensive. 
 Back in Rome, concern spread through the ranks of the papal Curia. Had Eterna 
providentia reached its intended recipients? Had these clerics heard of the emperor’s threats? If 
so, would they risk Frederick’s wrath and make the journey to Rome? Gregory and his advisors 
seemed to have had doubts. On October 15 of the same year, the papal chancery issued 231 
copies of three new summonses to the council. Remarkably, the register entries for those letters 
follow almost exactly the same pattern as those for the first wave of letters announcing the 
council. Once again, the chancery scribes laid out the records by geographic region, this time 
adding a new subunit: Tuscany, the March of Ancona, the Duchy of Spoleto, and Campania, 
areas that largely fell under direct papal jurisdiction as part of the Papal State.67 The chancery 
also added Norway to the subunit that already included Germany, Poland, and Dacia.68 And, 
once more, the papal scribes drafted three different letters, each almost exclusively for a separate 
audience. Petri navicula went to members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy; Dux exercitus went to 
kings; and Nuper considerantes went to nobles of various ranks. Furthermore, the distribution of 
these letters across region and type of individual or office-holder is almost identical to that of the 
first wave of summonses for the council [Figure 3]. 
                                                
67 ASV Reg. 20, ff. 49v-51v; These entries are reproduced, as with the entries for the first convocation of the 
council, with a very similar layout in Registres, vol. 3, nos. 5635-5885 [pp. 403-418]. 
 
68 ASV Reg. 20, f. 51r. 
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bases Cum graves 
France and Provence 51 1 4 
England and Scotland 16 9 0 
Germany, Poland, and Dacia 21 0 26 
Hungary 11 0 0 
Spain 15 0 0 
Lombardy, March, and Romagna 39 0 19 





exercitus Nuper considerantes 
France and Provence 51 1 4 
England and Scotland 17 9 0 
Germany, Poland, Davia, and 
Norway 21 0 26 
Hungary 11 0 0 
Spain 15 0 0 
Lombardy, Treviso, and 
Romagna 32 0 19 
Tuscany, Ancona, Spoleto, and 
Campania 25 0 0 
 
Figure 3: The distribution of papal letters for the first (August 9, 1240) and second (October 15, 
1240) convocations of Gregory IX’s proposed Council of Rome. While the entries for the second 
convocation add Tuscany, the March of Ancona, the Duchy of Spoleto, and Campania, the 
distribution of letters across geographic subunits for both convocations is virtually identical. 
 
 By the time he issued his second summons to the Council of Rome, Gregory had also 
come to realize the importance of aiding the physical movement of the invited prelates. On 
October 13, his chancery issued four copies of Nuper pro, which directed its recipients to arrange 
“a certain number of galleys and ships, in which prelates and others coming to the council may 
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be conveyed securely to the Apostolic See.”69 Gregory addressed copies of this letter to the 
nobles and people of Genoa, and then to three legates operating in the general region of that 
same city: Gregory de Romania, papal subdeacon; Giacomo Pecoraria, cardinal bishop of 
Palestrina; and Otto Candidus, cardinal deacon of St. Nicholas.70 To facilitate the process of 
acquiring galleys and ships, the pope sent a special agent, Brother Nicholas of the Cistercian 
Order, who served double-duty as the messenger for Nuper pro.71 
 Gregory was right to be concerned about the ability of prelates to travel safely to Rome. 
Although the pope had exhorted—twice!—Europe’s ecclesiastical and secular leaders to attend 
the forthcoming council, and he had now taken direct action to bolster attendance, Frederick had 
a trump card: military power. In one of the more interesting, and bizarre, episodes from the 
protracted conflict between empire and papacy, Frederick made good on his word to prevent 
clerics from traveling to the Eternal City. On May 3, 1241, a convoy of Genoese ships carrying 
clerics to Rome was ambushed, defeated, and captured by imperial naval forces under 
Frederick’s deputy, Admiral Ansaldus de Mari.72 The defeat severely damaged Gregory’s plans 
for the council. A week later, the aged pope, already worn by his conflict with Frederick, 
received a letter that surely left him angry and demoralized. Seven members of the episocpate, 
                                                
69 Registres, vol. 3, no. 5918 [p. 427]: “quod tantum numerum galearum et navium, in quibus prelatos et alios ad 
ipsum concilium venientes, secure ad Sedem Apostolicam deferendos.” 
 
70 Ibid., nos. 5918-5921 [pp. 427-429]. For additional information on Gregory, Giacomo, and Otto, see 
Zimmermann, Die päpstliche Legation, pp. 111-113, 132-133. 
 
71 Registres, vol. 3, no. 5918 [p. 427]. Nicholas was described the “bearer of the present letters” (lator presentium), 
which is precisely how papal letters had described messengers during the pontificate of Alexander III. See Chapter 
3. What is unclear from the description in Nuper pro is whether Nicholas bore four individual copies of the letter for 
each of the addresses, or whether he carried one copy that would be read out for each party. Sadly, there is no way to 
answer this question, but doing so would do much to help us understand the relationship between oral and written 
communication in this period. 
 




all of whom were now in Frederick’s custody in Genoa, conveyed the sorry news.73 “Grieving,” 
the letter began, 
we report, and we suffer too much to be conveyed, that we, along with our brothers 
in Christ, the archbishops of Rouen, Bordeaux, Auch, and Besançon, the bishops of 
Carcassonne, Agen, Nîmes, Tortona, Asti, Pavia, and the noble Romeus, procurator 
and nuncio of the illustrious count of Provence, and many other prelates and 
procurators of our and other dioceses and provinces, along with the venerable fathers 
and lords Giacomo, bishop of Palestrina, cardinal Otto, and Gregory de Romania, 
legates of the Apostolic See, struggled to journey to you out of obedience and 
devotion, according to the contents of your letters, having disregarded and scorned 
difficulties, terrors, and dangers.74 
 
Although Gregory had little to celebrate when they received this report from his captured 
bishops, the details of the letter prove that the model of communication laid out in the pope’s 
register was viable. The authors specifically cited Gregory’s summonses to the council (iuxta 
vestrarum continentiam litterarum). But even more remarkable is the fact that all but one (15 out 
of 16) of the bishops who appeared in the letter from May 10 had specifically been named on the 
list of recipients of Eterna providentia and Petri navicula.75 The system had worked. Gregory’s 
letters had reached their destination and, more importantly, the recipients of those letters had 
                                                
73 The seven authors of the letter included the archbishops of Arles and Tarragona, the bishops of Astorga, Ourense, 
Salamanca, Porto, and Plascencia. Registres, vol. 3, no. 6030 [p. 509]. 
 
74 Ibid., no. 6030 [pp. 509-510]: “Dolentes referimus, et referendo nimium condolemus, quod, cum nos et 
venerabiles in Christo patres Rothomagensis, Burdegalensis, Auxitanus, Bisuntinus archiepiscopi, Carcasonensis, 
Agathensis, Neumasensis, Terdonensi, Astensis et Papiensis episcopi, et nobilis Romeus, procurator et nuntius 
ilustris comitis Provincie, ac quamplures alii prelati et procuratores nostrarum et aliarum diocesum ac provinciarum, 
cum venerabilibus patribus atque dominis Jacobo, episcopo Penestrino, Otone cardinali et Gregorio de Romania, 
Apostolice Sedis legatis, ad Vestre Sanctitatis presentiam in obedientia et devotione accedere, juxta vestrarum 
continentiam litterarum, spretis sive postpositis quibuslibet difficultatibus, terroribus et periculis, niteremur.” For the 
purposes of translating this passage, which continues into a lengthy description of the naval battle itself, I have 
translated the subjunctive clause (“quod, cum nos…niteremur”) in the indicative. 
 
75 Cf. ibid., no. 6030, pp. 509-510; ibid., nos. 5424, 5426, 5427, 5429, 5431, 5440, 5443, 5445, 5563, 5566, 5567, 
5589, 5592, 5597, 5610, 5638, 5640, 5641, 5643, 5645, 5634, 5637, 5639, 5777, 5779, 5780, 5781, 5796, 5800, 
5805, and 5817. There may be a very good reason for the one discrepancy on the list. One of the co-authors of the 
bishops’ report was the bishop of Porto, whose name does not appear in the entries in Gregory’s register. However, 
the bishop of Porto was a suffragan of the archbishop of Braga, who was among the recipients of Eterna providentia 
and Petri navicula, as was the king of Portugal. Ibid., nos. 5564, 5574, 5778, and 5788. 
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then acted on the pope’s commands by attempting the journey to Rome. And yet, in spite of this 
remarkable achievement in communication, the result was not what Gregory had wanted. The 
pope’s word had been brought to those in the far corners of Christendom. His bishops had 
responded. And yet Frederick’s political organization and military might had turned what should 
have been a great victory into a stunning defeat. The emperor had closed off the political space 
that Gregory needed in order for his communication strategy to work in its entirety. Yes, the 
papacy’s communication strategy had gotten Gregory’s message to his bishops. But in this 
important moment, nothing had come of it. The Council of Rome never convened, and three 
months later Gregory was dead, bequeathing the conflict with Frederick to his successors, 
Celestine IV (October-November 1241), and, in particular, Innocent IV (1243-54). 
Conclusion: 
 Gregory IX’s plans for the Council of Rome in 1240 demonstrate in powerful ways how 
far the papacy had come since the primacy dispute between Canterbury and York at the turn of 
the twelfth century. Throughout his conflict with Frederick II, Gregory made use of all of the 
traditional mechanisms of papal communication: letters, delegated agents, and (albeit in an 
aborted fashion) a council. He used these various communicative tools in an integrated way, 
supplementing one with others while simultaneously tapping into networks that spanned the 
European continent and existed outside of the traditional hierarchy of the episcopate. In his 
register, we can begin to see the emergence of a coherent communication strategy based not only 
on monastic networks and the hierarchy of Church offices, but also on a new conception of 
geographically defined communicative units. Although many challenges accompanied the 
process of administrative communication in this era, the papacy had begun to internalize the 
need for effective ways to collect information and disseminate ideas and decisions. 
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 And yet, in spite of the strides taken by the papacy in the first half of the thirteenth 
century, challenges remained. Even when the pope’s will was conveyed to the far corners of 
Christendom, powerful forces could still disrupt—even doom—the translation of that will into 
concrete action. In the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, popes such as Alexander II, 
Paschal II, and even Calixtus II had been frustrated consistently by their own inability to control 
how and when people moved around the continent. This proved a thorny problem then, and, 
more than a century later, it remained a problem for Gregory. Even though his letters and his 
message had spread widely and, it seems, rapidly throughout Europe, the pope could not create a 
political space that facilitated the movement of key individuals whose support and guidance he 
needed to implement policy. This remained the great failure of the papacy’s communication 
system in the Middle Ages. Popes such as Gregory IX had learned a great deal. But without other 






 On December 12, 2012, nearly eight centuries after the last events described in the 
preceding pages, the 264th successor of St. Peter, Pope Benedict XVI, sent a message to millions 
of people around the globe with the press of a button.1 “Dear friends,” the message read, “I am 
pleased to get in touch with you through Twitter. Thank you for your generous response. I bless 
all of you from my heart.”2 The vehicle for Benedict’s message was a new communications 
platform called Twitter, an Internet-based networking service that allows users to share messages 
up to 140 characters in length with anyone to whom they are connected.3 Founded six years 
earlier by four entrepreneurs based in San Francisco, California, Twitter had spread around the 
globe like wildfire, thanks in part to a generation’s collective enthusiasm for new social media 
platforms that have allowed individuals and groups thousands of miles away from one another to 
share thoughts, pictures, and news in a matter of seconds. Now, the papacy—one of world’s 
oldest continually functioning institutions—was hopping on the social media bandwagon. 
 The image of the 85-year-old Benedict XVI typing out a Twitter message on a computer 
undoubtedly struck some contemporary observers as odd. But, in fact, the pope’s action was only 
the logical next step in a centuries-old tradition of experimenting with new ways to reach and 
influence the Christian faithful. “This is not a new approach,” argued Cardinal Gianfranco 
Ravasi, head of the Pontifical Council for Culture and a longtime supporter of new 
                                                
1 Stephan Faris, “The Pope Tweets with You: Benedict XVI Joins the Twitterverse,” Time, December 12, 2012. 





3 For a succinct overview of Twitter’s basic functions, see Elia Ben-Ari, “Twitter: What’s All the Chirping About?” 
BioScience 59 (2009), p. 632. 
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communications media. “What’s new,” he concluded of Benedict’s move to embrace Twitter, “is 
the technique.”4 
 The popes whose stories are told in the preceding chapters surely would have envied 
Benedict’s chance to harness the power of an entirely new communications medium. Between 
the years 1050 and 1250, the communicative tools available to the bishops of Rome were, in 
many ways, surprisingly few in number. Letters, delegated agents, face-to-face meetings, and 
councils formed the backbone of the papacy’s communicative arsenal as it sought to implement 
policy throughout the European continent and beyond. The tools did not change much over these 
two centuries—a period traditionally seen by scholars as the apogee of the papacy’s power and 
prestige—but the strategies for using them did. One of the dominant themes of this study has 
been the papacy’s gradual—but noticeable—experimentation with new ways to make its will felt 
in localities throughout Christendom. From Calixtus II to Gregory IX, the bishops of Rome used 
the tools that were available to them in new, interesting, and more systematic ways. Change 
occurred slowly, but it occurred nonetheless. 
At the turn of the twelfth century, the papacy struggled mightily to find a communication 
strategy that would enable it to end the tortuous primacy dispute between the archdioceses of 
Canterbury and York. After years of failure on the part of several popes, Calixtus II eventually 
discovered a way to systemetize the papacy’s use of letters, legates, face-to-face meetings, and 
the Council of Reims in order to bring about the institution’s desired end result. But even when 
the papacy finally resolved the dispute, it could hardly look back on the preceding six decades 
with any feeling of satisfaction. In spite of the strident claims to power that Gregory VII had 
articulated in the Dictatus Papae, the bishops of Rome still found themselves thwarted time and 
                                                
4 Quoted in Faris, “The Pope Tweets with You.” 
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time again by an English monarchy that proved remarkably adept at disrupting their 
communication channels. Until the final stage of the conflict, the papacy’s communicative tools 
routinely failed to produce desired results. Papal letters went unheeded and were often 
contradictory. Legates could not gain any traction. And the Council of Winchester failed in its 
one task: the resolution of the dispute. Of course, the primacy dispute was a thorny political 
problem, whose contours shifted as rapidly as the ever-changing cast of characters involved. But 
despite this fact, it is important to remember that the dispute was only one of many matters 
facing the papacy at the time—and in only one area of Europe. The primacy dispute, difficult 
though it may have been, paled in comparison to the communicative challenges that would 
appear on the papacy’s doorstep in the years ahead. If the papacy could not solve this problem, 
how could it be expected to deal with more complicated matters? 
Half a century after Calixtus II and his immediate successors finally brought about a 
resolution to the primacy dispute, the papal schism of 1159 forced another pope—Alexander 
III—to grapple with a much larger and more complex problem of communication. Cut off from 
parts of Europe and on the run for most of the period 1159 to 1164, the pope had to find ways to 
convince Europe’s ecclesiastical and secular elite of his legitimate authority. This he did by 
cultivating ecclesiastical networks that enabled him to communicate with key players on the 
European stage. Such a strategy was innovative and, ultimately, remarkably successful. By 
tapping into these networks, Alexander put a unique twist on the papacy’s use of delegated 
authority while simultaneously expanding the communicative reach of his letters and agents. 
Legates sent out from the papal Curia were still one of the tools available to popes, but 
Alexander saw a crucial opportunity to supplement the papacy’s use of legates, and he was quick 
to take advantage of it. 
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And yet, even while Alexander’s story shows the papacy experimenting with new 
communicative strategies, it is not one of complete triumph. Looking back on Alexander’s 
strategy, it is easy to see the pope as a kind of puppet-master, manipulating key allies to do his 
bidding. That vision, however, would be remarkably inaccurate. It is, of course, impressive that 
Alexander recognized how Eberhard of Salzburg, Henry of Reims, and Arnulf of Lisieux could 
aid his cause. But it is equally important to consider what would have occurred if one—or all—
of these key allies had abandoned his cause. Would he have found replacements or new networks 
whose power he could harness? Perhaps, but then again, perhaps not. Alexander exhibited real 
creativity as he navigated the papal schism, and he found new ways to expand upon the 
communicative tools that his predecessors had used during the primacy dispute. But his 
continued reliance on intermediaries to implement his will also revealed the remarkable degree 
to which papal authority was based on the cooperation of powerful individuals in the far corners 
of Christendom. 
Did Innocent III ponder Alexander III’s successes and failures as he tackled a similarly 
large-scale problem of communication, the reform of Christian society, at the Fourth Lateran 
Council of 1215? We will never know for certain, but there can be little doubt that under his 
leadership the papacy moved to institutionalize a series of communicative processes that would 
help it to implement policy. Historians of the Middle Ages often have viewed Innocent as the 
high priest of ecclesiastical centralization, and his strategy for communicating and implementing 
the reforms of the Fourth Lateran Council seems to support this view. Innocent’s attempt to use 
councils on a continental scale was innovative, brilliant, and remarkably elegant on a conceptual 
level. It combined two communicative tools that the papacy had used before—councils and 
delegated agents (this time in the form of members of the episcopate)—in an effort to reform 
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Christian society. And yet, even this innovative communication strategy could not overcome the 
maddening tendency of bishops to ignore the pope’s will. How could an institution such the 
papacy effectively communicate a complex series of reforms when its principal agents on the 
ground, the bishops, would not follow Innocent’s plan? As Honorius III discovered all too well, 
the answer was simple: without additional tools, it couldn’t. During Honorius’ decade-long 
pontificate, the papacy’s innovative communication strategy based on regular synods fell apart, 
and the institution’s other tools of communication—letters and legates—could not compensate 
fully. Even though the papacy was using its communicative arsensal in a much more systematic 
way than it had in the early twelfth century, and even during the schism of 1159, there were still 
problems to overcome. 
A quarter-century after the Fourth Lateran Council convened in Rome, Gregory IX, like 
Calixtus II, Alexander III, and Innocent III before him, displayed a willingness to innovate in the 
realm of communication. Yes, he used the traditional mechanisms of papal communication in his 
titanic struggle with Emperor Frederick II. But the pope went further, articulating a remarkably 
creative communication strategy that was just as brilliant on parchment as Innocent III’s plan for 
regular provincial and diocesan synods. This strategy sought to systematize the sending of papal 
letters towards the larger aim of convening a council, which was, as we have seen on many 
occasions, an important communicative tool in and of itself. The trouble for the papacy, as in 
years past, was not planning but implementation. By the time Gregory squared off with Frederick 
II, the papacy seems to have internalized the necessity of effective communication. And yet it 
still struggled to put its plans into motion. The aborted plans for the Council of Rome in 1240 
laid bare what Gregory’s predecessors had come to realize nearly a century and a half earlier 
during the primacy dispute: there were times when even the most elaborate of communicative 
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plans could not overcome secular power. The papacy’s plan for summoning clerics to the 
Council of Rome was a brilliant, and remarkably centralized, effort. But factors that Gregory 
could not control, particularly his inability to maintain a physical space in which the movement 
of people and letters was possible, sunk (quite literally) his Council and with it his efforts to 
blunt a powerful secular ruler. From Calixtus II to Gregory IX, the bishops of Rome gradually 
came to grips with the need to use the communicative tools available to them in a more 
systematic way, and to employ new tools where necessary. That development speaks volumes of 
the creative energies of one of the world’s longest continually operating institutions, even while 
it also highlights continued challenges that popes had to face when attempting to implement their 
will. 
 Taking these successes and failures into account, the papacy that emerges in the 
preceding pages is a more fragile institution than scholars have often painted for us. The analysis 
of papal communication strategies over the years 1050 to 1250 makes the papacy’s relentless 
drive towards centralization and institutional effectiveness look less relentless, and indeed much 
less successful in achieving those ends. This new conclusion comes about in large part due to a 
focus on process and implementation rather than policy outcomes alone. Too often, scholars of 
the Middle Ages and of the papacy have looked at the letters and decisions of the bishops of 
Rome and assumed that they were implemented as written. This study has attempted to correct 
that view by examining the means by which papal decisions did—and did not—come to fruition. 
As we have seen, bound up with this analysis are questions about communication media and 
strategies, which necessarily underpinned every pope’s efforts to make his will felt thrououghout 
Christendom. Although various bishops of Rome consistently innovated in the realm of 
communication, the overall effectiveness of the papacy in implementing policy continued to 
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suffer from inadequate means of overcoming serious communicative challenges. In many ways, 
then, this has been a story of an institution’s increasingly lofty goals and its inability to realize 
them fully. But that observation, of course, is perhaps as true now as it was eight centuries ago. 
As recently as April 21, 2016, Pope Francis—channeling the innovative communication efforts 
of his many predecessors—took to Twitter to inveigh against the dangers of climate change, a 
matter of global scale that the pope has consistently fought to address since assuming office in 
2013. “Climate change,” he said, “represents one of the principal challenges facing humanity 
today, and the response requires the solidarity of all.”5 The message reached more than nine 
million of the pope’s Twitter followers, but it was answered, it seems, by few.6 
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